D. A. NECHITAILO

Candidate of Political Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Arab spring, insurgency

Rapid changes in the states of the Arab world, and especially in North Africa, led to the fall of the regimes of A. Ben Ali (Tunisia), M. Gaddafi (Libya), H. Mubarak (Egypt), A. Saleh (Yemen) that had existed here for decades. The new conditions allowed moderate Islamists to achieve significant success in the political arena of this region.

At the same time, radical Islamist groups were completely unprepared for the "Arab Spring". The demands of the "street" were primarily democratic in nature and were far from the Salafists ' attitudes towards the creation of a universal caliphate.

In particular, the leaders of al-Qaeda did not make any statements about the events until the end of March 2011 and were slow to respond to the protests and political changes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Thus, Ayman al-Zawahiri in his address only warned Egyptians against adopting secular forms of government, which, according to him, are completely alien to the Muslim world.

The ideologues of Al-Qaeda have developed a strategy of action in various regions of the world. In those countries where it is difficult for Islamic radicals to strengthen their positions as a result of harsh measures taken by the authorities, they seek to implement their ideological line through local groups. Thus, focusing on the fight against the United States, Salafists are increasing their influence in the states allied to Washington, creating cells in them. During Osama bin Laden's leadership of al-Qaeda, the organization's strategic focus was on global jihad. At the same time, after Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, took over the head of the main structure, it became clear that he always harbored the idea of resuming the struggle for the overthrow of the ruling regime in Egypt.

EGYPT-THE PULSE OF THE ARAB WORLD

In general, according to the new leader of Al-Qaeda, the new stage of development of Salafism in the Middle East and, in particular, in Egypt, coincides with popular revolutions in the states of the region. A clear program and well-developed methods of the jihad movement will allow Salafists to make the most of the results of these mass demonstrations and regime change. The Mujahideen will also benefit from the close links between Al-Qaeda affiliates operating in a number of areas: the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula.

Political instability in Egypt, linked to the revolutionary events in that country, provided local radicals from Islam with an opportunity to step up their activities. In addition to the moderate Salafists represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, groups from among the guardians of the "letter of the Koran" - radical Islamists who share the ideology of Al-Qaeda-began to strengthen. At the same time, hundreds of members of the Al-Qaeda international terrorist network and other extremist groups have escaped from prisons in Egypt during mass protests since late January 2011. Among them were irreconcilable Islamists from the Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya organization, which posed a serious threat to the state, and refused to follow the decision of its leadership to stop the armed struggle against the government.1
Al-Zawahiri calls for support for the revolutions in Syria, Libya and Yemen, insisting that they will lead to the creation of Islamic states through an alliance of moderate Islamists and Salafists. According to him, some representatives of the new forces have focused on political action, while others rely on the Islamic call (da'awa). All of them emphasize the need for the establishment of an Islamic State based on Sharia law.2
According to him, the process of ideological rethinking will begin with Egypt and lead to the leadership of the Salafists. Al-Zawahiri's views on Arab protest movements and the role of Islamists and Mujahideen were outlined in a series of addresses - "A Message of Hope and a Guarantee for our people in Egypt".

The al-Qaeda leader notes that " the United States has retreated from supporting deposed leaders in Tunisia and Egypt," and warns that there are traitors who will not be able to help them.-

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dut seeks to manage revolutions in its own interests and push for "secular change"3. He believes that such demands will ultimately be rejected by the Egyptian people, since "the only possible one is that Sharia has been the demand of the majority of Egyptians since the death of H. al-Banna." 4
Al-Zawahiri also emphasizes that most of the demands of the revolutionaries are limited to social justice and economic reforms, which is clearly spelled out in many works of the ideologists of "pure Islam". Therefore, he recommends that the leaders of the" new wave "get acquainted with them and move from secular positions to" truly " Islamic ones. "Egypt must launch a popular campaign to restore the rights of its citizens, especially those from the impoverished strata of the population, and the main goal of this will be to eliminate social injustice, poverty and unemployment. Guarantees based on Islamic principles should consider social justice as one of their top priorities. The Prophet said: a believer is one who does not feel full, while his neighbor wants to eat next to him. " 5
Al-Zawahiri strongly warns Egyptian citizens against supporting the country's new leaders recognized by Washington. He insists on the need to prepare for the establishment of an Islamic State and the importance of forming alliances with other Islamic forces in revolutionary countries to prevent the establishment of a secular state.

