A. M. VASILIEV
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
In the 1990s and subsequent years, Russia, in principle interested in a Middle East settlement, maintained contacts with all parties to conflicts in the Middle East and the north of the African continent. The impact of the situation in the Middle East, in general, on world events prompted Russian leaders to visit the region.
Washington found itself constrained in its actions in the Middle East. Anti-Americanism in the Middle East and the Islamic world has been growing in response to US actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran.
Russia's support for contacts with all parties to the conflict did not exclude Hamas. In political terms, Hamas did not recognize Israel's right to exist, rejected all previous PLO agreements, and was ready only for a long-term truce (hudna). The division of the Palestinians into two camps called into question the "legitimacy" of any actions and agreements of the PLO and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded him in 2004. Yasser Arafat.
In 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Israel. In January 2011, President Dmitry Medvedev visited Jordan and the West Bank, and in June 2012, President Vladimir Putin visited Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. No one pinned much hope on these visits. It was more about strengthening bilateral ties.
Hamas leader Khalid Mashaal has repeatedly visited Moscow and even met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. But Russian attempts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah have failed. True, several times Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement on the creation of a national unity government, but it did not go any further. In his Cairo speech on July 4, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama Obama called for the creation of a Palestinian state, without specifying its parameters, and called the construction of Israeli settlements illegitimate. He advocated U.S. cooperation with the Islamic world based on shared values. All this created a certain chill in the relations between the two allies-the United States and Israel.
RUSSIA - ISRAEL: DRUZHBA WITH RESERVATIONS
By the early 1990s, the issue of restoring diplomatic relations between the USSR/Russia's relations with Israel are not only ripe, but "overripe".
When the wave of mass Jewish emigration from the USSR began "suddenly" in the third, fourth, and especially fifth years of Perestroika, the reason was not that Soviet Jews wanted to go there. They wanted to get out of here. And we drove. Simply because they, unlike the majority of citizens of a torn country experiencing the deepest crisis, had somewhere to go. The Jews once again proved to be a muddy barometer of moods, hopes, political orientations, and public sympathies, and they themselves created these orientations. In the 1920s and 1930s. they bet on survival and social mobility in a country that claimed to be building socialism. They themselves suffered losses, but they believed in the future. Now they have grasped the futility of their existence in a lost society.
These internal circumstances were imposed on Soviet foreign policy at a special historical moment for the fate of international relations, the international order, and the situation in the Middle East. Globally, the Soviet leadership sought to achieve cooperation with the United States. Facilitating the departure of Soviet Jews was one of the weighty proofs of the sincerity of Soviet intentions. It was necessary to move away from the unilateral orientation towards the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict, expand contacts with Israel and gradually normalize relations.
The article was prepared in the framework of the Russian Science Foundation project N 14 - 18 - 03615 - "Russian policy in the Middle East: opportunities and limits of cooperation with the countries of the region".
Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa today. 2015, N 12.
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It was not the USSR's foreign policy that changed the situation, but the projection of the internal situation on foreign policy. If the Soviet society was going to democratize and respect human rights, it should have simplified the rules of travel of its citizens abroad. An important role, of course, was played by the hope of the Soviet leadership to improve relations with the influential Jewish community in the West, especially in the United States, and to gain its trust.
The restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel was considered in Moscow not only in terms of regional policy, but also in a broader context. It was about the hope of being integrated into the very structures of Western society. But both Zionism and the West's relations with Israel were an essential part of both the vertical and horizontal components of these structures.
The expectation was that ideological differences with Zionism, which in official Soviet propaganda was equated with "racism" and "service to imperialism," would be forgotten. In fact, Zionism in its various manifestations remained an effective ideology and political practice, while real ("developed") socialism in both its Russian and European interpretations was rapidly heading for its collapse.
But in any case, in the late 1980s, the USSR and Israel were moving towards the restoration of diplomatic relations. The lifting of the ban on emigration in the USSR, the position of the USSR during the Kuwait crisis and its cooperation with the United States, and the start of the Madrid Conference in October 1991 opened the doors for an exchange of ambassadors.
Technical steps to resume diplomatic relations were taken earlier. In 1987, a Soviet consular group was established in Israel, and in 1988, an Israeli group was established in Moscow. Warmth in relations between the parties emerged when in the same year the issue of returning to the USSR a plane with hostages stolen by bandits to Israel in the hope that in this "hostile country of the USSR" they would be met with open arms was settled. In Israel, the fight against any form of terrorism was a matter of principle, and the bandits were extradited to the USSR.
In 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with his Israeli counterpart Moshe Arensrm in Cairo and later in New York. In January 1991, the consular groups in the two countries were officially transformed into consulates-General, which increased their status. In March 1991, Soviet Prime Minister Vladimir Pavlov met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in London, and in May, Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh visited Israel. In June and August, a number of high-ranking Israeli officials visited the USSR.
On October 1, 1991, direct charter flights were launched on the Moscow-Tel Aviv route. El Al Airlines and Aeroflot have signed an agreement on direct flights from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Israel.
But although the doors of Jewish emigration from the USSR had been wide open since 1989 and ties were developing along all lines, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel was delayed until October 1991. Two months later, the Soviet Union had already shrunk to the size of today's Russia.
A. E. Bovin, Ambassador of the USSR to Israel, received his credentials on December 23, 1991. And he immediately became the Russian ambassador.
His work took place in a new situation, when the majority of Russian media rejected the entire Soviet legacy in the Middle East, and anti-Islamic, anti-Arab and pro-Israeli sentiments prevailed. Bovin himself, a professional journalist and political scientist, was a "pro-Western Democrat" and extremely friendly to Israel. The Palestinian Arabs, their feelings, their tragedy, their goals and hopes were foreign to him. But officially, he held a different position 1.
Says A. E. Bovin*:
"Russia's main interest in the Middle East is that there should be no war, that we should not face a painful choice. This is the first thing. Secondly, the task is to use the intellectual and technological potential of Israel in order to facilitate the transition of our economy to market rails. Our third interest is that by the end of the century there will be a million of us in Israel. There is no other such country in the world. This is a very specific situation, a paradox. For 30 years, we have been bullying Israel, calling it whatever you want, and within the Union we have pursued a policy of anti-Semitism, and Jews have been crushed and strangled as much as they could. For 30 years, we called those Jews who left as traitors, but the paradox is that they love us there. The legacy of Russian culture turned out to be stronger than these terrible 30 years.
In this sense, I would say that I am in favor of a strategic alliance with Israel, without implying the military side. There are absolutely unique opportunities for positive work in Israel. And this is not only working with the Jews who are there, it is working with the entire diaspora of the world. Holo-
* Alexander Yevgenyevich Bovin (1930-2004) - Soviet and Russian journalist, publicist, political scientist, and diplomat. From 1972 to 1991 - political commentator for the Izvestia newspaper, member of the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU (1981-1986), Russian Ambassador to Israel (1991 - 1997).
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Our relations with Israel are good relations with the entire world diaspora. This means entering major financial markets. Thus, our national interests are: peace in the Middle East, Israel's technological potential and connection with the world Jewish community.
Author: In this situation, how do you feel about the principles of our policy in the Middle East?
Alexey Bovin:I have often been described in the Arab press as being pro-Israel. I have spoken on this issue many times in Israel and said: "I'm not pro-Israel, but pro-Russian." Where our interests coincide with those of Israel, I take a pro-Israel position. And where our interests coincide with the interests of the Arabs, I take a pro-Arab position. Because I express the interests of Russia. Paradoxically, I wrote to Moscow from Tel Aviv that now we need to increase attention to the Arabs.
Author: Don't you notice that there is a continuing struggle within our country over the level at which we should establish relations with Israel? And at the same time, is Israel influencing our establishment?
A. E. Bovin: I don't feel that Moscow can think about Israel right now. Moscow is preoccupied with its own affairs, domestic and foreign policy in the European direction, rather, in the American one. Israel offered a lot of opportunities for cooperation. We have no structures for this cooperation. We don't have any serious domestic partners for them. Unfortunately, there is no Israeli influence on us. I'm trying to organize it. I write to Moscow and say that as long as we continue to have anti-Semitism, we cannot think of good and stable relations with Israel. We need to end anti-Semitism, restore Jewish culture, theaters, and newspapers.
Author: Is anyone stopping this now?
Alexey Bovin: They don't interfere, but it's also a big question to help.
Author: And how do you see our role in relations between Israel and the Palestinians?
Alexey Bovin: Peaceful settlement is a central task. Our job (as well as that of the Americans) is to create the political conditions for Israel to have a direct conversation with its Arab neighbors, with the Palestinians. They must agree among themselves, they must find a compromise, I repeat, with our participation in terms of creating a favorable atmosphere for this. If Israel's security is disrupted, the entire peace settlement will collapse. If the rights of the Palestinians are violated, it will also collapse. Here is the biggest challenge: the tragedy is that both sides-both Israeli and Palestinian - are right. That's why it's so insanely difficult to solve this problem. There will be no peaceful settlement during the lifetime of my generation. The psychology of both Israelis and Arabs must change."
A. E. Bovin was replaced by Ambassador M. L. Bogdanov in March 1997, and G. P. Tarasov in February 2002. Both are professional diplomats.
After them, from January 31, 2007 to July 8, 2011, this post was also held by the professional diplomat P. V. Stegny.
Bilateral relations between Russia and Israel have been developing successfully.
Author 2: "Did the lifting of the ban on Jewish emigration or even on emigration from Russia matter?
Yevgeny Primakov: Of course, it was important for both Russian-American and Russian-Israeli relations. In the United States, there was a law (the Jackson-Veinick Amendment) that dealt a blow to economic ties with our country. Opening up the possibility of emigrating to Israel changed the situation. At the same time, it has had an impact on improving relations between Russia and Israel. The Arabs strongly opposed it, meaning mainly that it would strengthen Israel.
Author: But plus one million inhabitants in Israel did not play a fundamental role.
Yevgeny Primakov: I don't quite agree. You need to distinguish between quantity and quality. If you take the quality, many of those who came raised Israel.
Author: More than a million people have arrived. But the Arabs themselves at one time did not restrain, but encouraged emigration from Arab countries to Israel. Now there are more Jews - natives of Arab countries or their descendants - than those who came from Russia and the CIS.
E. M. Primakov: This is on the one hand. On the other hand, our relations with the Arabs should have been kept in mind at that time. It seems to me that the emigration of Jews and emigration from Russia in general may stop. It all depends on our social and economic situation."
Mass emigration from Russia and the former Soviet republics created a stable Russian-speaking minority in Israel in the 1980s and 1990s, approximately 1 million people. First, a visa to Israel for many emigrants from the USSR/Russia was a way to move to the United States. Then, under pressure from the Israeli government, a regular American visa was introduced to enter the United States on October 1, 1989, and immigrants willy-nilly ended up in Israel, where they most often settled. Among them was a very high percentage of ethnic Russians, family members or simply forged exit documents. For the first time, losing out in status to native Israelis (sabra) or immigrants from other countries
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West, Jews from Russia/The CIS countries quickly adapted and created their own influential political parties. There were practically no "leftists" among them.
