Igor MAXIMYCHEV

Chief Researcher Institute of Europe

Russian Academy of Sciences Ph. D (Politics)

Whenever there is reference to the current crisis in Western Europe, one can often hear Russian people say, "I wish we could swap our problems for theirs!". This kind of reaction may seem justified, because not a single West European country might be able to withstand, for just a year, the situation Russia is currently going through (which does not necessarily speak in favor of Russia). However, the crisis in West Europe is an absolutely real thing, arousing local concerns that are comparable in intensity to ours, for all the differences existing between us and West Europeans. The German Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's decision to hold an early parliamentary election (at the time when

The article had been written prior to the German parliamentary elections of September 18, 2005.

стр. 115

he and other cabinet members could easily keep their government seats for another year), was one of manifestations of the German crisis. The political ways that have become typical of Russia hamper correct appraisal of the significance of this decision - in this country, resignation of office is not a customary thing, even when people are insistently demanding it. As for FRG, there were no resignation demands as such, though the government's popularity was quite obviously declining. The results of public opinion polls, pointing to a probable defeat of the Chancellor's party in early elections, had been known long before, so one should not believe that Schroder "miscalculated" or "overestimated his chances". So what was it all about?

Essence of German crisis

German economy has been passing through hard times since long ago. Its growth rates are close to zero, with unemployment constantly growing. The country's current 10% jobless rate among the economically active population is too much. The existing system of social support for temporarily or permanently unemployed people, just as the FRG's pension system, were elaborated at the time when efficient concern for citizens became a prerequisite of West Germany's victory in its confrontation with GDR's centrally planned economy. The downfall of "real socialism" gave an impulse to dismantling of "capitalism with a real face". The situation is being further aggravated by the demographic disproportion, the numbers of pension-age people growing along with reduction in the number of those employed in productive labor. The inflow of refugees, primarily from Moslem states, is overloading the

стр. 116

welfare services - besides, it arouses concerns about a "clash of civilizations".

Symptoms of the imminent economic crisis had been clearly discernible even on the eve of Germany's reunification. However, the crisis was put off thanks to GDR's inclusion in FRG's economic space and the harsh privatization procedures (which later served as a model for privatization in Russia - Anatoly Chubais visited Berlin in 1992 to study the tenacious grip of German government agencies). Yet even after the effect of the dismantling of East German economy had dissipated, the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), who had promised the Germans "blossoming landscapes" all over the country following its reunification, did not have the heart to try and ward off the pending crisis by taking measures recommended by economic authorities - in particular, the "social market economy" concept put forward by Ludwig Erhard (CDU), which would involve a substantial reduction of the social element. Under Kohl, the "new lands", as the former GDR territory was now called, turned into a sort of "black hole", devouring, with no visible benefit, billions of taxpayers' money (taxes and other obligatory payments account for almost half of average Bundesbuerger profits). The victory of Social Democrats in the 1998 election, which resulted in SchЦrder's succeeding Kohl as Federal Chancellor, was to a large extent due to SPD's promises to put an end to the growing unemployment and do away with the economic stagnation.

However, it is one thing to make a promise and quite another to live up to it. In the first place, Schroder had to choose among different concepts of fighting the crisis - the one put forward by liberal economists (doing it at the expense of welfare programs), or

стр. 117

the proposal backed by Left Social Democrats and their highly influential leader, Oskar Lafontaine (who insisted that it should be done at the expense of wealthier social groups). Schroeder chose the former as the most practicable, which resulted in his breach with Lafontaine, who was at the time the number two figure in the SPD. Lafontaine quit the party and dropped out of political life until recently. His dismal prophecy, however, came true, and Schroder's attempt to start curtailing people's social benefits resulted in a precipitous decline of public support for SPD.

The entire history of German Social Democracy dating back nearly a century and a half has always been a history of endorsing the interests of the "small man". Yet when the "small man" saw that SPD was prepared to sacrifice his interests for some attractive yet far-away goals, they withdrew their support for the party. As a result, Social Democrats started steadily losing federal state parliamentary elections. After the latest (May 2005) SPD's defeat in North Rhine - Westphalia, the most populous German federal state that had been ruled by Social Democrats for the previous 39 years, the CDU/CSU coalition got a two-thirds majority in the federal upper house, Bundesrat, thus allowing it to block all legislation passed by the lower house, the Bundestag. It is following this defeat that Schroder decided he could not go on without having the electorate immediately confirm their support for the government's economic policy.