After the famous events that took place in Egypt, A. al-Zawahiri published the book "Rehabilitation of the Kalam and Sword community from tiresome accusations of fatigue and weakness". In it, he writes that conditions in Egypt now provide a suitable basis for strengthening the position of Al-Qaeda, as the country's internal security forces have weakened, many supporters of "pure Islam" have been released from prison, and a significant number of supporters of "pure Islam" have returned to the country from other states after spending years in prison. exiled as a result of persecution by the Egyptian security services. Now, in the current circumstances, al-Zawahiri sees a great opportunity to resume jihad in Egypt after the radicals failed to cope with serious pressure from the Egyptian security forces in 1995.

According to Al-Qaeda ideologist A. Naji, the Mujahideen should avoid expensive operations with no obvious return effect. In particular, Egypt, considered by the radicals as the "pulse of the Arab world", is one of the most important for the radicals.

Al-Zawahiri called one of his works "At - Tariq ila al-Quds yamurru abra al-Kahira" (The road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo). This means that defeating the Egyptian regime is a higher priority than fighting Israel and the United States. However, during the Mubarak regime, it was very difficult for al-Qaeda to strengthen its position in the country.6 The authorities, relying on the special services, dealt harshly with the manifestations of fundamentalism. At the same time, extremist propaganda was not directed at the general public. Therefore, this organization could not become a driving force for the protest moods of the "Arab Spring".

The situation in Egypt is discussed in detail in the works of A. al-Zawahiri. Salafists have learned the lessons of the 1990s, when Egyptian jihadist groups were completely suppressed by the security services.

In the absence of sufficient police and government security forces in the Sinai Peninsula, Islamist radicals began to create radical Salafist organizations. One of them was Shabab al-Islam, which declared itself a branch of Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula. It calls for strict implementation of Sharia law, the annulment of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Sinai, and the launching of large-scale military operations against Tel Aviv on behalf of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

The group's document, distributed in the city of El-Arish, sets out a strict demand to stop exploiting the natural resources of Sinai, infringe on the rights of Bedouins, cancel Egypt's agreements with Israel and Egyptian military intervention in the Gaza Strip. Although the decision to create a new radical structure has not yet been officially supported by the main Al-Qaeda, it was quickly spread by the media structures of the world jihad movement.

Since the spring 2011 events, smuggling between the Gaza Strip and Egypt has increased, and cooperation between Gaza smugglers and Sinai Bedouins has strengthened. At the same time, the number of radical Islamist cells has increased.

Sinai-based extremists have repeatedly attempted to blow up a gas pipeline leading to Israel, and police stations in the regional capital of El-Arish have been attacked. What is happening has alarmed Cairo, which has lost control of the Sinai Peninsula.

Unlike the unarmed peaceful demonstrators who filled the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, the Sinai Bedouin tribes were heavily armed and had already clashed with the Egyptian authorities on several occasions. After numerous attacks on police stations, almost half of the local police personnel deserted.

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Al-Qaeda is less interested in Tunisia, with its powerful State apparatus and security forces. This state is considered by the radicals to carry out propaganda activities and raise funds, but not as a "priority direction of jihad".

SAUDI ARABIA TARGETED BY AL-QAEDA

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has little involvement in the recent demonstrations in the Shiite-populated Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. This organization, with its flamboyant anti-Iranian rhetoric, has failed to consolidate its influence by exploiting the growing protest potential in the Shiite part of the country.

