Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1968, 367 p. Circulation 2000. Price 1 rub. 50 kopecks.

For a long time, one of the most important periods in the history of autocratic Russia - the era after the revolution of 1905 - 1907-remained poorly studied in Soviet historiography. Now this gap is beginning to be gradually filled. Substantial studies have emerged that are notable not only for their richly presented fresh factual material, but also for their strictly scientific approach to it1. Among them is a peer-reviewed book by K. F. Shatsillo, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Senior researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The author is mainly known for his research on the formation and development of monopolistic capital in the Russian shipbuilding industry. He is a pioneer in this field, and the book he wrote sums up to a certain extent his previous works. K. F. Shatsillo used materials from the archives of Leningrad, Moscow, Tallinn, Nikolaev, and Riga. He introduces a lot of new facts into scientific circulation that give a comprehensive idea of how and under the influence of what factors the fleet was restored after the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian shipbuilding industry arose, and how the process of monopolization took place in it. It attracts unpublished materials from central naval departments, banks, factories, and numerous personal funds.

The author revealed the topic in such a way that the problem of creating a fleet turned out to be a focus in which the most important lines of Russia's foreign and domestic policy intersected between the first Russian revolution and the first World War. A wide panorama of the life of the country of those years unfolds before the reader. Along with this, K. F. Shatsillo quite naturally assigns a large place to foreign policy subjects, because the reasons for the restoration of the fleet and the pace of its accelerated construction can only be properly understood in the light of the general development of international rivalry, especially the naval arms race of the great powers, which led to a sharp increase in the role of the fleet. As the autocracy prepared to throw as much as the country's meager resources could provide into the construction of dreadnoughts,it hoped to reassert itself as a formidable military force. The brilliance of the navy should have overshadowed the economic, political, and military weakness of tsarism, and made the world forget its recent defeat. Moreover, having acquired significant naval forces in the Baltic, the ruling circles even hoped to play the role of an arbiter in the escalating rivalry between Germany and England. Schacillo seems inclined to accept such plans and calculations as sound. However, in our opinion, tsarism at that time no longer had a real opportunity to choose an ally who would "give more". Objective contradictions with Germany and Austria deprived the autocracy of the freedom of foreign policy combinations that supporters of the creation of a large fleet imagined. The book notes that it is not by chance that the British government for the first time in many years showed a benevolent interest in strengthening the naval potential of Russia (p.40). London understood that the navy could not give Tsarism a preponderant position in the Entente. However, in the race of naval armaments that was unfolding at a furious pace, it was necessary to try not to lag very far behind the requirements of the moment, as evidenced by the situation in the Black Sea basin, where initially it was not intended to create large naval forces at all. But shortly before the war, tsarism begins to strengthen the Black Sea squadron with feverish haste. The reasons for this are analyzed in the book on the basis of new archival materials that help to better understand the crisis in international relations that led to the First World War. F. Shatsillo shows that all the accelerating events find the autocracy completely unprepared to conduct an active policy on the Black Sea. It operates here alone, moreover, by its own allies in the Entente.-

1 A. J. Avrekh. Stolypin and the Third Duma, M. 1968; V. S. Dyakin, Russian Bourgeoisie and Tsarism during the First World War (1914-1917), L. 1967; R. S. Ganelin. Russia and the USA. 1914-1917. L. 1969; B. V. Ananyich. Russia and international capital. 1897-1914. L. 1970.

page 156
those who condone the outbreak of naval rivalry in the Black Sea are directly damaging its interests in this area, which is essential for it. Weakened, lacking any significant military resources, and above all a fleet (not only military, but also transport), the tsarist autocracy loses control over the course of events. The author explores the complex interweaving of inter-imperialist and inter-Allied contradictions around the Black Sea problem. The most important part of the book is that which deals with the problems of both the domestic political situation in Russia and the processes of monopolization that took place in its economy. The restoration of the fleet became an important part of the relations between the Duma and the autocracy within the Third June system. The material presented in the book gives an idea of how well both partners" worked together", how successfully the political mechanism created after the coup of June 3, 1907, functioned. In the matter of rebuilding the fleet, both sides reached an agreement (for this purpose, the government had to recognize certain rights for the Duma and implement some of its wishes concerning the reorganization of the maritime department and the regularization of affairs in the state shipbuilding industry, which was a model of ugly mismanagement, lack of control and irresponsibility). The existing disagreements are partially smoothed out. However, the majority of Duma members continued to defend the priority of the army over the fleet, and there was also a debate about which Sea, the Baltic or the Black Sea, should be chosen as the main area of activity of the fleet. In our opinion, when considering this question, it should be borne in mind that the preparation for war was a special area of relations between the Duma and Tsarism. Both the bourgeoisie, which aspired to power, and tsarism, which tried to hold on to the helm of government, could most easily find a common language here. After Tsushima, the bankruptcy of the maritime department became obvious to everyone, and tsarism, for its own interests, had to agree to its reorganization. On this point, the resistance of tsarism was and should have been the least, although its general opposition to the necessary bourgeois reforms increased in the last years before the war and this led to increased tension in relations between the autocracy and the Duma. This point, in our opinion, should have been reflected in the book.