As a matter of fact, the ruling SPD/Green coalition could be expected to lose the regular parliamentary elections as early as in 2002. By the time, the electorate's discontent with the Social Democratic government's policies had already reached dangerous proportions. The situation then, however, was influenced by

стр. 118

several emergency developments. First of all, the Federal Chancellor demonstrated confidence and efficiency in supervising over the emergency relief operation following a disastrous flooding in the upper reaches of the Elba River - in particular, in the area of Dresden. Another development speaking in favor of Schroder was his clear and unequivocal refusal to participate in the impending US invasion in Iraq unless it is sanctioned by the UN Security Council. There was also a third factor, though it is not quite clear how much it affected the election returns - the CDU/CSU coalition nominated the CSU leader, Bavarian minister-president Edmund Stoiber, as its candidate for the Federal Chancellor post - yet the overly independent-minded Bavarians are not liked too much outside this largest German state.

Characteristically, all the above factors were of a marked internal nature - even the Iraqi one, because voters who remember well the Second World War immediately realized what sending troops to Iraq might mean for German young people of draft age. By the way, FRG became the only country whose population, by participating in the Bundestag elections, cast votes to demonstrate their attitude to the Iraqi war. At the same time, even though post factum, the majority of Germans also expressed their opposition to the German "Luftwaffe"'s participation in NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.

Schroder's decision to hold an early parliamentary election shows that he recognized the danger of his party's "playing into other people's hands" by reforming the social sphere in a way that would benefit big business. The Social Democratic leader found what might be the only possible way out of the situation. His reckoning may be as follows - if the electorate backs the "Red-

стр. 119

Green" coalition once again, the Social Democrats are going to get another four-year term of undisturbed rule, always being able to say their economic policy was supported by the majority vote; if not, the SPD will revert to its traditional protection of the interests of the "small man", shifting on the CDU/CSU all responsibility for the consequences of the previous government's politics.

As a matter of fact, the criticism of the "Red-Green" coalition's politics by its opponents had to do with the scope and tempo of the planned reforms, rather than their essence. Nevertheless, public seemed to believe it is the government that is to blame for the dismantling of the social security system, whereas the CDU/CSU bears no responsibility at all. The Social Democrats would most likely suffer a crushing defeat in the regular election scheduled for 2006. What is more, the magnitude of this defeat might be catastrophic, posing a threat to the very existence of the SPD as a mass national party. At the same time, the early election preserved for the Social Democrats a real chance to win the election of 2009 even if they lost it in 2005 - SPD leaders believe that the rule of the CDU/CSU with its even tougher methods of curtailing social rights is inevitably going to result in a sharp disillusionment of the electorate.

New all-German political force

Schroder's decision to start dismantling of the social support system actually played into the hands of the CDU/CSU and FDP (Free Democratic Party), because the SPD undertook the "dirty task" of conducting the economic reforms, though it was actually something the opposition called for, in the first place. This action on the part of the Social Democratic government upset the entire

стр. 120

internal alignment of political forces in Germany. When the two most influential political parties put forward similar programs, the electorate always finds it hard to determine its preferences. In this situation, it is usually minor details that become decisive, being able to influence the outcome of elections in the very nick of time.

The necessarily brief election campaign in Germany was characterized, in the first place, by an evidently much higher electoral support for the CDU/CSU, compared with the SPD. This is only natural - the government policy, being rejected by the population, resulted in a growing popularity of the Christian Democrats by virtue of the elementary propagandistic set-off of the party programs alone. Secondly, the Free Democrats, another opposition force, also had their rating somewhat raised, which may let them overcome the 5% barrier. Thirdly, the "Greens", the SPD's junior coalition partner, largely managed to shun responsibility for the government's most unpopular measures, thus having their electoral support preserved and even strengthened. Fourthly, the Left Party emerged as a new national political force, rapidly strengthening its positions - it put forward a really alternative program for going out of the crisis, similar to concepts of the Left Social Democrats.

The Left Party's phenomenon deserves a closer consideration. The Party of Democratic Socialism, which emerged in the final period of GDR's existence out of the ruins of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, has remained until lately an essentially regional party in the "new lands". It became a notable political force here, participating in the governments of such important federal states as Berlin and Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania. It, however, has failed to solidify its positions in Western Germany. Even though it

стр. 121

had a certain Leftist potential, all efforts to unify it ended in failure. Even today, West Germans show a rather condescending attitude to their Eastern compatriots. Nevertheless, in late 2004, the "old lands" saw emergence of the "Electoral initiative for labor and social justice", aiming to mobilize the West German Left for participation in state and federal elections. A distinctive feature of the new political grouping was its preparedness to cooperate with the PDS. When the prospects for a merger of the two left political groups became a reality, political heavy-weights joined in, too. Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi gave their consent to head the Left Party's federal electoral list.

Lafontaine does not require any special credentials. His service record includes holding the post of Saarland Prime Minister for many years, the 1990 nomination for Federal Chancellor as the SPD candidate, and, finally, the SPD chairmanship prior to and during the first government of Gerhard Schroder. Gregor Gysi is almost as well known in Germany - being an attorney in East Berlin, in 1989 - 1990 he led the rebellion of the reformist wing in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and managed to recreate a hardy and combat-effective party from the debris of the GDR's "leading and guiding force" - the only party in the FRG that preserved the reference to "socialism" in its program. Of late, Gysi has been ill, has undergone several surgeries and was considered a "political pensioner". However, his very first public addresses demonstrated that he had preserved his brilliant oratorical gift and the ability to carry the audience with him. The participation of the two well-known leaders of the German Left movement as lead candidates of the unified Left Party has added significant novel elements to the alignment of political forces in Germany.

стр. 122

In mid-summer, regular public opinion polls presented it as follows. The initial lead of the CDU/CSU had been somewhat reduced, yet it remained the most popular political force. In July, 42% of the polled were going to vote for them, with 28% supporting the SPD, while another 8% backed the "Greens" and 7%, the Free Democratic Party. The polls predicted a 12% electoral support for the Left Party, which means that the opposition alliance of the CDU/CSU and FDP was going to get a relative majority of 1% (49% against the total 48% of the SPD, "Greens" and Left Party). In other words, the opposition's lead, so to say, is well within statistical error. In the "new lands" (the former GDR), the CDU/CSU faced an absolutely deplorable situation. The polls predicted them only a 27% electoral support (equal to that of the SPD), while the FDP got 5%, the "Greens", 4%, and the Left Party, as much as 32%. It is clear that subsequent polls were going to show some changes - however, these figures presented a sufficiently complete picture of political preferences of the main electoral groups.

In summer, attempts were undertaken to find a way out of the situation. A wide-scale campaign was launched in favor of setting up a "large coalition" of the CDU/CSU and SPD, which, however, from the propagandistic perspective, would be the most unfavorable decision for the Social Democrats - they would still bear responsibility for the unpopular measures, and the process of erosion of the party's mass base would continue. It is only logical that Schroder refused to participate in a "large coalition" government. At the same time, he also refused to participate in a government based on a "Red-Red-Green" majority in the future Bundestag (i. e. with the Left Party's participation), in the event that

стр. 123

the elections result in such a majority. This dual refusal produced an impression that Schroder had decided to end his political career, because restoration of the "Red-Green" majority (SPD and the "Greens") is hardly likely. With no backing from the Left Party, the SPD is doomed to stay in opposition. This role may suit Schroder. It may also be possible that the Social Democrats will need a new leader.

Should one be afraid of Angela Merkel?

