Libmonster ID: RU-18949
Автор(ы) публикации: A. M. VASILIEV →

A. M. VASILIEV

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences

1. What tasks did the leadership of the regime established in Iran after the anti-Shah Islamic revolution set for itself?

The regime's elite - the top theologians (some of whom have become "oligarchs" in terms of their wealth), the top bureaucrats and law enforcement agencies, and entrepreneurs-bazaars - are usually distinguished by a clan or patronage-clientelist structure. Its strategic objectives (in addition to those declared within the framework of religious doctrine) are to retain power and privileges, increase wealth, maintain its control over the country's hydrocarbon and mining resources, ensure its economic development and stability, satisfy at least some of the aspirations of the masses, and protect the country and, accordingly, its own positions from external pressure or military threats. expand the area of Iran's influence on its neighbors, especially where there is a Shiite component of the population.

2. The "Shiite democracy" regime has shown that it can produce, albeit temporarily, positive economic results.

Within a few decades, Iran has become a medium-developed country: it has reached the second ten in the world hierarchy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) - approximately at the level of Turkey. According to the International Monetary Fund, nominal (in current prices) Iran's GDP in 2011 was approximately $482 billion, compared to $990 billion at PPP.2 You can mention the production of cars, steel, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, rocket technologies (in particular, the launch of artificial Earth satellites). Nuclear research also requires a fairly high technological level.

Iran's exports are based on hydrocarbons, primarily oil. Iran has the second largest gas fields in the world, very large oil fields, but for political reasons these figures are often exaggerated. At the same time, "non-carbon" exports are growing.

In Iran, progress has been made in literacy and Internet use (almost half of the population). The figures are not far from the level of, say, Germany and are almost twice as high as in Russia. Of course, there are certain filters and restrictions on the Internet, but they can be circumvented. Iranians live in a society without an iron curtain. Men who have served in the army have the right to obtain a foreign passport. Many travel freely to Southeast Asia and even Canada.

The stability of the regime is based on a religious and propaganda basis, a flexible combination of clan interests and social measures, including assistance to the poor, in order to deflect a possible wave of discontent. But the regime's base is made up of power structures that compete with each other: the military-political and economic organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the armed Forces, the Ministry of Information and state Security, as well as the local Iranian Komsomol - the Basij youth organization, a massive recruitment reserve for all "adult" organizations.

Both the war with Iraq and the confrontation with the US have strengthened the regime.

Of course, Iran has been negatively affected by sanctions and restrictions before. Now, when more and more new sanctions are consistently imposed by the United States and Western Europe, the blow falls on sensitive points. Some EU members and other countries have imposed restrictions on the import of Iranian oil and a ban on cooperation with the Iranian Central Bank and other financial institutions. Sanctions are starting to bite, prices are rising in Iran, and the rial is being devalued.

It can be assumed that those countries that continue to import Iranian oil and gas, taking advantage of Iran's difficulties, will demand that it reduce prices for Iranian raw materials. This is how China, Turkey, and others will act. Replacing Iranian oil with another one on world markets is difficult, but possible.

What are the weaknesses of the Iranian regime?

The economic system, which is 70% state-owned and largely supported by huge subsidies, is becoming increasingly corrupt and less efficient.

It can be assumed that the educated population of large cities, the middle class that has access to the Internet, and its natives who have visited abroad are already tired of the" specific " behavior of representatives of the media-

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there is no regime and we would like to see changes. Moreover, as a result of sanctions, there may be a real deterioration in the situation of both the masses and industrial and commercial bazaars. However, their effect will be delayed.

Given the accelerating pace of change in the world and the increasing and often unpredictable impact of information technology, it is not necessary to speak with complete confidence about the strength of the regime. But the forces that make up it will not leave without a fight, without resistance. The Gorbachev option is hardly possible in Iran.

It should also be borne in mind that Iranians have a deep sense of the danger of spilling out nationalist and separatist sentiments. After all, Persians make up less than two-thirds of the population of Iran (about 75 million) - 61%, and Azerbaijanis-more than 16%, Kurds-10%, Lurs-6%, there are also Arabs, Turkmens, Baluchis (all 2%), etc. 3

However, under the current regime, it is difficult to assume the triumph of separatist sentiments. Shiite staples are still strong. Recall that Ali Khamenei's Rahbar (supreme leader) is an Azerbaijani. The attempt to create the Republic of Azerbaijan during the Soviet occupation ended in failure. But separatist sentiments have not died out. This, in particular, is what both Western and Israeli opponents of the regime are betting on.