K. F. Shatsillo carefully examines the economic and economic-political issues related to the implementation of billion-dollar naval programs, primarily the situation of the shipbuilding industry, which was" created during the implementation of these programs. For decades to come, the state became the sole customer of the shipbuilding industry and easily made huge overpayments. No other industry has provided such opportunities for generating super-profits as shipbuilding. The book provides numerous examples of how businessmen of various calibres profited from building a fleet. However, in general, the question of the amount of enrichment in the implementation of naval programs can be finally resolved only after an in-depth study of the profitability of factories and the dividends paid by companies in comparison with the dividends of other industries. The process of monopolization, which was taking place at that time in Russian industry, took place in shipbuilding, as the author shows, under particularly favorable conditions. inexhaustible orders secured for many years, a scanty number of shipyards, and the resulting practical lack of competition created a real greenhouse for emerging monopolies. Based on the data provided by K. F. Shatsillo, it becomes clear why monopolization immediately went so far here. The author's comparison of the efficiency of state and monopoly capital on the basis of shipbuilding is also of no particular interest. It is found that the latter, while receiving predatory profits, still turned out to be able to fulfill the orders of the maritime department at cheaper prices than state-owned factories. State-owned factories, instead of driving down prices to the shipbuilding monopolies and competing with them, were themselves forced to lower their prices to the level of private industry, which, taking advantage of its organizational superiority and better business management, successfully squeezed the state-owned industry.

The book contains many facts that make it possible to get a clear idea of such an extremely complex subject.

page 157
in this process, such as the merging of the state apparatus with monopolistic capital and the formation of state-monopoly capitalism. The corruption that permeates all levels of the ministerial apparatus, from the minister to the humble draftsman, is vividly shown. It seems, however, that the author omitted one important feature of the coalescence process, which was determined by the fact that Russian monopoly capitalism has not yet become the absolute master of the country and, while asserting its economic dominance, has not become the leading political force. He only tried to bend the government and the state apparatus to his will, and in many ways depended economically on the state power that had partly brought him to life. Therefore, splicing was often not much different from a criminal offense. This was a "merger" of the bribe taker and the bribe giver, which remained undisclosed. Coalescence, however, based on the recognition by the authorities of certain rights of the other side, granting it a legitimate participation in the solution of state affairs, is already a phenomenon of wartime. This feature is given by K. F. Shatsillo lost sight, apparently, due to a certain overestimation of the political role and influence of the Russian bourgeoisie, and in particular monopolies. One cannot agree with the author's statement that "the emergence of monopolies transferred actual control over the creation of the entire Black Sea Fleet and a significant part of the Baltic Fleet from the hands of tsarism to the hands of Russian finance capital" (p.316). Indeed, the fleet on the Black Sea and Baltic was built mainly in factories owned by newly emerged monopolies, but the latter was still very far from the role of manager. The thesis that the bourgeoisie in the pre-war years and during the war, having strengthened its economic position, "came almost close to political power" is also unconvincing (p.317). It seems that, while making minor concessions, the autocracy did not retreat one iota on the main issue (the question of state power); this was expressed in its persistent unwillingness to agree to the creation of a "responsible ministry". The autocracy did not allow the bourgeoisie anywhere near the helm of government, and the Duma, as the organ of the bourgeoisie, continued to play the role of an impotent appendage of tsarism until the last moment.

The comments we have made mainly concern the placement of correct accents. In general, the author in his monograph has posed and successfully investigated a number of significant problems that determined the life of Russia in 1906-1914.

page 158

Постоянный адрес данной публикации: