[Gleriy SHIROKOV]
Leading Fellow
Institute of Oriental Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences
Ph. D. (Economics)

Partly due to the dissolution of the Socialist camp, partly due to the reduction of the number of authoritarian regimes in developing countries, partly for political and ideological considerations, the term "democracy" was in an extraordinarily extensive usage at the turn of millennia. It is argued that democracy does not only mean individual freedom but also constitutes a basis of modern economic growth, leading to formation of a social state or a consumer society. The latter statement is, to say the least, inaccurate. There are a lot of states in the world (China, Iran, Malaysia, etc.), which no one calls democratic, yet they demonstrate a consistent and considerable economic growth, improvement of living standards, and expansion of civil liberties.

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Is it possible for this group of states to transfer to democracy?

x x x

Historical researches of antiquity and early Middle Ages demonstrate existence of different types of social evolution in the two parts of the planet we currently call the West and East. In the West, the State primarily emerged on a class basis. This basis, however, was unable to exist outside of a system of sufficiently complex social relations. On one hand, in the class society, this system of relationships had to take a form of antagonism between rulers and citizens, rulers and state slaves, citizens and non-citizens. A certain form of repressive apparatus was needed to enforce these relationships, which resulted in new contradictions. On the other hand, there also existed non-antagonistic relationships - family hierarchy, relationships within a clan, confessional and other relationships, which were regulated on the basis of informal agreements. All these relationships intermingled with one another and were often interdependent.

In the East, the State emerged on not only class basis, but also on a tribal or confessional basis, hence its specifics. Firstly, antagonism of relationships between various social strata was not so pronounced, as contradictions might be balanced by informal relationships- e.g. within a clan council of elders. Secondly, land, the basic production resource of the time, along with other natural resources (water, forest, etc.), was in most Oriental states owned by the State. This was due to both natural and climatic conditions (the need for irrigation, fighting natural calamities, etc.) and specifics of the State genesis. State ownership served as the basis for a pyramidal socio-economic structure headed by the ruler and penetrated by a system of vertical relationships. This structure was used, on one

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hand, in land management, and on the other hand, in transfer of the alienated net product. In historical literature, this structure got the name of Oriental despotism. Thirdly, in most cases, the head of the Oriental despotism simultaneously was the religious leader of the state. This made all his decisions indisputable - true, the reverse side of this structure was its low flexibility. Fourthly, in the East, there have existed, since ancient times, economic segments (trade, handicrafts, usury, etc.) based on private ownership - consequently, on other than vertical social relationships. The difference between the West and East lay not in prevalence of certain types of relationships but in the extent of their interdependence.

In the East, segments of other social relationships were relatively small, because the biggest portion of net product bypassed them. Furthermore, they were closely linked to the core pyramidal structure (participating in the redistribution of values, the change of their physical form, etc.), yet acted on the basis of the product that was alienated primarily by noneconomic methods. This is why they depended on the scale and terms of alienation, having no feedback on the core structure.

The above differences determined specifics of social evolution in the West and East. In the West, changes in group relationships within each stratum resulted in shifts of all interdependent relationships. In a state based on private ownership, this entailed a chain of irreversible changes in all spheres, until the existing structure was liquidated or fully transformed. Formation of a new phase started on the basis of elements formed in the process of decomposition of past social relations. This type of social evolution formed the basis of Hegel - Marx's theory of formations, in which one phase of social relations replaces another.

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In the East, new (to be more precise, different) social relations either penetrated with a new conqueror or emerged in the process of inter-dynasty struggle - in any case, they were unable to occupy a dominant position and transform the entire existing system. To do this, one would have needed to destroy state ownership, because all other relations were derived from it. But every conqueror or victor in inter-dynasty struggle, instead, tried capturing and strengthening the institute of state ownership as a source of net product. What is more, in a number of countries (India, China), where privatization started with a weakening of the state, a subsequent strengthening of state power once again led to a reverse process of return to state ownership.

Under these conditions, new social relations which penetrated into the East or which had an endogenous origin did not destroy preceding structures, as in the West, but got accumulated above them. In doing this, the new relations got assimilated, accommodated themselves to old ones, or even developed synthetic forms with them. In some cases, they got localized in port or metropolitan areas. Soviet Orientalists invented a term "stable multiformity", which denoted a system of vertically integrated socio-economic patterns. In reality, however, this system emerged much later in time, after the formation of the colonial system and, especially, after the industrial revolution. Prior to renovation of the socio-economic system and the technological mode of production, the differences between patterns had not been too great.

With the establishment of the colonial system, the differences in social evolution of the West and East could be expected to disappear. In fact, colonial authorities in practically all dominions

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attempted, quite often through the use of force, to implant the system of social relations that existed in the mother country. The results, however, did not at all meet the expectations.

Firstly, social relations introduced to colonies from the outside had to develop in a socially foreign environment - therefore, for expanded reproduction, they had to partially destroy this environment, partially reform it, and to a large extent adapt to it. The proportion of destruction - transformation - adaptation depended on many factors, such as the level of formation development of the mother country, the availability and size of natural resources in the colony, the colonized population's resistance, the scale of the colony's involvement in global economy and its duration, whether or not the entire economic space of the colony or just a portion of it was involved in international division of labor, etc. In most cases, however, the adaptation element appeared to be very substantial.

Secondly, attempts to directly introduce European social relations to the colonial environment demonstrated that they either run into fierce opposition or have a restricted effect, because new institutes are unable to interact with traditional ones. This is why colonies demonstrated a most bizarre synthesis of modern and traditional forms all through the 19th - early 20th century. For instance, a manor might act as a joint-stock company, an essentially feudal rent as dividend, recruitment at a capitalist enterprise (plantation, mine, factory) might be done through a contractor and could hardly be considered free.

Thirdly, most colonial powers (except the US), along with colonies, set up regimes of the so-called indirect rule. These included protectorates of Indochina, sultanates of Malaysia and

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Indonesia, Kachin and Shan states in Burma, the so-called native states in the territory of present-day India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, sultanates in South Arabia. Colonial authorities (through their resident) controlled external political and external economic relations, very rarely interfering in domestic policies of the rulers of these territories. Implantation of European social relations was very slow here, with old relations remaining practically unchanged.

As a result, no complete replacement of traditional Oriental social relations by modern, European ones occurred in colonies. Instead, new relations once again got accumulated over former ones, with traditional relations simultaneously being eroded and deformed. Colonialism thus resulted in increased numbers of types of social relations, interacting and opposing one another. Eventually, this erosion and deformation took a universal form, spreading to countries that had remained independent - Iran, China, Thailand, Turkey, Japan. Influenced by the growing economic, technological and military superiority of European powers, these states, in order to survive, were forced to purchase new equipment. To successfully use it, they had to change their legislation and set up new organization structures, and - the most important thing - they needed to train personnel that would be able to master this equipment. However, the layer of people involved in management and defense was rather small.

Another factor promoting modernization of independent Oriental states was involvement of their economy in international division of labor and establishment of foreign enterprises. However, what took place in this case was modernization (even then, a partial one) of only those national structures that directly interacted with the global market or foreign entrepreneurs. The

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result was an enclave-type formation of new social relations, which gave rise to new contradictions. As the modernized stratum was small and as in most cases it occupied the lowest steps of social hierarchy, it was not able to overcome its growing enclave nature by normal methods. Hence a wave of revolutions that has swept practically all independent countries.

The political sovereignty attained by Oriental countries in the late 1940s - early 1950s might be expected to put an end to the system of formation of multiple social relations and bring it in accordance with the analogous structure in the West. Indeed, the sharply accelerated rates of development in the second half of the 20th century, agrarian reforms, new legislation, industrialization, which resulted in the doubling of the share of developing countries in global production, and finally, the threefold growth of the export quota might be expected to lead to displacement of the old forms of social relations and a complete victory of capitalism.

In reality, however, it only took place in a very small group of countries (South Korea, Taiwan, etc.), which, firstly, demonstrated high enough rates of industrialization to enable them to move a mass of population from agriculture to industry and from the countryside to towns, and, secondly, received the most active support from developed countries in the various spheres. The situation in the bulk of Oriental countries was different. In the first place, the "demographic" explosion and the expulsion of dependents to the labor market appeared to be so sizable here that industrialization failed to have any noticeable effect on distribution of the population among industries. What is more, as extensive expansion of industry was accompanied by its technical modernization and intensification, it was unable to not only

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absorb the entire natural increase of the population but also to substantially reduce the hidden unemployment that had accumulated in the preceding period. At the same time, it is the depressive segments of agriculture, petty production, retail trade, characterized by a low vertical and horizontal mobility of population, that retain the biggest strata of archaic social relations. On one hand, the invariable way of life makes it possible to observe traditions and customs in both family and public relations. On the other hand, the meticulous observance of traditions and customs of ancestors creates an illusion this can protect the individual from the onset of a foreign and incomprehensible world.

Simultaneously, there occurred a process of revival of autochthonous civilizations or their individual elements, even though it did not take a linear form and was slower than the process of adoption of European values. This "revival" was indissolubly related to the national liberation movement. Historical precedents, real or mythological merits of national character, religious traditions were used in awakening national identity. The concepts of revival of original values were intermingled with residues of preceding social relations, strengthening one another.

A certain euphoria resulting from the attainment of political freedom led leaders of national liberation movements - Neru, Jinna, Sukarno or their successors (Mahathir in Malaysia) to believe that they should only adopt technology and production organization from the West. As for local social relations, customs and traditions, they may well be utilized while transferring to the economic growth regime. This belief may probably be based on the view that the preserved types of preceding social relations may be

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used for a mobilization rush in the process of economic growth. Some researchers believe these perceptions are already being practically realized in a number of East and South East Asian states.

x x x

Despite the tangible success achieved by Oriental countries in capitalist modernization in the 2nd half of the 20th century, the overwhelming majority of these countries did not have high enough rates of development to fully eliminate the former social relations. Consequently, there has emerged no global economic space with prevalence of a uniform socio-economic mode of production. Preservation of economic segments based on old social relations, on one hand, and impeded, if at all possible, "modernization" of the social, cultural and religious sphere, on the other hand, formed the basis for preservation of original traditions, customs and perceptions. What is more, traditional forms started penetrating all cells of public life with the formation of the national state and the coming of local elites to power.

The "multiplicity" of social relations in the East is distinctly revealed in formation of the ruling regime. It is known that, in the West, democracy develops on the basis of the civil society that emerges in the process of emergence of associations of people with the same interests. For emergence of such associations, what is needed is an absolute elimination of all preceding links and relations, in which the man acts as a subject. Only in this case may a homogeneous "democratic majority" be possible.

In the East, an individual may act as a member of numerous associations of people - the clan, family or caste, community or confession, and at the same time be a member of a modern type of

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association, like a trade union, youth organization, or political party. Participating in socio-political life, this individual reflects the views of numerous associations to which he belongs. The resulting atomistic structure of society makes it impossible to find out the opinion of the "democratic majority", and, accordingly, a certain degree of authoritarianism is needed to control public processes.

It is hardly possible to implant democracy in such a society, especially through the use of force.

RA

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