Russia's political influence through Russian-speaking citizens of Israel was small. But the reverse influence of former Soviet / Russian Jews on the political course of Russia was significant. Through their contacts, the Israelis received such a quantity and quality of detailed information about the socio-political and economic situation in Russia that the US special services might envy them. Russian leaders were forced to reckon with sympathies for Israel in financial and economic circles and in the media.
On a number of international issues, especially in the fight against terrorism, Israel was on the side of Russia. If it wasn't about Israel itself and regional politics, its leadership was at least trying not to irritate Russia. In the Balkan affairs, in particular, on the fate of Kosovo, Tel Aviv's position was close to that of Moscow. When the South Ossetian conflict broke out (August 2008), the Israelis did not follow the anti-Russian line of the Western media, although at that time the Georgian Defense Minister was an Israeli citizen, David Kezerashvili, and the Georgian army had some Israeli weapons.3
Looking ahead, we note that the peak of Israeli support was the absence of an Israeli representative in the voting hall of the UN General Assembly when the issue of Crimea was raised. Technically, there was a strike of employees of the Israeli Foreign Ministry at that moment, but the gesture of Tel Aviv, i.e. non-participation in the vote, was obvious.
We will return to the Iranian nuclear issue later.
The level of cooperation between Israel and the United States, i.e., its main strategic partner and patron, was not comparable to the level of cooperation with Russia. But relations with Russia are self-sufficient for Israel. Cultural ties between the two countries are extensive. The most prominent Russian theater and music groups visited Israel and found a responsive and wide audience. In Israel, various friendship societies, organizations for the study of the Russian language and Russian culture began to function. Given the growth of the Russian Orthodox community, the fate of former Orthodox shrines has taken an important place.
In 2008, the territory and buildings of the St. Sergius Metochion, built with money from the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society in Jerusalem, were returned to Russia. Negotiations on this were conducted for a long time, meeting with the resistance of a number of Israeli structures.
Author: "During your time as ambassador, it was you who pushed for the return of the Sergiev Metochion. Is there still some disputed property there?
P. V. Stegny4: In 1964, as part of the" orange deal", we sold 22 plots of"Russian Palestine". I believe that this is already an established fact.
Author: Stupidity is done - do not change.
Pavel Stegny: It was a stupid thing to do, but under certain historical conditions. It's a long conversation. "Russian Palestine" was created by both geniuses and people who made many mistakes. When we returned to the years of the English mandate, the debt was already 140 thousand gold rubles. Then the debt grew. The 1960s were a difficult time for us, when we had to sell plots for fruit."
On April 27, 1994, the Russian-Israeli agreement regulating trade and economic relations was signed. The parties granted each other the most-favored-nation treatment and created a mixed commission. The scope of cooperation was broad. Many engineers who came from the CIS and Russia, having become Israeli citizens, easily found a common language and technical solutions with their Russian colleagues. A number of Israeli satellites were launched with the help of Russian launch vehicles. At the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Russian companies appeared in projects for gas production in Israel's offshore fields in the Mediterranean Sea. And in 2013 Mosmetrostroy, together with an Israeli company, has laid two tunnels for the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem high-speed line. Mutual trade grew, exceeding $3 billion by the second decade of the XXI century.
Military cooperation has become a completely new phenomenon in Russian-Israeli relations. Already in the mid-1990s, agreements were signed on the transfer of Israeli experience and modern weapons to Russia for anti-terrorist operations. In 2003, in the framework agreements for the protection of intellectual property rights, Israel committed to attract Russian firms to "modernize Russian-made equipment" (in fact, military equipment) in third countries.
In 2010, for the first time in history, a long-term Russian-Israeli agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed. According to Israeli licenses, Russia began to produce drones. But already in 2013, in the interests of national security, the Russian military-industrial complex was entrusted with the task of fully, with the exception of specially agreed cases, to ensure the production of weapons on its own, so as not to depend on the Russian military-industrial complex.
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foreign suppliers. However, Russian-Israeli cooperation in the supply of weapons to third countries continued.
Author: "We seem to have good relations with Israel. What are they based on? Emigration is almost exhausted. Trade of $3 billion. it's quite big every year, but it won't grow much. Our offshore companies hope to extract gas, but this is not comparable to the oil capabilities of Iraq. And politically, we often irritate them, just as they do us.
Pavel Stegny 5: I think we need to talk about other, special criteria in our relations with Israel. We are too historically connected. Netanyahu bluntly said that without the Russian diaspora, Israel would not exist. This is a generally accepted official thesis. In a sense, we can talk about Israel's gratitude to us. They also remember 1948, but the veterans have a slogan: "Without the 45th, there would be no 48th."
Author: That's right, without the victory over Nazi Germany, there would have been no Israel.
P. V. Stegny: They remember who liberated Auschwitz. In Netanya, on the Mediterranean coast, stands the only monument to the Red Army, built by the Israelis absolutely on their own initiative with their own money. By the way, it was built for Putin's visit in 2012. There are real people. In the Golan Heights, I met Yasha, an Israeli, the son of Sholokhov's personal physician from the village of Veshenskaya. "Afghan", in a vest, military uniform, with a beret on his bald head, absolutely "Soviet Cossack of Jewish origin", he began to raise sturgeon in the Golan and make beautiful caviar. I remember how he repeated Sholokhov's jokes to me and explained what a real yushka is. These people are the potential of our relations with Israel.
Author: Is it still there?
P. V. Stegny: It is increasing.
Author: Aren't their children becoming Israeli-Americans?
Pavel Stegny: No. They learn Russian. In the family and on courses. Development is underway. In different directions. On June 6, the birthday of Alexander Pushkin, I had invitations to at least 6 locations. When I arrived in some dingy town, an ensemble of violinists appeared on the stage of the village club in tailcoats. They played Tchaikovsky in such a way that you can't stop listening. And in the club (there were many Jews from Birobidzhan), the walls are covered with wallpaper "Christmas trees in the snow".
Here and come up with general standards!
When you sit there with intellectuals, they insult everyone and everything and start crying when they see these Christmas trees in the snow. And young people are the same. They have one and a half hundred Jewish Heroes of the Soviet Union. You can imagine: a monument has been erected to everyone! Each.
We arrived at a kibbutz, and there a choir of old women began to sing our songs: "Blue Handkerchief", "Roads". I say: "Our songs", and one old woman says to me: "No, these are our songs. First of all, we translated them into Hebrew, and secondly, we fought under these songs back in ' 48."
I am talking about those things that are out of the field of view of political scientists. And this is the "vinaigrette" that makes up our relationship.
Author: How long will Israel continue to have a special attitude towards us?
Pavel Stegny: The modern Israeli is largely a product of Russian culture, or rather, a product of two cultures: Jewish and Russian. And this mysterious Slavic soul in it gets along with an equally mysterious Jewish soul. A new type appears.
I'm not saying that Israel is "Russianizing". By the way, they are very fond of the Russian language and Russian culture. Unlike our Ukrainian brothers, there are no inferiority complexes. The "melting pot" works, although no one is engaged in it, the process goes naturally. Some parts are "melted down" into another culture, but there is no rejection of Russian roots. Moreover, there is also pride in Russia."
MINEFIELDS OF IRAQ
After defeating Saddam's Iraq, the United States took steps to prevent the revival of its armed forces and, especially, the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). All members of the UN Security Council agreed to this. International sanctions imposed by him prevented the import of weapons, limited the volume of oil sales and the list of goods imported into Iraq. Resolution No. 687 of 3 April 1991 called for the complete dismantling of the development of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles. Until this was achieved, all economic sanctions remained in place.
A special Commission of UN Inspectors monitored the disarmament of Iraq from 1991 to 1998. Under their supervision, stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons, missiles and factories for their production were destroyed. The IAEA Commission, working together with the UN Special Mission, eliminated all infrastructure that could be used for the production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
The UN Security Council's oil-for-food program allowed Iraq to import humanitarian products. In 1995, its nomenclature was expanded, and in 1999 a larger volume of oil exports was allowed. If the ban on the import of weapons was ab-
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If the oil is salty and efficient enough, then it is smuggled with large discounts to Turkey and Jordan, or mixed with Iranian oil and exported as Iranian products.
In general, there was no famine in Iraq, but restrictions on the import of medicines, for example, affected the situation of the population and led to an increase in child mortality.
In exchange for the elimination of WMD and missile production, the Iraqi leadership sought the easing or lifting of sanctions. Relations with the UN Special Commission immediately became confrontational. The inspectors demanded access at any time to any sites in Iraq, including military bases and presidential palaces. Saddam Hussein saw these demands not only as a personal insult, but he rightly believed that the UN commission included American and British intelligence officers who collected information for future attacks on Iraq. The head of the Special Commission, Australian Richard Butler, actually fulfilled the tasks set by Washington.
Washington hoped that the collapse of Saddam Hussein's Kuwait adventure and the heavy consequences of sanctions would strengthen and activate the Iraqi opposition and lead to the fall of the Baathist regime. This would make it possible to change the entire political architecture of the Middle East in the right direction for the United States and at the same time establish control over Iraqi oil.
But the repressive apparatus of the Ba'athist regime persisted, and the regime itself temporarily retained its stability. The tug of war began. The aura of American military victory began to fade over the years. The weakening of Iraq meant an increase in Iran's influence in the region, which raised many questions about the effectiveness of Washington's policies.
Saddam Hussein, in order to maintain his prestige within the country and ease sanctions, began to allow himself actions that the United States considered provocative. In 1994, he moved elite units of the Iraqi army to the border of Kuwait, hoping to use military demonstrations to get sanctions lifted or eased.
This is a chance for the United States to once again demonstrate who is the main force in the region and "punish" Iraq.
When the danger of a second Kuwait crisis became real, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev visited Baghdad. He convinced the Iraqi leadership to start withdrawing troops from the border with Kuwait and recognize the independence of this state. The Security Council adopted resolution No. 949, in which it repeated some Russian-Iraqi language from the joint Russian-Iraqi communique: "Iraq has confirmed its readiness to positively resolve the issue of recognizing the sovereignty of Kuwait and its borders, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution No. 833." 6
In general, Russia, with the support of China and France, sought to ease sanctions against Iraq. But the United States stubbornly stood its ground.
Kozyrev commented on his actions as follows:: "We have stated from the very beginning that a military solution to the issue should be considered only as a last resort if it comes to a war in the Persian Gulf. We countered this by relying on a political initiative. This was the point of my trip to the region, undertaken on behalf of the President of Russia."
Immediately, he curtsied to the United States, which simply had a "misunderstanding of the situation." 7
The United States was not happy with its loyal partner A. Kozyrev, because his activity limited their choice of a pretext and time for launching a strike on Iraq. But Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported the Russian initiative.
It is interesting to note that A. Kozyrev's actions caused quite a heated discussion in the country. They were approved by some media outlets and condemned by others, mostly pro-Western ones. Moskovsky Komsomolets, for example, wrote: "Once again, through its (Moscow's) efforts, Washington has lost the fruits of an effective military strike against its adversaries. Once again, Russia's" diplomatic victory " leaves a sense of second freshness. Once again, dubious political acquisitions. " 8
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs V. Lukin, former ambassador of the new, "democratic" Russia in Washington, a former dissident and "pro-Western democrat", could not resist criticizing Kozyrev: "We again dreamed of the laurels of world peacekeepers, and it is the passion for show-off, the "Potemkin village" syndrome, that is ruining us. As a result, we managed to ruin something that should have been treated more carefully - working relations with the US administration. If the goal of Smolenskaya Square was to annoy the strongest and richest country, then this goal has been achieved. " 9
Another crisis in relations with the UN Special Commission broke out in 1997. At that moment, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was E. M. Primakov, who believed that the Americans needed a pretext for launching a new military strike. Saddam Hussein demanded the immediate expulsion of American inspectors from Iraq. To show Saddam Hussein the seriousness of the situation, Russia supported a Security Council resolution condemning Iraq,
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which was adopted unanimously.
Moreover, on November 17, Yeltsin sent a message to Hussein: "We are doing everything in our power to prevent a strike on Iraq. Today, at 10: 00 a.m., I once again spoke on the phone with President Clinton about this... I would like to ask you not only to publicly confirm that Iraq not only does not refuse to cooperate with the Special Commission, but also to invite the Special Commission inspectors to return to Iraq to continue their work normally. Naturally, this meant a return in the previous composition... I would ask you to take this message of mine very seriously. " 10
Almost immediately, by agreement, Tariq Aziz (Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq in 1979-2003) flew to Moscow. On November 17-19, negotiations were held with him. The Special Commission was returned to Iraq on November 20. The conflict was resolved through the mediation of Russia. But it flared up again the following year, leading to US military strikes in Iraq.
Russia believed that if the complete elimination of a particular weapon of mass destruction and the possibility of its production were proven, then a number of sanctions should have been eased or lifted accordingly. This position was supported by France and China. However, the United States and the United Kingdom were ready to lift or ease sanctions only if the entire dossier on all WMD and missiles was closed.
Saddam Hussein's defiant behavior gave new reasons for the United States and Britain to exert military and political pressure on Iraq.
The Iraqis, as a reward, provided Russian companies with great opportunities to import food and non-military goods to Iraq. The economic result for Russia was limited and not without irony, because the country itself was no longer able to provide for the production and export of many goods. And "Russian companies" operated from offshore companies as intermediaries in other countries.
The Iraqi government has signed a contract for the development of the West Qurna oil fields with a Russian company. However, its entry into force was due to the complete lifting of sanctions. So far, Russian diplomacy has failed to contain either the US military fervor or Saddam Hussein's provocative behavior.
The UN Special Commission effectively ceased its work in 1998. 2000-2002 Iraq did not allow UN inspectors to enter the country, demanding the lifting of economic sanctions.
TURKEY HAS BECOME A PRIVILEGED TRADING PARTNER 11
In the 1990s, Russia's economic cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, declined. During this period, Turkey came to the fore, and the parties were convinced that their economies were complementary. The official trade turnover for the same period increased to $5 billion.
The "suitcase" trade has become significant. It is estimated that the volume of small-batch supplies of Turkish consumer goods rose to $5 billion in 2000, providing income for tens of thousands of Russian and Turkish citizens. Russian tourists began to quickly develop Turkish resorts, and by the end of the 1990s, Russian tourism to Turkey became widespread, and in the zero years it grew even more. Turkish contract construction in Russia has become widespread.
Major joint projects were becoming more and more clearly highlighted.
Turkey's growing economy needed energy resources, and Russia was an energy-surplus country.
In the 1990s, a legal framework was created for cooperation in both the economic and political fields. In May 1992, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Turkey signed an agreement on the establishment of a joint intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation, and a few days later-an agreement on the basis of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. The parties confirmed their intention to maintain and strengthen good-neighborly relations that have developed historically, as well as to promote stability in the region.
In April 1994, an agreement on cooperation on military-technical issues and in the defense industry was signed. The parties agreed on military-technical cooperation in a number of important areas, including personnel training. Russia has agreed to supply helicopters to Turkey.
Agreements on cultural and scientific cooperation, tourism, and customs affairs followed.
During the visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Chernomyrdin to Ankara in December 1997, seven intergovernmental agreements, treaties and protocols were signed at once. Among them: the agreement on the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income, on the promotion and mutual protection of investments, on cooperation in the field of energy, etc.
But the main thing, of course, was the agreement on the supply of Russian natural gas to the Republic of Turkey through the Black Sea. The volumes of gas that Russia has pledged to supply and Turkey to purchase have been determined: the parties have outlined an increase
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volumes from 0.5 billion cubic meters. in 2000, up to $ 16 billion in 2007-2025 and agreed to build a gas pipeline: Russia - on its territory and across the Black Sea, Turkey-on the land part of its territory. In November 1999, the route of the Blue Stream gas pipeline was determined - from the village of Izobilnoye in Russia to the city of Samsun in Turkey.
In April 2000, an agreement was signed on cooperation in the protection of marine areas on the Black Sea.
Russia's relations with Turkey have developed unevenly. Political differences often clashed with economic logic. One of the objects of mutual misunderstanding was the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline. Responding to calls from the United States and Western Europe, and hoping to gain additional leverage and revenue, Turkey has supported the construction of this pipeline, designed to supply oil from the Caspian region, bypassing Russia. It was a politicized pipeline that never started working at the declared capacity.
Author: "Has our position on the Baku-Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline somehow evolved? Has the pipe been filled in, or is it still a "white elephant"?
P. V. Stegny 12: This is a "political trumpet". Everyone knows that the pipe is one-third full. Everyone knows perfectly well that in the near future, if the pipeline from Turkmenistan is not connected, everything will remain the same. There is less oil in Azerbaijan than they shouted at the time. But our skirmish on "pipeline diplomacy" in the first half of the noughties never seemed logical to me. Lukoil participated in the company from the very beginning. It had 7.5%. When the Americans started doing everything possible to prevent us from having East - West oil and gas pipelines, instead of gaining a foothold in Baku-Ceyhan, we withdrew Lukoil. It was a mistake."
There were many other points of disagreement and mutual irritation. Moscow has condemned Turkish incursions into northern Iraq aimed at bases of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party, which has led the armed struggle of Turkish Kurds against the central government. We did not like the close cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv at that time. Ankara was irritated by Russia's intention to sell S-300 missiles to Cyprus. Moscow and Ankara had different positions on Bosnia and Kosovo.
In the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Ankara, of course, was on the side of Baku. Moscow called for a political solution, as if taking an objectivist position, which was interpreted by the Turks as a "pro-Armenian bias". Indeed, cooperation between Russia and Armenia has become increasingly close.
Russian-Turkish relations were poisoned both by excessive Turkish activity with anti-Russian overtones in Central Asia and by events in Chechnya.
Author: "When Demirel was still in power (once again Prime Minister in 1991-1992, and then president in 1993-2000), pan-Turkist sentiments that had been dormant before emerged in Turkey: "We will be the leaders of the Turks (there is no difference in Turkish-Turks and Turks) who separated from the former Russia."
Turks in the former Soviet Union began to invest money in schools, colleges, and invite entrepreneurs to their homes. We tried to invest money ourselves. But over time, it turned out that Senka didn't have the right hat - he didn't have enough strength. This subsided by itself.
But with Russia, on the contrary, it went up and up.
Why do Turks of various political orientations still have common sense and a certain sense of benevolence towards Russia? How can these Turkish fluctuations be explained?
P. V. Stegny 13: After 1991, the Turks could not understand what was happening at first. We, i.e. the USSR, collapsed for show or not really? They did not understand our relations with Central Asia - then Central Asia, our relations with Eastern Europe - now Central Europe. They didn't know how long it would take. Therefore, under Demirel with his "Eastern policy" there was a reaction: to fill the vacuum, to stake out as much as possible. But it passed pretty quickly.
They did not expect that everything would fall apart so quickly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For them, since Soviet times, Central Asia and the Caucasus have been a single system within the USSR. They didn't expect that when the magnetic field of discipline, including party discipline, was turned off, everything would fall apart. Of course, there were also illusions nurtured by the West, and some nationalist sentiments that distorted the picture. In general, they realized that they would not pull Central Asia.
The Turks had positive results only where they managed to create the foundation of economic cooperation. Once they got to Central Asia and the Caucasus, they suddenly saw that the main thing there was to steal everything as quickly as possible.
The Turks, like us, were not prepared for the fact that these countries, having jumped from feudalism through capitalism directly into socialism, would jump back, almost to tribal feudalism, and would feel great. At least on a psychological level. They, the Turks, were constantly "thrown" in Georgia, "thrown" in Central Asia.
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Author: "Threw" and in Russia, and not only the Turks. I myself have seen Saudi-Yemeni capital squeezed out of oil projects on Sakhalin or Omani capital squeezed out of oil pipelines. They stole - yes, even as! They stole - and in Russia.
Pavel Stegny: The Turks came to me and complained.
Yes, we also "threw" each other with the Turks. Here was the Ramstore chain of stores. The Turks honestly created 22 department stores, some of the buildings were built, some were rented. Then, in one day, we raised the rent three times. They came running to me... I wrote. It's like going into a black hole.
But, oddly enough, everything was organized faster for us. Our " capitalists "well understood the Turks, who" put "where it was necessary, as well as the" capitalists " in our country.
Author: There was not enough economic base to increase the role of Turkey in Central Asia?
Pavel Stegny: There was no stability. But there are still some cultural connections.
Author: The Turks failed in their megaplans regarding Central Asia. But what was the attitude to the Caucasus, including the North Caucasus? After all, during the Chechen wars, the Chechen community in Turkey worked very actively against Russia, and the Turkish leadership turned a blind eye to this.
Pavel Stegny: Of course, it all happened...
The problems started not even with the Chechen war, but with GUUAM - a kind of pro-American "union" of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova. The Americans tried to rebuild the" pro-reform"," democratic " post-Soviet states in this format. The Turks initially supported this idea, but GUUAM was stillborn.
There is a special position on the Caucasus. There are 7 million descendants of people from the Caucasus, including Georgia, living in Turkey.
Author: They usually already consider themselves Turks, but they don't forget their roots.