Its focus on overthrowing the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia encourages this organization to become more familiar with the works of Al-Qaeda ideologues and, in accordance with them, follow in the wake of its installations. In addition, it has to operate in an environment with a high percentage of people who have received religious education, and participation in theological debates about the choice of methods and tactics to combat them requires a high level of training. As a result, being almost self-financed, AQAP is in the general ideological field of the parent structure.

The Arab Spring and the unstoppable youth-led revolutions that toppled the long-standing dictatorships of the Libyan, Egyptian, and Tunisian rulers have created problems for both the Saudi regime and the jihadists. Residents of the kingdom are concerned about the aggravation of the internal political situation in Bahrain and Yemen, as well as the activation of political movements in their own country. Jihadists, meanwhile, have begun to lose their traditional recruitment pool, as Arab youth movements provide an alternative to Salafist ideology.

The Saudi authorities have taken several steps to avert the threat on their borders, including deploying GCC troops* in Bahrain and supporting the Council's initiative to transfer power to President Saleh in Yemen. At the same time, in February 2011, King Abdullah announced on State television that he would allocate many billions of dollars for housing construction, increase spending on education and social needs, and create an additional 1,200 jobs.7
At the same time, the Saudi government cracked down on the opposition in the country. Hundreds of people in the kingdom "have been arrested and prominent reform advocates have been sentenced to long prison terms," according to a recent report by Amnesty International. These measures provoked increased discontent among Saudi youth and became a source of criticism of the Saudi government. Several demonstrations were held in Riyadh demanding the release of prisoners.

The Saudi capital also held several trials of 16 suspected terrorists (14 Saudi residents, a Yemeni and a Syrian belonging to the Istiraha cell), who were sentenced to a total of 228 years in prison.8
When asked why the Arab revolution did not reach the Gulf countries, and especially Saudi Arabia, the well-known ideologue of jihad, H. al-Bassaam, replied that "there is a protest movement in the country of two holy sites that supports the release of prisoners... It is important that these performances continue." At the same time, he notes two reasons for the absence of a mass movement in opposition to the ruling regime: first, it is a powerful apparatus of the security services, which strictly suppresses any call for revolution; and second, it is the official religious clergy, which is entrusted with the religious information space by the ruling regime.

While the Arab Spring presents new challenges for both jihadists and the Saudi state, residents of the kingdom are more interested in preventing internal dissent inspired by youth movements, while jihadists are losing opportunities to recruit new supporters. It is unlikely that al-Qaeda will succeed in mobilizing young Saudis for political demonstrations, as they are already protesting. It is therefore more likely that they will continue to rely on Yemen as a launching pad for jihadist expansion into Saudi territory.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has demonstrated flexibility and adaptability to the situation in the region, overcoming the personnel crisis that occurred as a result of attacks on it by Saudi and Yemeni special services.

Over the past two years, it has become a serious threat to the United States, developing a new strategy for attacking this country.

In January 2009, Al-Qaeda's branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen merged after the defeat of its cells in the kingdom. Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were directly involved. The head of the Yemen branch, who had close ties to bin Laden, Nasir al-Wahaishi, was chosen as the group's emir, and Saeed al-Shihri, a Saudi, became his deputy. Both leaders shared similar biographies: Wahaishi escaped from Sanaa prison in February 2006, while Shihri was released from Guantanamo Bay in December 2007.9 Together, they quickly rebuilt the radical structure, taking into account the experience of al-Qaeda affiliates in a number of countries, including the North Caucasus, by doing so. It is necessary to rely on strengthening ties with followers of traditional Islam and enlisting the support of local tribal elders who are negatively inclined towards the ruling regime. At the same time, they actively recruited volunteers to join their ranks. So, they were joined by a specialist in the manufacture of explosive devices, Saudi Ibrahim al-Asiri. He created the bomb used in the failed suicide attempt on Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in August 2009.

