Libmonster ID: RU-19148
Автор(ы) публикации: V. Y. KUKUSHKIN →

V. Y. KUKUSHKIN, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: oil, natural gas, "Arab spring", North Africa, curse of resource abundance, rentier states

For the oil and natural gas exporting countries of the North African region, which experienced a series of socio-economic, political and military upheavals in 2011-2014, often collectively referred to as the "Arab Spring", these events generally had serious negative consequences. 1 They affected key sectors of the oil and gas sector, as well as trends and prospects for economic development, either directly (in Libya, Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in Egypt), or mostly indirectly, which was typical for Algeria until the beginning of 2014.

THE ARAB SPRING AND THE LOSSES OF ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS INDUSTRIES

In 2010, Libya, which produced 77.7 million tons of oil, ranked 1st in the region and 3rd in the African continent (after Nigeria and Angola).

As a result of the civil war in 2011, with the active intervention of the armed forces of NATO and a number of its allies on the side of the rebels, Libyan oil production fell almost 3.5 times - to 22.5 million tons.In 2012, it was restored to levels close to pre-war levels.

However, this revival proved to be very short-lived and shaky, mainly due to the acute contradictions within the country, primarily political, but also local, ethnic, clan, tribal and others, which led to repeated cases of blockade of pipeline communications and export infrastructure, especially oil and gas loading terminals.

By November 2013, oil production again fell to about 12.5 million tons (in terms of annual rates), or more than 6.2 times in relation to the pre-war period. Almost simultaneously, there were repeated interruptions in the export supply of Libyan natural gas. These events have sharply worsened Libya's foreign trade position.

The losses of the Sudanese oil and gas industry are quite comparable in scale to those of Libya, due to the division of the country's single economic complex in 2011 into two new state entities - Sudan and South Sudan, as well as as a result of the continuation of conflicts between them and within each of these two states. In 2011-2012, their total oil production decreased almost fourfold, compared to the last year of the unitary state's existence: from 22.3 to 5.6 million tons 2.

Egypt's oil production has so far passed such sharp declines. However, the political and socio-economic crisis has not spared the most dynamic, until recently, industry in the Egyptian energy and raw materials complex - the gas industry. The crisis processes were most severe in its most high-tech divisions - enterprises for the production of blue fuel on the offshore shelf and the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The total volume of Egyptian gas supplies to foreign markets from the maximum level of 18.32 billion rubles. m3 fell to 7.3 billion in 2009. In 2008, LNG exports peaked at 14.06 billion m3, while in 2012 they fell to 6.7 billion m3. Moreover, over the years, the Egyptian gas industry has continued to build up some of its extremely capital-intensive production capacities in compliance with previously concluded contracts. 4 The utilization of existing and commissioned facilities has steadily declined, causing additional financial losses for both the State and its foreign partners.

For example, one of the most successful gas producing and exporting companies in the 1990s and 2000s-the British BG Group PLC (British Gas), which until recently was proud of the phenomenal, almost 100% efficiency of exploration work at its license areas in Egypt, suffered serious losses and was forced to write off a significant amount of its assets. part of the book value of its $1.3 billion worth of Egyptian assets. in the fourth quarter of 2013 By the beginning of 2014, the state

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The country's institutions have accumulated almost $1.4 billion in outstanding debt. in relation to this English firm. In the first quarter of 2014, it completely stopped exporting LNG from Egypt, and in the second quarter, it expected to ship no more than one tanker (for comparison, it managed to load 10 ships with Egyptian LNG in the same period of 2013).

One of BG's main technical and economic problems is the reduction of production at the company's most productive gas field in Egypt, the West Delta Deep Marine offshore field in the Mediterranean Sea. Additional drilling operations involving foreign specialists, as well as the import of equipment, are urgently needed to intensify production here. In the current unstable political situation, the firm does not risk either sending its employees to Egypt or financing new investments. In addition to the deteriorating investment climate, BG is under increased pressure from the Egyptian state, which is forced to direct an increasingly significant part of the falling gas production to the domestic market, further restricting export opportunities.5