Pavel Stegny: Trails from Chechnya have been established to visit relatives in Turkey who have been living there for a century. Chechens in Turkey studied and were treated. There were camps for "stateless persons" near Istanbul. Then the attitude of the Turks changed after Erdogan came to power. He believed that Chechnya was "not our (i.e., not Turkish) problem." He came with his own agenda. It was in the noughties."
But already in the 1990s, the two countries began to find an increasingly broad field for interaction. During a visit to Moscow in May 1998 by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ismail Karadai, the two sides agreed on military cooperation, including training, joint maneuvers, and the purchase of some military equipment. 14 This was an unexpected move for a NATO member country.
If we evaluate the essence of the two countries ' approaches to their relations in the 1990s, it can be summarized as follows: expand the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and narrow or ignore differences. This made it possible to create conditions for the rapid development of cooperation in the zero years.
DIFFICULT MOVEMENT TOWARDS EACH OTHER 1'
The new Russia in Iran has ceased to be called "the second great Satan". Even in Soviet times, bilateral relations began to intensify: in June 1989, during the visit of the Speaker of the Mejlis A. A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani to the USSR, a Declaration on the principles of military cooperation relations was signed, and then a number of programs concretizing the Declaration.
Under the new conditions, the two countries found many points of common ground and mutual interests, although there were still differences. The refusal to support the Chechen separatists was caused by fears of the Iranian leadership for the unity of the multinational Iran itself. No one in Tehran forgot that, for example, there were twice as many Azerbaijanis in Iran as in the newly independent Azerbaijan, and Kurds or Balochs could once again express their national aspirations.
But when assessing the events in Chechnya, the Iranians made a gesture of goodwill to Russia. In the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Tehran strongly supported Armenia, which objectively helped Russia's neutral position aimed at a political settlement of the conflict.
Both sides were opposed to the Taliban in Afghanistan and supported the northerners - Tajiks and Uzbeks - against them until in August 1998, when the Taliban captured Mazar-I-Sherif and approached the borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Both sides worked to reach a compromise between the armed Islamist opposition and the secular government of Tajikistan. Moscow knew that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which was given responsibility for relations with the Muslim states of the CIS, helped the Islamists of Tajikistan (although they were Sunni) financially and militarily. Tajik fighters received training in Iranian camps, and their headquarters were located in Iran. But the desire to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan was mutual, and the efforts of Moscow and Tehran were crowned with success.
The interests of the two sides in the Caspian Sea and its oil and gas resources coincided for some time. At first, Moscow and Tehran claimed that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was not applicable to the closed Caspian Sea,
page 34
with the understanding that the Soviet-era treaties between Moscow and Tehran of 1921 and 1940 continue to be the legal basis for the division of Caspian waters and resources, with a modification that takes into account the possible requirements of the new coastal states - Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.
These three countries, which did not exist as independent states in the early 1990s, would like to apply this convention, which would allow them to share the sea without the participation of Moscow and Tehran. The July 6, 1998 signing of the agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on sharing the resources of the Caspian Sea created some tension between Moscow and Tehran. But it became a fait accompli and set a precedent in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.
In March 2001, during the official visit of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Russia, a joint statement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea was signed, which confirmed the validity of the agreements of 1921 and 1940 and stated that both countries " do not officially recognize any borders on this sea until the legal regime of the Caspian Sea is improved." that Iran agrees to divide the sea only into five equal parts according to the number of Caspian littoral states. At the same time, in a joint statement, the parties indicated their rejection of laying any trans - Caspian oil and gas pipelines along the seabed.16
Russian-Iranian trade grew in the 1990s. Although it was smaller than the Russian-Turkish border, it was still significant and differed in nomenclature. Russia has agreed to supply MIG-29 and Su-24 aircraft to its neighbor across the Caspian Sea on the basis of old agreements signed during the Soviet era.
But Russia has been extremely cautious in its military cooperation with Iran, given the US position. In 1995, an agreement was signed between US Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Russia pledged not to enter into new arms deals with Iran, although it retained the right to fulfill its previous Soviet contracts.
When Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi visited Russia in February 1998, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that Russia would not discuss agreements on new arms supplies to Iran, although it would fulfill old contracts. At that time, Russia did not respond to Iran's request to purchase S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, which Russia promised to supply to Cyprus.
In January 1995, after several years of negotiations and the conclusion of several preliminary agreements, Russia signed a contract with Iran for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr with a capacity of 1 thousand tons. MW, worth $1.2 billion. Formally, it was like a continuation of the previous construction, started and abandoned by the company "Siemens". Some of the structures of the future station were destroyed by Iraqi bombing. In fact, it was a new project. The contract entered into force in January 1996.
The United States tried to disrupt this deal through both diplomatic and commercial channels. Moscow expressed surprise at American criticism of Russia's involvement in Iran's peaceful nuclear program. "Indeed, we are helping the Iranians build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr," said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Putin. Posuvalyuk to the editor-in-chief of "Monde diplomatique" A. Gresch - but this construction is under strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are fulfilling all our international obligations. " 17
In the 1990s, agreements were signed on legal assistance in civil and criminal cases, on cooperation in the market economy, on trade and economic cooperation, and on the avoidance of double taxation. On September 11, 2000, Russia, India and Iran signed an Agreement on the North-South International transport corridor, which was designed to ensure the transit of goods from Europe to the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
On March 12, 2001, during M. Khatami's visit, an Agreement was signed on the basis of relations and Principles of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which laid the legal foundations for long-term bilateral relations in the political, trade, technical, economic, scientific and cultural spheres.