3. What is the reason for the long-standing US confrontation with the Islamic Shiite regime?

It seems that the US goals in the region are to preserve economic (unhindered flow of hydrocarbons), trade, economic and geostrategic positions, and ensure Israel's security.

Washington is aware that direct control, the creation of a network of obvious American satellites, is already difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the new conditions. Therefore, the task is to establish relations with local new or previously preserved regimes based on the partnership of senior and junior, to ensure the development of the region's countries along liberal-democratic patterns that are more convenient for the United States and the West, and to reduce the military-political and, accordingly, economic burden on the United States itself. These tasks were set both for the Greater Middle East plan and for the slightly modified New Middle East plan, which was discussed in President Barack Obama's conciliatory speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in June 2009.

The Soviet Union is no longer standing in the way of implementing these plans. Russia has ceased to be a major, or at least a defining, regional player. But the implementation of these plans is opposed by Iran, which after the anti-Shah revolution turned from a junior ally-semi-satellite-into a hostile state, got out of Washington's military and political control, deprived the United States and the West as a whole of direct or indirect control over its natural resources, and created problems for the United States along the entire perimeter of its borders.

4. However, Iran-US relations are not so straightforward.

The Iranian leadership, after a period of anti-American emotional mood, tried to get out of the confrontation with Washington, especially during the years of the "reformers" led by President M. Khatami, and was ready to make concessions and cooperate to some extent with the United States. Tehran helped Washington in the war against Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Kabul was taken by the Northern Alliance, which was supported by Iran and Russia). Of course, the collapse of these regimes also served Iran's interests.

But even then, as now, it was necessary to convince Tehran of the US rejection of the plans hatched, according to the Iranians, to overthrow the existing regime in Iran and, accordingly, to undermine the positions of the Iranian business, political and religious elite, and to make at least a symbolic reduction in the US military presence in the Persian Gulf zone. But Washington could not meet Tehran halfway, as it seems, primarily because of distrust of it and its own internal political considerations. In America, memories of the anti-Shah and anti-American revolution, the humiliation of the United States, and the taking of hostages in the American embassy were still alive. The moment was lost.

As a result of both external and internal circumstances, the balance of power in Iran has shifted in favor of extreme conservatives. In domestic politics, the religious establishment began to fear that Khatami's supporters would "follow the path of Gorbachev." In foreign policy, flirting with Washington did not work. M. Ahmadinejad became President in 2005. True, being a secular figure, he tried to distance himself a little from extreme religious figures, once again appeal to Iranian nationalism, and actively solved the social problems of the lower classes.

But a certain provincialism of this strong leader affected. His harsh anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist rhetoric, as well as his attacks on the United States, made him an unacceptable partner for dialogue with Washington, and gave arguments to Israeli propaganda and American "hawks". Apparently, at the next election, he will be replaced by a moderate conservative.

5. If we talk about real, rather than irrational and emotional factors, the opportunities for cooperation between Iran and the United States both in the economy and in establishing peace, security and stability in the region objectively exist.

Iran's fight against terrorism based in Pakistan and drug trafficking, which is not coordinated with the United States and ignored by the international community, is still ongoing. Hundreds, or even thousands, of Iranian military and police personnel are killed in this undisguised war every year.

As for normal economic cooperation, it doesn't really matter who controls the hydrocarbon resources. Iran can't drink its oil. Suffice it to recall that there is a broad-based US-Saudi cooperation, although almost all oil production and exports in Saudi Arabia are controlled by ARAMCO, in which 100% of the capital belongs to the kingdom.

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In addition, due to the use of advanced oil production technologies and the discovery of new fields in the Western Hemisphere (Brazil, Canada, etc.), the United States reduced the share of imports in the consumption of this fuel from 60% in 2005 to 45% in 2011, while the share of oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf itself decreased to 22%.4.

6. Now the main contradiction is Iran's nuclear program.

Its implementation can be divided into several stages. Nuclear research began to develop under the Shah. He planned the construction of several nuclear power plants, and sometimes talked about his desire to acquire nuclear weapons. After the anti-Shah revolution, the fatwa of Ayatollah R. Khomeini (however, its text was not found) declared that atomic weapons are un - Islamic and it is a crime to use them. (Khamenei confirmed these statements) At that time, everything that the Shah was fond of was abandoned, and nuclear research was also frozen. It took years for the Bushehr nuclear power plant to be restored and restored to working order with Russia's help.

However, during the nearly eight-year war with Iraq, the Iranians faced the use of weapons of mass destruction-toxic gases-by Saddam Hussein's regime. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Iranian military personnel have been poisoned by them.

Later, an active propaganda campaign was launched in the West, claiming that Iraq was engaged in the development of nuclear weapons. Then the Iranian leadership reconsidered its position (although it still denies it) and began to give nuclear research a military character. Therefore, in a sense, it can be argued that Saddam Hussein became the "father" of Iran's nuclear research in the military field.

When Saddam Hussein was defeated in 2003 and it was discovered that no military-grade nuclear research had been conducted in Iraq, it was an incentive to suspend military nuclear research in Iran. It is possible that another factor also played a role - the fear of a possible strike from the United States if Washington believes that Iran is preparing to develop nuclear weapons. It was then that Tehran (under President Khatami) signed the additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which includes a provision on sudden inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the Iranian Parliament has not yet ratified this document.

According to White House officials, who rely on data from the US intelligence community, the political decision to produce an atomic bomb in Iran has allegedly not yet been made.5 From my point of view, the Iranian leadership, in principle, of course, would not object to having nuclear weapons, like North Korea, for example. But, first of all, it is fraught with a certain danger of a preemptive strike. Second, Iran understands that its acquisition of nuclear weapons will trigger a chain reaction and nuclear weapons may appear in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. Therefore, the best option, which, from my point of view, is visible, can be called "five minutes to twelve": Iran seeks to technologically approach such a threshold that if a political decision is made, then in three to five months it may have nuclear weapons. However, there are several dozen such threshold states in the world, but they observe the non-proliferation regime, and no one has applied and does not apply draconian sanctions against them. Moreover, the United States gradually lifted restrictions on cooperation with India, which created the atomic bomb.

7. In Israel, the anti-Iranian campaign has reached a high point.

They claim that Iran is preparing to produce an atomic bomb and then use it against Israel. Therefore, an "existential" threat to Israel has allegedly emerged (i.e., it is a matter of life and death), and the answer to it should be a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Tehran's harsh anti-Israel statements are adding fuel to the fire.

At the same time, from a geopolitical and geo-economic point of view, there are no insurmountable contradictions between Iran and Israel. Both sides are interested in maintaining their positions, their power, and in the future - in cooperation, as it was in the time of the Shah. Although Iran's ultra-conservative leadership opposes Zionism, denies the Holocaust, etc., the bellicose rhetoric in both countries is intended for domestic consumption, to strengthen the dominant political forces and regimes. Another thing is that the irrational-emotional component of politics can overflow over the edge and cause war, as has happened more than once in world history. In Tel Aviv, they constantly emphasize that "a military solution to the Iranian nuclear problem" is on the table.

It is hard to imagine Iran taking the military path in a conflict with Israel, especially with the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons. A retaliatory strike by Israel and the United States would be simply murderous. Another thing is that through its junior allies, through its "agents of influence", whether it is Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Sunni Hamas in Gaza, Iran can exert pressure on Israel, including applying certain military injections. In Israel, they claim that there are about 200 thousand rockets around it, although, perhaps, they also mean ordinary mortar shells, including homemade shells. Israel will not have 100 percent protection, even with all its missile defense capabilities. But the question can be asked: is Iran's ally, the Shiite Hezbollah party in Lebanon, more interested in preserving and consolidating its dominant influence in Lebanon itself, or in serving Tehran's interests?

In Israel, which was satisfied with the Alawite regime of father and son Hafez and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, they are now inclined to accept any regime, "as long as there is no Iran there."

8. Iran's relations with its neighbors.

8.1. Turkey is a roughly equal country. Rivalry between the predecessors of Iran and Turkey (especially during the Ottoman Empire), and

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earlier - by the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines-it lasted for two and a half millennia. But in recent years, before the events in Syria, relations between Iran and Turkey developed harmoniously, with trade growing to about $15 billion. per year. Turkey received Iranian hydrocarbons and supplied its own goods, including industrial ones, in exchange.

But the foreign policy vectors of Turkey and Iran were different. Turkey remains allied with the United States, still hopes to become a member of the European Union, and Iran is in a state of confrontation with the United States and the European Union. Disagreements over Syria arose about a year ago. First, Turkey sought to demonstrate its commitment to the West's course. Secondly, the main opposition force in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, is ideologically close to the Turkish ruling party. The social base of the secular opposition in Turkey is, in particular, a large Alawite (Alevi), i.e. Shiite community. Ankara has no sympathy for the Shiite regime in Iran, but political differences do not mean curtailing economic cooperation yet.