Another partner in Egypt, the Spanish firm Union Fenosa Gas, is experiencing similar difficulties from underloading the capacity of its LNG export enterprises, but is looking for other ways to circumvent the crisis. In May 2014, it signed a declaration of intent with a consortium of companies operating the Tamar gas field on Israel's Mediterranean shelf. This document provides for the early conclusion of a 15-year contract for the supply of $ 70 billion. m3 of Israeli GHG via pipeline to Egypt for further liquefaction at the Union Fenosa facility and further re-export from Egypt in the form of LNG. It is typical that until 2011 Israel, on the other hand, has been importing Egyptian gas for quite a long time through the same pipeline system, which is now supposed to be put into reverse mode for pumping "blue fuel" in the opposite direction.6

ARE NATURAL RESOURCES A BASE OF DEVELOPMENT OR A WEAPON OF OPPOSITION FORCES?

It is likely that the most difficult and lengthy way out of the crisis will be in Libya and South Sudan. The oil and gas industry is becoming a hostage to the most acute, intractable internal contradictions. The majority of numerous political, regional, ethnic, and confessional groups, mainly in the periphery, widely apply various measures of influence, mainly by force, on this industrial complex to put pressure on rivals, primarily in the ruling circles of the still extremely weak central government.

In Libya, these "economic weapons" are most actively used by the following groups: the so-called Arab "federalists", or supporters of broad autonomy in the province of Cyrenaica in the east of the country, where the most productive of the existing Libyan oil fields are concentrated; activists of the national movement of Libyan Berbers, who mainly inhabit the coastal northern region of Jabal Nafusa in northern Syria. the western province of Tripolitania, where the predominant part of the oil and gas export infrastructure is concentrated; representatives of the Tuareg and Tebu (or Tubu, Tibbu, Teda) peoples, their tribes and intertribal unions from the southern province of Fezzan (or Fezzan).

So, in 2013, the self-proclaimed " Executive Bureau "(government) Cyrenaica, which operates in Benghazi, has established its own Ministry of Natural Resources, as well as the Libyan Oil and Gas Corporation (LOGC). They were initially formed as mirror doubles-rivals of the relevant central institutions operating in the capital Tripoli: the collective supreme body of legislative and executive power represented by the General National Congress, which, however, formally lost its legitimacy in February 2014 due to the expiration of its terms of office, its "technical" interim government with its own Ministry of oil and Gas, as well as the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC).

However, the practical result of such "duplication" was only to aggravate the deadlock, stalemate. Despite extensive efforts, in 2013 LOGC failed to find any foreign partners who would risk purchasing liquid fuel for export from the oil loading terminals under its control, thereby giving at least a minimum of international legitimacy to the mentioned regional institutions.

Meanwhile, the structure of the opposition forces - supporters of the autonomy of Cyrenaica-is far from being limited to their representatives in the regional capital of Benghazi, being much more diverse and complex. So, since the summer of 2013, a much more radical armed group of a certain "field commander" Ibrahim Jadran from another regional center of Ajdabiya has been increasingly moving to the forefront. It was this group that finally managed, on March 8, 2014, to ensure the loading of oil (estimated to be about 47 thousand tons worth up to $30 million) of a North Korean-flagged tanker chartered, according to various sources, by Egyptian or Saudi entrepreneurs, in the terminal of the port of Sirte, controlled by the opposition.

The Cyrenaica "Executive Bureau" soon authorized the operation. No efforts by Tripoli prevented the ship from leaving port for international waters in the Mediterranean Sea, where the tanker, which approached the coast of Cyprus, was later captured by a US Navy special forces unit and handed over to the Libyan central authorities on March 22. [7] Thus, only thanks to foreign military intervention, it was possible to prevent an independent deal of the Libyan opposition on the world oil market.

Ethnic and national opposition movements did not set themselves such "global" tasks as the "federalists" of Cyrenaica, limiting themselves to acts of more or less prolonged blockade of pipelines and ports. Such measures were used, for example, by activists of the Berber movement in the north-west, as well as Tuaregs in the south-west of Libya.

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The actions in the north mainly affected enterprises of the Libyan gas industry and electric power industry. For example, the blockade of a gas pipeline from the Wafa fields to the coast in September 2013 and later led to power outages throughout western Libya. Since October, the pipeline was shut down and the export of gas condensate was stopped, and on November 12-19, natural gas supplies to Italy via the Green Stream trans-Mediterranean gas transmission system were completely interrupted. Until the beginning of 2014, they managed to restore them to no more than half of the capacity of this largest export gas pipeline.

In another case, since the beginning of November 2013, Tuareg armed groups have blocked one of the most productive Sharara fields (producing over 15 million tons of oil per year) in the southwestern Murzuk oil basin, which has restricted not only the export of raw materials, but also the supply of the Libyan oil refinery in Zawiya.8

The central authorities of Libya were unable to apply any sanctions "symmetrical" to their actions against the opposition, out of fear of aggravating the already tense situation, as well as due to the practical impossibility of subjecting the opposition to them without affecting the rest of the population. Therefore, both real and potential groups that challenge the State's monopoly on armed violence continue to freely use (at low, heavily subsidized prices, and sometimes even free of charge) gasoline, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products produced or imported by the State-owned NOC. A similar situation has developed in the field of electricity supply, which is provided by the national General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL) on the same preferential terms.

IS AFRICA SUBJECT TO THE "CURSE OF RESOURCE ABUNDANCE"?

In the economic history of the North African oil and gas industry, including the dramatic events of recent years, there are many empirical bases for theoretical constructions united by the rather conventional concept of the" curse of resource abundance", along with the theory of the"rentier state" that is close to it in many respects. First of all, the extremely high rent intensity of the oil and gas complex determines its peculiar "fatal" role in Libya, as in most other developing countries.

Thus, the author's earlier comparison of some rent-forming technical and economic characteristics of the United States and Libya at the turn of the 1970s-1980s, when most of the largest and most productive oil fields that are still being exploited and form the basis of the Libyan energy and raw material potential were already put into economic circulation in the North African country, gave an idea of labor productivity (based on a comparison of average annual production volumes per worker and employee employed in the oil and gas industry of the two countries).

Of course, only due to extremely favorable natural and geological factors, the Libyan indicator was almost one and a half times higher than the American one, despite the most advanced achievements of technology and technologies used in the United States. The gaps in investment efficiency were (and still remain) much more pronounced.

For example, in Libya, each billion dollars of investment in the oil and gas industry provided for the annual production and export of oil approximately 8.5-9 times more than identical investments in the development of the hydrocarbon resources of American Alaska.9

It is important to note that differential rent of any type in a market economy is formed objectively, i.e. independently of specific forms of ownership and from the activities of owners of natural resources that are not products of labor. Economic institutions and agents in this case only affect the ways and proportions of distribution of rental income.

The most" cruel joke "with exporters of energy and raw materials is played by the objective contradiction of these incomes, which play a key, system-forming role in the models of the"rentier state". The fact is that their most effective mobilization requires the most centralized, ideally monopolistic, possession and disposal of rental resources. On the contrary, the most rational use of these funds, mainly foreign exchange earnings, often requires much more liberal mechanisms for maximum consideration and reconciliation of various economic, socio-political, regional and other interests.

After Libya gained independence in 1951, under the previous state structures of both the federal (1951-1963) and unitary types -both under the monarchy in 1963-1969, and under the authoritarian regime of Gaddafi until 2011-these tasks were solved in different ways, far from being successful in everything, but, in general, with certain achievements.

For example, during the 1960s, the extremely liberal foreign economic policies of the royal regime essentially transformed Libya into the largest oil-producing and exporting country in Africa and the Arab world, thanks to the unprecedented pace of development of the oil industry in economic history, although at the cost of redistributing the predominant share of rents in favor of foreign investors and Western states. The balance of these funds was not used effectively in the national economy, according to most researchers.

The tightening of state control and rapid nationalization of the industry in republican Libya and during the years of the Jamahiriya led to serious conflicts with foreign investors, but provided a very effective mobilization of oil rents to the state budget.

The development plans of the 1970s-2000s, thanks to abundant domestic financing, allowed the implementation of a number of mega-projects in the field of industrialization, agricultural, infrastructure, etc.-

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cultural development and in other areas, which, as planned, were to gradually rid the country of the strongest "oil dependence" 10. But for many reasons, this main goal is still far from being achieved, not only in Libya, but also in almost all "rentier states".

In addition, as the sad modern experience after 2011 has shown, the previous unitary Libyan state structures failed to overcome many regional and other social contradictions that manifested themselves extremely during the "Arab Spring".

The main drama of the current situation is that the extremely weak Libyan State after the civil war is not able to draw rational and practical lessons from the experience of its predecessors. It passively participates in the redistribution of dwindling rental incomes among the new elites and watches as the national currency savings melt away, which by the end of 2013 will be reduced by the end of the year. they still amounted to an impressive $143 billion. only liquid holdings (equivalent to the value of 2-3-year imports of goods and services).

ALGERIA'S EXPERIENCE: IS IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THE OIL "CURSE" IN A SINGLE COUNTRY?

The difficulties experienced by Libya put Algeria in 2011 on the 1st place in terms of production of liquid hydrocarbons (over 73 million tons of oil and gas condensate liquids) in North Africa and on the 3rd-on the entire African continent. This country has so far managed to avoid serious social upheavals in the 2010s, primarily due to an active, detailed and, in general, quite effective state system for distributing budget revenues generated from revenues from oil and gas exports.

The events of the "Arab Spring" force the Algerian leadership to further improve this system. However, despite these efforts, the known limitations of any redistributive mechanisms cause many researchers to doubt the ability of the Algerian state to continue to contain the growing social contradictions at a rather slow pace of restructuring the economic and institutional structure.

Algeria stands out for having the longest experience of forced industrialization (or "industrial revolution", according to the national doctrine), with an emphasis on industries that produce the means of production.

Already shortly after independence from France, in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s, approximately 2/3 of its public investment was directed to industry and production infrastructure, and of industrial investment, in turn, over 80% was in heavy industry.

Among the largest Algerian projects on a regional scale, implemented with the active assistance of the Soviet Union, was a full-cycle ferrous metallurgy plant in El Hajar near the port city of Annaba. By the mid-1980s, the company's pig iron and steel production capacity had been increased to 2 million tons. t per year. The creation of large objects was theoretically justified not only by the experience of the USSR and Egypt, but also by the interpretation of some Western concepts, for example, the theory of "growth poles" developed by representatives of the Grenoble School of Economics and Geography in France.

Soon, however, the practical implementation of the economic models used in Algeria was found to be flawed. The most serious of them were violations of the inter-industry balance: the manufacturing industry, capital construction, infrastructure and other economic divisions lagged behind, which were assigned the role of the main consumers of the products of the basic industrial complexes, including metallurgy.

In the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s, financial difficulties were added due to sharp declines in the energy and raw materials export markets, aggravation of external debt problems, and, finally, deep political destabilization, and then almost a decade of being on the verge of a civil war with Islamic radicals.

As a result, from the late 1980s to the early 2010s, the creation of new industries in Algeria almost stopped. Large enterprises of the core industry continued to be put into operation almost exclusively in the oil and gas complex and its servicing infrastructure, while other industrial divisions were mainly limited to restructuring or adding relatively small facilities. The restructuring included substantial property rights reforms in the general context of the announced market transformations, mainly through corporatization, followed by the sale of assets to private investors, mainly foreign, especially strategic ones.

So, in 2001, the plant in El Hajar became a joint-stock company ArcelorMittal Annaba. ArcelorMittal, the largest multinational steel corporation with its headquarters in Luxembourg, acquired 70% of the capital in this company, while 30% remained in the ownership of the Algerian state concern Sider.

Judging by the results of the reforms carried out before the beginning of 2013, they did not turn out to be a panacea. In 2012, Al-Hajar produced only 580 thousand tons of steel, which was much lower than the planned 800 thousand tons and meant a total utilization of less than 26.4% of the annual production capacity of 2.2 million tons. The complex experienced serious financial difficulties during the previous two years. In October 2012, its situation became critical, forcing ArcelorMittal Annaba to ask the government for massive financial support to ensure the continuation of operations in the country.

At the beginning of June 2013, an agreement was reached: the State Commercial External Bank of Algeria allocates a credit line in the amount of $700 million for the rehabilitation of the enterprise in 2014-2017. The process schedules provide for full utilization of the design capacity and, possibly, their expansion to 2.5 million tons of steel by the end of the period.

Support agreement

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It is also linked to the recapitalization of ArcelorMittal Annaba. It is almost certainly expected to redistribute the shares in favor of the Sider concern, whose share grows from 30% to 46%, and add a third owner-the National Investment Fund with a 5% share. Almost a step has been taken towards renationalization with the return of the majority shareholder role (51%) to the Algerian state.11

The events surrounding the Al-Hajar combine may mark a turning point not only in the industry policy, but also in the overall socio-economic strategy of Algeria: after a break of almost a quarter of a century, it is trying to restore the state's position as a leading investor in basic industries, in addition to oil and gas.

New and promising sectors for Algeria include the automotive assembly industry. The country is firmly established on the 2nd place in Africa (after South Africa) in terms of car imports. In December 2012, a joint venture was established for the construction of the automobile plant by two Algerian state investors-owners of 51% of the shares (34% from Societe Nationale de Vehicles Industriels and 17% from the National Investment Fund) and the French concern Renault with a 49% stake.

Starting from November 2014 (after a break of almost 40 years), it is planned to start assembling 25 thousand passenger cars of one model per year. Then their annual output is planned to triple to 75 thousand, while expanding the model range and increasing the share of locally produced components, and in the longer term - possibly up to 150 thousand, depending on market conditions. 12

Auto-assembly is not the only example, but a modern trend in the development of other branches of Algerian mechanical engineering as well. Earlier, in August 2012, under similar conditions of distribution of shares (51:49 in favor of Algeria), a large American corporation AGCO, which produces agricultural machinery, established a joint venture for the assembly of tractors of the Massey Ferguson 13 brand. In early 2013, General Electric, another major power engineering corporation in the United States, established an assembly plant with Algeria for the production of turbines and other electric power equipment.14

Active development of social and economic infrastructure, such as transport, also continues. In reality, and especially potentially, one of the most metal-intensive programs is the intensive expansion and modernization of the Algerian railway network, which has been going on almost continuously since 1999, including three five-year stages: 1999-2005, 2005-2009 and 2009-2014.

For their more efficient development and implementation, the state railway company SNTF created in 2007 a specialized autonomous planning and investment structure-ANESRIF. If the third stage of development is successfully completed, the length of the operated railway lines is expected to increase by almost 2.6 times - from 3,854 km to 10,000 km in 2015. Their total length already reaches 4,573 km, significantly exceeding the operational 15.

In addition, to expand the capacity, it is planned to partially modernize the railway network in order to increase the speed of movement on the most stressful sections of 1,240 km in length: up to 220 km / h for passenger trains and up to 120 - 140 km/h for freight trains. Formally, these limits are noticeably lower than the performance characteristics of modern high-speed trains, but they represent a great technological advance for Algeria.16

The positive demand trends largely justify the ambitious plans of the Algerian leadership to implement at least two much larger metallurgical megaprojects relative to El Hajar, but so far less detailed.

In January 2013, Algeria and Qatar signed an agreement of intent for the construction of a joint steelmaking complex in the Algerian city of Bellara (with the distribution of the authorized capital, according to various sources, in the proportions of 61:39 or 51:49). At that time, British and French sources estimated its annual output at 10 million tons (5 million tons of unrefined steel and another 5 million tons of rolled depreciation scrap).

The project, which was still at the stage of a feasibility study, was scheduled for 2017-2018. It was assumed that this complex would fully meet Algeria's current and prospective needs for metallurgical products, allowing it to finally abandon its importation17.

However, in April 2013, after mostly economic calculations were completed and more specific documents were signed by the shareholders (Algeria's Sider and Qatar's Qatar Steel International), the Algerian press published much more modest information about the Bel Lar complex: it is expected that the first stage of the project with an annual capacity of 1.5 - 2 will be put into operation in 2017 million tons, which will double to 4 million tons of steel after the launch of the second stage in 2019. The total project investment is estimated at almost $1.7 billion. Many infrastructure objects - transport, energy, water supply, and others-related to the main project are also named.18

One can only guess whether such a correction in investors ' plans was caused by more realistic forecasts of the dynamics of the domestic Algerian market for metallurgical products and raw materials (for example, for marginal capacities), the prospects for an increase in the cost of capital investments, especially related ones, or some other reasons.

Be that as it may, the prevailing caution of industry analysts in one direction probably did not prevent statements about the next mega-project, which is being prepared for launch in 2014 by a consortium of three Algerian state - owned enterprises-Sonatrach, Ferphos, Sider.

One of its main goals is to develop the richest mineral resources in southwestern Algeria, primarily the Gara Jebilet and Mesheri Abdallah iron ore deposits. Their total reserves are estimated at 3.5 billion tons, of which 1.7 billion. they can be economically extracted by open-pit mining at an estimated rate of 20 million tons per year.

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No more than half of these products are intended for the domestic market, while the rest is intended for export. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether only existing and ready-to-build metallurgical complexes will be supplied with enriched raw materials, or whether new steelmaking capacities will continue to be designed or their previously approved planned development indicators will be corrected.19

On the one hand, the raw materials of the iron ore deposits that are being prepared for development are not suitable for traditional coke-and-straw cycles in Al-Hajar; on the other hand, their production is clearly excessive for the future steelmaking plant in Bellara, taking into account the reduction in the design capacity of the latter. In general, the scheme of intra-industry relations still seems far from fully balanced.

At the same time, information on the last of the mentioned mega-projects in Algeria confirms at least two important conclusions about the beginning of likely changes in its macroeconomic policy and structure.

First, the complex of metallurgical industries may be preparing for the role of one of the largest national exporters after the energy and raw materials industries, which, of course, will retain their primacy for a long time. By adding export functions to the original import - substituting functions, the Algerian metallurgy industry could join in solving one of the most important tasks of the country-to overcome the clearly expressed mono-industry specialization of its economy as a whole, but especially of foreign economic relations and the monetary and financial system. So far, oil and gas industries account for 40% of Algeria's GDP, 98% of exports, and almost 2/3 of budget revenues.20 The strategic goal of diversification, repeatedly confirmed by various ruling regimes, remained out of reach for several decades.

Secondly, in order to achieve this goal, the Algerian leadership is overcoming long-standing concerns that have hindered the large-scale introduction of experimental industrial technologies. In the 1960s and 1980s. They were used very actively, for example, allowing Algeria to become an industrial producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas for the first time in the world, although exposing the country to a number of serious technological disasters. Since such an innovation was always very expensive and not always successful, it was abandoned for a long time. Now there is a revival of some traditions in this area, and at least a partial increase in the propensity of state investors to take entrepreneurial risks in technical solutions for the development of iron ore resources.

The confirmation of the current Algerian President for a fourth consecutive 5-year term (since 1999)was secured by the victory of A. Bouteflika in the April 17, 2014 elections with an overwhelming margin of 81.5% of the vote. 21 This gives rise to certain hopes for maintaining the continuity of the country's course, including the socio-economic strategy, and for the implementation of at least a number of these projects. At the same time, some researchers ' concerns about the likely preservation of certain negative trends in recent years are growing.

From the point of view of "exemplary" compliance with the characteristics on which the model of a modern "rentier state" is based, six Arabian oil monarchies that are members of the GCC (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf) are often cited as examples. However, during the years of the Arab Spring, Algeria surpassed these countries, ranking first in the region in one of the main indicators-the activity of the state budget in the process of redistributing gross product.

Between 2009 and 2012, the share of government spending in Algerian GDP was 40.8%, compared to 38.1% in the total GDP of the GCC countries. On average, for all Middle Eastern and North African exporters of hydrocarbons, this figure was 35.4%, and in Egypt it was even more modest - 33.3%. The greatest increase in this activity occurred just at the beginning of the "Arab Spring": in 2011, the total expenditures of the Algerian state increased by 50%, and the salaries of civil servants were increased by 46% .22

So far, these measures are based on a fairly solid financial base: with minimal external debt, Algeria has about $200 billion in foreign exchange reserves, slightly exceeding the value of three years of imports of goods and services.23 At the same time, there are very worrying trends in the reduction of production and, even more significantly, exports of fuel and energy products.

In 2007 - 2012, Algeria's oil production (including gas condensate liquids) steadily declined by 15.6% (from 86.5 to 73 million tons), while natural gas production fluctuated, but in general, also downwards by almost 5%. 24 The relatively low activity of foreign capital in the oil and gas sector in Algeria is due to the relatively low level of investment in the oil and gas sector. Foreign experts explain the lack of proven hydrocarbon reserves to restore, first of all, by the deterioration of the investment climate due to increased state control.

Thus, the relatively liberal 2005 law, which in some cases granted foreign firms full ownership of their Algerian subsidiaries, was already modified by a presidential decree in 2006. The mandatory majority participation of the state-owned company Sonatrak in the amount of 51% of the capital of all enterprises in the oil and gas industries was restored, and taxes on "excess profits"were raised. The last type of tax mobilization of rent was again deployed in a liberal direction only in 2013.

Another negative factor in recent years, which continues to restrain investment activity , is the intensification of radical Islamism in the Sahara and Sahel, which was significantly affected by the consequences of the civil war in Libya, the weakness of its modern regime and the easy permeability of state borders, which is common to almost the entire region. For example, at the In Amenas gas field in the Sahara Desert in southeastern Algeria near the border with Libya, Islamists took almost 700 employees, including foreigners, hostage in January 2013 and held them for five days. Their os-

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The liberation ended with several dozen casualties, including 25 British and Japanese specialists killed.

Finally, there is an insufficiently rational exploitation of available hydrocarbon resources by the state-owned Algerian company Sonatrak. In 2008-2012 alone, GHG production at its largest gas field, Hassi R'Mel, fell from $ 75 billion to $ 55 billion. m3 due to poorly applied methods of production intensification.

It is believed that the optimal rate of development of this field was significantly exceeded in the 2000s in order to compensate for the lag in the commissioning and capacity development of at least six other gas fields in Algeria. This was one of the main reasons for the decline in GHG exports from the country from 60 billion rubles. m3 in 2007 to 52-55 billion rubles. m3 in 2011-2012, as well as the indefinite postponement of the project for the construction of a new gas pipeline to the Italian island of Sardinia-the object of the Algerian-Italian memorandum signed back in 2007.26

At the same time, in 2005-2010, the share of domestic consumption relative to production in relation to oil increased from 26% to 40%, and to natural gas - from 19% to 29% .27 Accordingly, the share of the "remaining" oil for export decreased to 60%, and gas-to 71%. If such dynamics continue, Algeria may lose its export resources of liquid fuel in the first half of the 2020s. In this case, the effectiveness of raising rents by strengthening the state monopoly again collides with the need for liberal methods to mobilize other economic resources.

Thus, without radical structural reforms, Algeria still cannot get rid of the consequences of the "resource curse", although it manifests itself in somewhat milder forms than in Libya, Sudan and South Sudan. We can only hope to see which of the developing countries will be the first to break the almost mystical bonds of these economic contradictions and when.


1 Many political and socio-economic events and problems of the "Arab Spring" in Egypt, Libya and other North African countries have already been analyzed on the pages of the journal. See, for example: Vasiliev A.M., Vinitsky D. I. New round of the Egyptian Revolution / / Asia and Africa Today (hereinafter - AIAS). 2014, N 1. (Vasiliev A.M., Vinitsky D.I. 2014. A new spiral of the Egyptian revolution // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 1) (in Russian); Isaev L. M., Korotaev A.V. Egyptian coup d'etat: experience of econometrics analysis // AiAS. 2014, N 2. (Isaev L. M., Komtaev A.V. 2014. Egyptian coup d'etat: experience of econometrics analysis // Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. N 2) (in Russian); Meshcherina K. V. New Libya: A thorny Path... Where? // AiAS. 2014, N 2. (Meshcherina K. V. 2014. New Libya: the thorny path... to where? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. No. 2) (in Russian); Doroshenko E. I. Gosudarstvennaya ideologiya novaya Livii kak otrazhenie sotsial'no-politicheskikh protsessov v stranii [State Ideology of New Libya as a reflection of socio-political processes in the country]. 2013 N 9. (Doroshenko E.I. 2013. The new state ideology of Libya // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 9) (in Russian); Fituni L. L., Solodovnikov V. G. Towards the "Arab winter" / / AiAS. 2012, N 6. (Fituni L.L., Solodovnikov V.G. 2012. Towards the "Arab spring" // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 6) (in Russian); Abramova I. O., Bessonov S. A. "Arab spring "and cross-border migration // AiAS. 2012, N 6, 7. (Abramova I. O., Bessonov S. A. 2012." Arab spring " and cross-border migration / / Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 6, 7) (in Russian)

2 Рассчитано по: ВР Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 Workbook - http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-worl d-energy-2013.html

3 Calculated from: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, ... 2010, ...2013.

4 Ekonomicheskaya infrastruktura stran Afrika [Economic Infrastructure of African countries], Moscow, 2012, pp. 98-99.

5 Ibid., p. 101; Williams S. BG Group's Egypt Woes Continue / / The Wall Street Journal. May 1, 2014 - http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10001424052702303678404579534991692516198.html

Mitnick J. 6 Israeli Offshore Natural Gas Is Headed to Egypt // WSJ. May 6, 2014 - http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023 03417104579545902477622762.html

Mohamed E. 7 Libyan official: US navy hands oil tanker to Libya // Associated Press. March 22, 2014.

Hamilton J.J. 8 Libya's Oil and Gas Sector Problems Persist // Libya Herald. Business Eye. Tripoli, December 2013/January 2014, Issue 6, p. 18 - 19.

9 Countries of North Africa: State and Economic Development, Moscow, Nauka. 1987. pp. 85-86.

10 Istoriya Livii v novoe i sovremennoe vremya [History of Libya in the new and modern times]. 1992. pp. 139-157, 171-183.

11 L'Etat algerien devrait investir massivement dans Facierie d'El Hadjar et en prendre le controle a hauteur de 51% // Econostrum.info, 30 Mai 2013; L'Etat se dirige vers le rachat de ArcelorMittal Annaba // Algerie-Focus, avril 10, 2013 - www.algerie-focus.com

12 Algeria Autos Report. Summary. May 8, 2013 // Business Monitor International - store.businessmonitor.com/algeria-autos-report.html; Renault launches industrial development project in Algeria // Automotive World. December 19, 2012 - www.automotiveworld. com/tag/algeria/

13 AGCO Grows Africa Presence with Establishment of Joint Venture in Algeria // Business Wire. August 17, 2012 - www.businesswire.com/

14 GE to build turbine factories in Algeria as part of 8.400M W supply contract // African Energy. Issue 250, 14 March 2013 - www.afric.a-energy.com/

15 SNTF: histoire, modernite et defis // Algerie Rail. Edition Special, 19.06.2013, p. 7; "Chiffres cles" - www.sntf.dz

16 Ligne a grande vitesse. Algerie. Lignes en projet -fr.academic.ru/dic.nsf/frwiki/1024957#Lignes_en_projet

17 Middle East Steel 2012. Metal Bulletin Focus Supplements, December 2012. P. 5, 14 - www.metalbulletin.com; Algeria, Qatar ink Steel Plant Deal // Agence France-Presse. January 7, 2013.

Saou M. 18 Bientot la realisation du complexe siderurgique de Bellara // Liberie. 2013, Avril 17 - www.liberte-algerie.com/

19 Sonatrach, Ferphos et Sider en association: Consortium national pour l'exploitation de Gara Djebilet // El Watan, 10.06.2013 -www.elwatan.com/

20 Algeria shies away from growth amid political doubt // Zawya. June 20, 2013 - www.zawya.com/middle-east/countries/algeria/

21 Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika Wins Fourth Term // The Wall Street Journal, Updated April 18, 2014 -http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304311204579509613 541298576.html; Algeria's Bouteflika wins re-election with 81.5 percent: official results // Reuters. April 18, 2014 - http://news.yahoo.com/algerias-bouteflika-set-election-foes-cry-fraud-120901159.html

Achy Lahcen. 22 The Price of Stability in Algeria // The Carnegie Papers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C.April, 2013, p. 10 - 11 - http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ price_stability_algeria.pdf

Achy Lahcen. 23 On the Algerian Economy: A Widening gap between resources and achievements - http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/ll/12/on-algerian-economy-widening-gap-between-resources-an d-achievements/ guny

24 Рассчитано по: ВР Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 Workbook - http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/encrgy-economics/statistical-review-of-worl d-energy-2013.html

25 Algeria's oil and gas. Not so jolly. Recent events and wariness of foreign investors dent the oil-and-gas economy // The Economist. February 9, 2013.

26 Hassi R'Mel, la chute d'un geant // Africa Energy Intelligence. P. N 709 du 29.10.2013; Incertitudes sur Galsi - N 687 du 20.11.2012.

Achy Lahcen. 27 Algeria needs more than Hydrocarbon Law-Amendments - http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/01/22/algeria-needs-more-than-hydrocarbon-law-amendments/f 4rg


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