* GCC-Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.

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Perhaps the most important success of AQAP in recent years has been achieved in the ideological sphere. While al-Qaeda's parent organization was caught off guard by the Arab Spring, AQAP filled the propaganda vacuum. While openly acknowledging that Al-Qaeda is not leading the "revolutionary tsunami" taking place in the Arab world, the organization's leaders noted that the fall of traditional Salafist enemies such as Mubarak, Gaddafi and Saleh was a positive development for global jihad. In a situation of powerlessness and internal political instability, radical Islamists intensified their propaganda work, attracting new supporters to their ranks, and stepped up the transfer of weapons and militants.

YEMEN IS A TERRORIST PARADISE

The chaos that Yemen is rapidly plunging into and the weakening of the central government, especially in the periphery, open up prospects for radical Islamists. This country for the terrorist Islamist organization "Al-Qaeda" was and remains a strategically important point, from where it is relatively easy to transfer fighters to participate in combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Africa and East Asia.

The current strategy of al-Qaeda in Yemen is limited to aggressive propaganda campaigns combined with demonstrative terrorist actions. Al-Qaeda's main targets are Western tourist groups, army checkpoints, oil production facilities, Western embassies, and residential complexes for foreigners. It is in these ways that the Islamists seek to further weaken the position of the official authorities.

The deepening political crisis in Yemen and the serious weakening of the State's positions in Abyan, Lahej, and Shabwa provide AQAP and its affiliated groups with additional opportunities to plan and conduct operations, as well as recruit fighters.

Unemployment in Yemen exceeds 40% and continues to grow. Increased instability has led to higher food prices; a severe currency shortage and the devaluation of the Yemeni rial are increasingly affecting the domestic political situation in the country. These factors increase the susceptibility of young people to radical ideologies.10
Al-Qaeda, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, has never focused on developing socio-economic programs. However, AQAP may well strengthen its influence by adopting the experience of the "brothers" by providing local residents with attractive projects to improve the socio-economic situation, medical services and security, and appointing its representatives to the authorities in the localities under its control.

At the regional level, the weakening of State power and border controls provide additional advantages for AQAP's cooperation with groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia. The media has repeatedly reported that these organizations are actively establishing cooperation, taking advantage of the poorly protected coastline on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, as well as the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Somali extremists send militants and weapons through well-established channels. Moreover, after the beginning of the active phase of anti-government protests in Yemen, there was a tendency to strengthen this interaction. Yemen has long been known as a regional black market for weapons. Moreover, this reputation has been preserved for about 200 years. This is largely due to its convenient geographical location.

Such an aggravation of the situation in Yemen can provoke a deterioration of the situation in neighboring states.

Unable to lead mass anti-regime protests in the country, Al-Qaeda is taking advantage of the instability to pursue its tactical objectives in the region.

In Yemen, Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have stepped up their activities. At the same time, they pay great attention to propaganda in order to attract as many followers as possible under their banners. Even before the unrest in Sana'a, the Yemeni regime failed to take control of the situation in the country. In most districts, the socio-economic situation remains difficult, and the state is not able to provide security. Local tribal entities assume the functions of central authorities.

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Under these circumstances, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula gained relative freedom of action. For example, on May 29, 2011, more than 200 AQAP members seized the town of Zanjibar in Abyan province in South Yemen. A little earlier, militants attacked a military factory in the city of Jaar.