The electoral preferences of German voters are mainly influenced by domestic rather than external political problems (of the latter, Germany's claim to a UN Security Council permanent member's status is the most significant). Germans are also concerned about the prospects for Turkey's accession to the European Union - the problem that also has strong internal political overtones for Germany. The Schroder government's support for Turkey's accession to the EU appeared to be one of its most unpopular acts. Germans are wary about the already large Turkish community, whose members primarily live in isolated urban districts - sort of Turkish ghettos. Germans have good reason to believe that Turkey's potential membership in the EU will result in a further inflow of Turks into Germany, whereas "the boat is already overcrowded". The London explosions of July 2005 only helped to exacerbate the negative attitude of most Germans to Turkey's EU membership. The words of CDU leader Angela Merkel, who from the outset called for "close relations" with Turkey that should not, however, lead to its admission to the EU, won her a lot of sympathies within the country, yet at the same time created certain problems outside. The European Union is already negotiating

стр. 124

Turkey's accession to the EU with the Turkish authorities, and it may be hard for Berlin to defend its "special" posture on this subject. At the same time, according to pre-election public opinion polls, most Germans are convinced that Schroder can defend Germany's interests better than Merkel. If the Federal Chancellor were elected directly, 45% of the polled would vote for Schroder, while only 41% would support Merkel. However, over 60% believe it is time to change the ruling coalition.

The CDU/CSU undoubtedly loses some electoral support by opposing the UN Security Council reform concept put forward by Germany, Japan, India and Brazil (the essence of the concept is conferring the status of Security Council's permanent members to these four states, even if they may not initially have the veto right). The CDU/CSU's proposal that this status should, instead, be conferred to the European Union (i. e. the Eurocommission) as a collective representative of all the EU members does not receive any serious support from German public, especially after the fiasco of the Euroconstitution project, which raised the question of revising the functions and authorities of the "Brussels octopus". "Eurosceptic" attitudes proliferate in Germany, largely supplanting the "Euroenthusiasm" of past decades. If Germany had held a Euroconstitution referendum (instead of having the Bundestag approve it), its outcome would not have been much different from the results of voting in France and the Netherlands.

Neither is German public enthusiastic about Merkel's calls for a closer cooperation with the US - in particular, in what regards the US war in Iraq. The rather strong "Iraqi syndrome" existing in Germany works against the CDU/CSU. The fact that the Christian Democratic program has absolutely no reference to Iraq allows its

стр. 125

opponents to fiercely attack the CDU/CSU's positions, accusing it of an intention to involve Germany in the Iraqi venture at any cost. It should be noted that Merkel withstood the temptation of attacking the French-German-Russian trio that has earned an international reputation. The "trio" was not and could not be an anti-US scheme - its sole goal was to try and restore the UN's role of the highest instance in settling international disputes and matters of coexistence between states. It is true that the "trio"'s diplomatic successes helped drawing international attention to Germany's posture. Besides, it should be remembered that the "trio" emerged under Chancellor Kohl, especially as Merkel considers herself his political "granddaughter".

One can often hear people wondering whether or not Angela Merkel's coming to power may result in deterioration of German-Russian relations. It is unlikely, even though one cannot rule out problems in the initial period. The main fields of cooperation can hardly be affected, as Germany needs Russia no less (or maybe even more) than Russia needs Germany. CDU "experts" hint that the close direct links between the leaders of our states may not be preserved. One should note, however, that these links have taken different forms. Kohl and Yeltsin, for instance, used to go to the baths together, yet Schroder and Putin did not. But could one regard it as an indication of worsening relations between the two states? One can think of absolutely different forms of communication, ensuring confidentiality and efficiency of top-level contacts. In the long run, it is not personal relationships that lead to friendly relations between states - instead, it is neighborly relations between states - in the first place, in the economic sphere, - that form the basis for personal contacts between their leaders.

стр. 126

In Russia, Angela Merkel enjoys the reputation of a serious politician, acquainted with Russian history and culture. Therefore, one should give a negative answer to the question, "Are Russians afraid of Angela Merkel's coming to power?".

* * *

In contrast to the US and some other states that pretend to global influence and the right to dictate their terms to others, Russia has always refrained from proclaiming its preferences as to the outcome of elections abroad. The Russian people a priori show respect for whatever decision the German electorate will take, and accept their sovereign choice. They are prepared for cooperation with the new German government to be formed as a result of these elections, as they are a priori sure there is no contradiction between national interests of our countries. Our sole wish is that Germany would stay in the international arena as a stable and predictable political force, not subject to internal crises or upheavals, because Germany plays too important a role in both Europe and around the world.

Постоянный адрес данной публикации: