I. S. IVANOV

Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

As I understand it, our discussion should ultimately be aimed at determining what Russia's interests are in the Iranian direction and what policy we should follow in this regard. But first, a few general comments.

I would avoid such phrases as" Shia superpower " when applied to Iran. The term superpower seems to me to apply only to the United States and China on a global level. Russia, of course, remains a nuclear superpower.

As for Iran, it can be considered as a regional power, based on the scale and potential capabilities of the country in the region. It is difficult for Iran to influence the development of the situation in the world. This is the first one.

The second one concerns Iran's nuclear program as such. Today, the nuclear program in Iran is a national idea, around which all political forces are united. I do not know of any serious politician in Iran, either oppositional or non-oppositional, who would speak out for curtailing the nuclear program. No one talks about nuclear weapons there for political reasons: neither government officials nor moderates.

We all know when the development of Iran's nuclear program began. If I am not mistaken, the question of creating nuclear weapons was never raised publicly under the Shah. They talked about the development of nuclear technologies and nuclear energy.

After the radical regime change, this program has been preserved as a political slogan that is being implemented. Therefore, in my opinion, Iran will not give up its nuclear program in any situation, whether it changes the regime or preserves it. This is a reality that we must take into account and look at things as they are, and not as someone might like. The task of the international community must be to ensure that this nuclear program does not develop into a military program. How to achieve this is the next question, on which I will express my point of view a little later.

As for the military action against Iran, if we talk about Israel, it is really conducting various military preparations. But these preparations are not limited to Iran. Israel is making military preparations because it lives in a hostile environment. How the situation will develop in Egypt, Syria or other countries in the region, Israel does not know, and it must be prepared for all possible options to ensure its security.

It seems to me that the rhetoric surrounding Iran's nuclear program in Israel has recently intensified, including in connection with the US election campaign. Both in Israel and in Jewish circles in the United States itself, there was concern that Barack Obama was beginning to drift somewhat towards flirting with the Islamic world. Therefore, during the election campaign, it was necessary to get firm assurances from all candidates - both Democrats and Republicans - that in any outcome of the election, the United States would stand by Israel and ensure its security. From my point of view, the Israelis have achieved this goal very successfully.

As for Iran, the rhetoric about the possible destruction of Israel is linked to specific political goals. I have met with the Iranians many times, and for several years I have held talks with representatives of the Iranian leadership, and I can say with confidence that no one has actually considered the use of force, let alone nuclear weapons, to destroy the Jewish State. Public statements in this regard are part of a campaign to establish Iran as a regional power and as the leader of the Islamic world. To do this, it is very convenient to use this slogan. Therefore, it is necessary to take all this into account, although the possibility of a military scenario cannot be completely excluded.

The speakers spoke about several scenarios for the development of events around Iran, including a military one. It seems to me that a military scenario is the least acceptable for Israel, since it is almost impossible to calculate the consequences.

The well-known Israeli air strikes on targets in Iraq and Syria cannot serve as a precedent.

As for Iran, there is not just one facility or experimental enterprises, but already a seriously developed infrastructure of the nuclear industry. I do not know if there are hidden military programs there, but the facilities that we know about are legitimate ones, most of them were visited by IAEA observers. Why should they be targeted by military strikes? Because just someone suggests that they can be used for military purposes?

Another question that either consciously or unconsciously is not brought up for discussion: that a nuclear-armed Pakistan is less dangerous than a potential (potential!)Iran. nuclear weapons? In Pakistan, the regime is more reactionary, more unstable, and supports radical movements. Bin Laden, after all, was not in Iran, but in Pakistan. However, the threat from Pakistan remains silent. Why? Because it is an ally of the United States. And the threat of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists in Pakistan is many times higher than in Iran. In Iran, the regime strictly ensures the security of its nuclear facilities. We all had the opportunity to see this. When India and Pakistan conducted the first nuclear explosions, many people said, as I remember very well, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be buried. Not buried. Moreover, Russia then actively cooperated with India in the development of various nuclear programs. You can say that India is the biggest democracy in the world, Israel is a democratic country, you can write off anything for democracy. But the fact remains that they have nuclear weapons.

I'm not saying this to ease concerns about Iran's nuclear program. But it is also impossible not to take these facts into account. Now we have shifted all the arrows for political reasons to Iran. Aren't there other threats? For me, for example, the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, especially in view of the upcoming withdrawal of American and NATO troops from Afghanistan, is a matter of particular concern. After all, where did nuclear technology come from? From Pakistan, from a Pakistani "great scholar", not from Iran. Therefore, when considering the Iranian nuclear issue, we must do so in the broader context of nonproliferation.

Now, as for Russia's position. I won't tell you the whole backstory. But we must not forget that we managed to reach an agreement with the Khatami government on a moratorium on nuclear development. Unfortunately, our policy was not developed at that time, primarily due to the unwillingness of the Western powers to cooperate with the current Iranian regime.

In our negotiations with Iran, we have never allowed even the thought of our consent to the appearance of nuclear weapons there. The question was how to draw a line that would allow the development of nuclear energy, but exclude military developments. Let me remind you that the 5+1 negotiating mechanism on Iran's nuclear program was our initiative. Previously, the European "troika" and Russia negotiated separately. We have managed to invite the United States and China to join the negotiation process. They convinced Iran of the need for this, convinced the Americans and the Chinese, which was quite difficult.

It seems to me that the negotiation process with Iran has not been sufficiently active recently. From my point of view, Russia could act more proactively. Activity within the "5+1" group has decreased. Iranian diplomacy, which is highly professional, did not fail to take advantage of this. And then there were Turkey and Brazil with their own initiatives, which began to blur the position of the"five". I believe that such initiatives only harm the common cause. I have spoken about this publicly both in Turkey and in other countries.

Therefore, I fully agree that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue requires unity within the 5+1 framework and, above all, among the permanent members of the Security Council. I think that the UN Security Council sanctions are also starting to work. This is a serious factor of pressure on the Iranian political circles, which forces them to make a certain compromise. I think we should take this chance. On the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen the activity of the " five plus one "in the framework of this negotiation process, and on the other-to use the sanctions regime.

I am deeply convinced that a qualitative change will come when direct negotiations between Iran and the United States begin. Iran is trying to achieve this. Washington does not rule out such a possibility, but now they cannot do it for domestic political reasons. None of the American politicians will speak with Ahmadinejad, although, as you know, unofficial contacts between Iran and the United States are maintained. But if after the elections in Iran there is a new figure who will be less odious, the situation may change.

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