As the country descends into anarchy, Islamists have strengthened their positions in five provinces of central and eastern Yemen, located along the border between the north and south of the country and stretching from the northern border with Saudi Arabia to the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, these regions are important for the country both in economic and political terms. In particular, Marib is home to one of the three main oil fields, as well as a number of historical monuments that are regularly visited by tourists. In this province, a gas pipeline begins transporting gas to the port of Al-Salif. The Salafis have established close cooperation with the two largest tribes, Murab and Avida .11
Shabwa, like Marib, has a number of oil and gas fields and pipelines leading south to the ports of Bir Ali and Balhaf. Shabwa is the birthplace of A. al-Awlaki , one of the leading ideologists of modern radical Islamism. Gradually, control over the situation here passes to the al-Awlyaki and ad-Diyab clans. In this regard, using dissatisfaction with the central government and the high level of religiosity of the local society, Salafis position themselves as those who reflect the interests of true Muslims. At the same time, the radicals implement their line without invading the traditional way of life of these clans. This allows them to enlist the support of the elders.

Hadhramaut is also home to a number of oil fields and pipelines to the port of Al-Shihr 12. Khadramaut has the longest border with Saudi Arabia and, together with Al-Jawf, acts as a key route for the penetration of AQAP militants, as well as weapons and financial resources from Yemen to Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda seeks refuge and relative freedom of action here through its fighters, who belong to the most influential tribal confederations of Attamim and al-Kinda in Hadramaut.

Yemen's al-Jawf province is also part of AQAP's area of interest. It borders on Saudi Arabia. From here, supporters of "pure Islam" are transferred to conduct combat operations against Shiite Zaidi separatists from the province of Saada. In this region, the extremists also seek to enlist the support of the local Hussein and Bakil tribes .13
In Abyan province, al-Qaeda militants are gradually shifting their focus of activity to rural areas, setting up military training camps there. At the same time, militants are moving weapons across the Arabian Sea. At the same time, the loyal attitude of the al-Yafi and al-Fadli tribes, the most influential in this province, became a guarantee of the stability of the Islamists ' positions in this area.

Paramilitary formations of local clans are a serious force. Islamists are actively recruiting young people whose living conditions force them to study military affairs from childhood, thanks to which radical Islamist groups receive already well-trained fighters. AQAP occupied the town of Rohda in southern Yemen in early September 2011 after prolonged fighting with government forces. The radicals ' main goal is to take control of the port city of Belhaf and the complex for processing and liquefying natural gas (coming here from the Marib field, located 320 km to the north), owned by the French company Total and the American Hunt Oil. This settlement is the fourth after Sharq, Azzan and Zanjibar captured by AQAP in Southern Yemen.

At the same time, the leadership of AQAP understands that in Yemen, with its clan-tribal structure, supporters of "pure Islam" will not be able to come to power. Moreover, AQAP's main interests are in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Yemen, for the most part, is a base for expansion in the territory of the Saudi Kingdom. And the virtually uncontrolled borders of this country open up favorable prospects for AQAP to regroup its forces, focusing on striking targets in the states of the region.

(The ending follows)

1 Sharif S. Tarshid al-amal al-jihad fi misr wa al-alam - www.ansar-net.ws/vb/showthread.php?t= 17381

2 Zawahiri A. Massive of Hope and Joy to our People in Egypt (statements 1 - 5). 2011 -www.jihadology.net.

3 Zawahiri A. A Treatise Exonerating the Community of the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness. 2011 - http://hrw.org/arabic/ docs/2011

4 Ibidem.

5 Ibid.

6 Zawahiri A. At-Tariq idya al-quds yamurru abra al-kahira. 2011 - www.ansar-net.ws/vb/showthread.php?t-14593

7Jones T. Saudi Arabia Moves to Maintain Regime Stability // Policy Watch, April 1, 2011.

8 Ibidem.

9 Hegghammer T. Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia // International Affairs. 2008. Vol. 4, p. 707.

10 Sharjabi A. Al-Qasir al-diwan: ad-dawr al-siyasi li-l kabilah fi al-Yaman. Sana, 2010, pp. 43-44.

11 Green D. The al-Qaeda Crescent in Yemen // Policy Watch. June 22, 2011.

12 Henderson S.Yemen in Transition: The Dangers of Continuing Instability and al-Qaeda // Policy Alert, June 6, 2011.

13 Green D. Op. cit.

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