Playing along with the United States and the West, the Turks say they can switch to oil supplies from Libya. But this is a game to reduce prices for Iranian hydrocarbons.

There are also disagreements in the details. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid an official visit to Tehran in March 2012 after visiting Seoul. He brought a message from Barack Obama to the Tehran leadership. And after that, there were statements by Iranians that the talks between Iran and the" six " in Istanbul could be moved to another place. Erdogan was offended. But it was most likely just a normal diplomatic haggling. The meeting took place. The next one was held in Baghdad.

8.2. Iraq's Shiite government is close to Tehran, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki calling Turkey an "enemy" after it received Sunni opposition Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Baghdad fears the success of Sunni Islamists in Syria, which would mean increasing their support (on a mutual basis) for the Sunnis of Iraq.

8.3. In the South Caucasus, Christian Armenia is a traditional friend and partner of Iran.

Shiite Azerbaijan was historically part of Iran, but it passed to Russia as a result of two Iranian-Russian wars. Independent Azerbaijan fears a powerful southern neighbor. His leadership has focused on the secular nature of the country's development, on multilateral cooperation with Turkey, the West, the United States and NATO (to some extent with Russia), and more recently with Israel. Baku has angered Iran by agreeing to buy $ 1.5 billion worth of weapons from Israel. Iran fears the influence of independent Azerbaijan on the Iranian Azerbaijanis. But at the same time, in Azerbaijan itself, where, according to some media reports, wealth and power are in the hands of the Aliyev family and related clans, the opposition is increasingly taking on a Shiite character. It is possible to develop in a scenario where Islamists with ties to Iran will be able to challenge the current regime.

8.4. Central Asian countries have different degrees of cooperation with Iran. Close relations have developed with Tajikistan, they have very close languages, although the Iranians have Arabic graphics, the Tajiks have Cyrillic. Iranians have taken part in the peaceful settlement of the internal conflict in Tajikistan and are developing economic ties with it.

Business partnership is developing with other countries in the region. A gas swap has long been established with Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan supplies this fuel to Northeastern Iran, and for this, the Iranians export their gas as Turkmen gas.

All Central Asian countries are in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear research in a peaceful manner, and they are opposed to any kind of military solution to this problem, fearing both economic and political consequences, but at the same time they are all against Iran's nuclear weapons. Tehran's attempts to establish special relations with Kazakhstan, which is one of the world's largest uranium producers, have failed. Astana carefully balances between Russia, China, the United States and Western countries, and it, in fact, does not need to be in any way connected with Iran.

8.5. In Afghanistan, the Sunni Taliban regime maintained a strictly hostile position to Iran. Suffice it to recall the massacres of Shiites and employees of the Iranian consulate in Herat during the rule of the Taliban. As noted above, Tehran actively assisted the United States during the intervention in Afghanistan.

Given that nothing is impossible in politics, it is logical to assume that now there is some kind of cooperation between the Iranian leadership and the Taliban on an anti-American basis. In what form it will result, it is difficult to say.

8.6. Despite Iran's previous close relations with Pakistan, Islamabad's cooperation with the United States is irritating in Tehran. They are dissatisfied with either the inability to stop, or the encouragement by the Pakistani leadership of terrorist attacks from its territory to Iranian Balochistan.

But, as usual, Tehran also uses the carrot policy. An agreement was reached on the construction of a gas pipeline to Pakistan. In contrast, Saudi Arabia promises to supply more oil to Pakistan in order to reduce its dependence on Iran. The fate of the gas pipeline has not been resolved. But in the event of an armed strike on Iran, Islamabad may be on its side.

8.7. Among the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, the attitude towards Iran is ambiguous. Formally, none of the Arab countries recognized the occupation of the islands in the Strait of Hormuz back in the days of the Shah of Iran. (By the way, on the old Soviet maps it was indicated that these are disputed islands between England and Iran.) There are ritual protests from the United Arab Emirates, but Iran's close economic cooperation with the UAE, especially with Dubai, outweighs the differences. They do not want to quarrel with Iran, given the presence of the Shiite community in this country.

The situation is more complicated in Saudi Arabia. Here about 10% on-

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The villages are Shiite, and they are concentrated in the eastern, oil-rich province. Attempts by Shiites to speak out with anti-royal slogans are mercilessly suppressed by the Saudi police. It was Saudi Arabia that helped Bahrain's Sunni government crack down on the country's Shiite majority. The Iranians supported them, but mostly limited themselves to propaganda volleys.

From the point of view of the doctrine that prevails in Saudi Arabia, let's call it "Wahhabism", Shiites are "wrong" Muslims, from the point of view of the Saudi ultra - Orthodox - as if they were "non-Muslims"in general. But this did not prevent the normalization of relations and cooperation between the two countries at the time. In any case, they were able to divide the shelf of the Persian Gulf, avoiding conflict. But the kingdom's close military and economic cooperation with the United States makes relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran tense. In turn, Saudi Arabia fears Tehran's geopolitical ambitions, real or imaginary. Both sides would welcome the collapse of their respective political regimes in their neighbor's country, but only if it was done... someone else's hands.

If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the Saudis intend to produce them themselves, or maybe buy them from Pakistan.

Kuwait is being cautious. There is also a fairly large Shiite community in the country, and the Kuwaiti Government would not want to enter into a confrontation with Iran.

Oman has a special position. He clearly avoids direct confrontation with Iran. Suffice it to recall that with the help of Iranian troops, the anti-government armed struggle in the Omani province of Dhofar was suppressed under the Shah.

American troops have been withdrawn from Iraq, but there is a fairly large contingent in Kuwait. Major American bases are located in both Bahrain and Qatar.

Yemen, which does not play a decisive role in the Arabian Peninsula, although it is the largest country in terms of population, has a fairly large moderate Shiite Zaydi community. And in the Sunni provinces, Al-Qaeda is active.

9. When defining relations with Russia, Iran remembers history.

These are the Russo-Iranian wars of the 19th century, the loss of large territories by Iran, including Dagestan and Azerbaijan, the occupation of the country by Soviet troops in 1941 on the basis of a rather unequal treaty, and the attempt of the USSR to create separatist formations in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Ayatollah Khomeini called the United States "the big Satan" and the Soviet Union "the little Satan."

But in the context of Iran's international isolation, Russian-Iranian cooperation was established. On the Caspian Sea, both countries are opposed to the appearance of foreign military forces in the region, in favor of a peaceful political solution to all problems. Russia and Iran have no territorial disputes. A developing North-South transport route passes through Iran and Russia. Both countries are interested in economic and military-technical cooperation.

Due to the need to take into account all aspects of the foreign policy situation, Russia refused to supply Iran with S-300 air defense missiles, paying a penalty. This caused serious dissatisfaction in Tehran. However, weapons that do not fall under international legal restrictions were delivered. Russia has completed the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, announced its readiness to build another power unit there, and hopes to receive contracts for the construction and modernization of railways.

Tehran has taken a loyal position in relation to the actions of the Russian leadership against separatist and terrorist actions in the North Caucasus. In Central Asia, Iran's anti-American stance does not in principle interfere with Russian interests. Although Tehran was eager to join the SCO, Russia and China did not particularly encourage it, citing UN sanctions against Iran.

Iran's possible development of nuclear missiles poses a significant threat to Russia. To prevent it, Moscow is working closely with the United States and other countries. But a military solution to this problem by striking Israel alone or together with the United States is unacceptable for Russia. Therefore, Moscow's course is logical: it stands for a political solution to problems related to Iran.

Regime change in Iran and the hypothetical rise to power of pro-American forces could also have negative consequences for Russian-Iranian relations, including possible support by Tehran for separatist sentiments in the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region.

* * *

Now one conclusion is obvious: the situation around Iran is in a state of uncertainty.

After all, it is difficult to say which will prevail: the irrational-emotional and at the same time momentary selfish interests of the leaders in the US-Iran-Israel triangle, or a balanced, responsible approach to the fate of the region, and indeed the entire world, the global interests of the world community, which would eliminate the real danger of war.


1 Sunni and Shia Populations. Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population. October 7, 2009. Pew Research Center - http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population (6).aspx

2 Gross domestic product, current prices U.S. dollars. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP Current international dollar. All countries // World Economic Outlook Database. April 2012. International Monetary Fund - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx

3 Library of Congress - Federal Research Division Country Profile: Iran, May 2008 -http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Iran.pdf

Forerojuan. 4 Center of gravity in oil world shifts to Americas // The Washington Post, 26.05.2012.

Warrick Joby 5 and Miller Greg. U.S. intelligence gains in Iran seen as boost to confidence // The Washington Post, 8.04.2012.


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