Each of the countries pledged not to use force or the threat of force in mutual relations, not to use its territory to commit aggression, subversive and separatist actions against the other country. If one of the States was subjected to aggression by any State, the other State should not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor that contributes to the continuation of aggression, and should help to resolve the differences that have arisen on the basis of the UN Charter and international law. 18
Russian diplomacy and the Russian leadership have repeatedly stated their firm unwillingness to see the appearance of a state with weapons of mass destruction on their borders.
page 35
destruction. Russia did not provide any assistance in creating Iran's missile program, although it is possible that there may have been some illegal transactions outside of government control. In November 1997, an Iranian citizen was expelled from Russia for attempting to gain access to missile-related technology.
In May 1998, Moscow tightened export controls on all companies operating in the field of nuclear missile technology. President Boris Yeltsin's official spokesman said: "The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, technologies for their production and means of delivery, especially in countries adjacent to or close to Russia, is considered a serious threat to Russia's security." 19
Despite this statement, both chambers of the US Congress passed an act of sanctions against companies that had "credible evidence" that they were helping Iran's missile program. This decision was coveted by President Clinton. But the president, in agreement with Congress, imposed sanctions on 9 Russian companies and institutions that were suspected of helping Iran with its missile program. In Moscow, they said that they will study the activities of these companies.
It is possible that in the" cursed nineties " in the giant rocket-building complex of Russia there might have been those who wanted to be tempted by Iranian proposals. But such attempts were resolutely suppressed.
Since the election of the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatami as President of Iran in May 1997, the Clinton administration has become somewhat kinder to Iran. In May 1998, Washington ended legal proceedings against Total (France), Gazprom (Russia) and Petronas (Malaysia), which had signed agreements with Iran to develop huge gas fields. This meant that the Americans seemed to have retreated from their hardline position.
In Moscow, the rapprochement between the United States and Iran was perceived with both irony and apprehension. Ironically, because the two countries ' old scores have not been settled, and fearfully, because potentially broad Iranian-American economic cooperation would have pushed Russia to the margins.
But when a tougher Ahmadinejad took over as Iran's president in 2005, normalization of relations with the United States was delayed for years.
Until the 1980s, Kuwait remained the only Arab State in the Persian Gulf that had diplomatic relations with Russia. After the collapse of the Iraqi adventure in 1991, the USSR/Russia has opened embassies in all the countries of the Persian Gulf. In gratitude for its position, it received loans of $2.5 billion. from Saudi Arabia and $1 billion. from Kuwait.
Some connections began to be established. New Russian businessmen have also appeared here. Inspired by the experience of getting rich quickly in their own country, they initially hoped for the same result in the Gulf countries. Many of them had expected to find primitive merchants just dismounted from the back of a camel. But it turned out that their potential partners, who were educated in the best business schools in the West, often in the second and third generation, are professionally higher than them by a head.
Adaptation to local conditions was not easy. But already in the 1990s. Several thousand Russian citizens, including their family members, have settled in the United Arab Emirates - businessmen, computer scientists, and tour operators.
The visit of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation V. S. Chernomyrdin to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in 1994 was a definite step towards strengthening relations. Hopes have been raised for broader political, economic, and even military cooperation.
The journey was not easy. The political atmosphere was poisoned by the events in Chechnya. In Saudi Arabia, with the government's benevolent attitude, "charitable" foundations began to operate, through which funding and often arms supplies to Chechen separatists went. Sentiments of anti-Russian solidarity with Chechen Muslims were fueled not only in the Gulf countries, but also in the Muslim world as a whole. Russia has been harshly criticized, including by Saudi representatives, at meetings of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Al-Qaeda's anti-government activities directed against the Kingdom and the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 were still to be experienced, so that anti-Russian sentiments would be muted for a while (before the events in Syria).
DESIRED PARTNER 20
the USSR/Russia and Egypt, former de facto Cold War allies who found themselves on opposite sides of the fence in the 1970s, were slowly moving towards each other by the early 1990s. This, it would seem, was facilitated by the turn of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership to cooperation with the United States and the end of the Cold War. National interests of the USSR/Russia and Egypt did not contradict each other, but, on the contrary, they coincided in most positions.
However, the complexity of "reformatting" the entire system in relation to-
page 36
Economic difficulties of both the USSR/ Russia and Egypt complicated the process of rapprochement and coordination of positions. That is why President Mubarak's visit to Moscow in 1990 was so colorless, and his negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev were virtually fruitless.
The vector of Egypt's foreign policy and economic interests was turned to the West, to the United States. This allowed the country to join the anti-Saddam coalition in 1990-1991 and receive a serious reward for this. Almost $50 billion was written off. Egyptian debts, including military ones, to Western countries.
The "restart" of bilateral relations between Moscow and Cairo, which failed at that time, resulted in a noticeable reduction in trade and economic ties that were already experiencing a decline. The volume of mutual trade rapidly decreased: from $1.2 billion. at the end of 1980 to $350 million in 1991. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, its participation in the implementation of social and economic projects in Egypt had ceased.21
Egypt, while remaining the center of political life in the Middle East and North Africa, objectively retained its strategic importance for Russia. But interest in it in the Russian leadership was temporarily lost.
The decline in Russian-Arab and, in particular, Russian-Egyptian relations was most pronounced in the early 1990s. Its relative short-term duration and dynamics of emerging from the "lowest point of decline" were largely determined by fundamental circumstances - the complex of humanitarian, cultural and economic ties between the USSR and the countries of the Arab East, and especially Egypt, that has historically developed since the mid-1950s.
The business partnership has not been completely curtailed, but ties have become sporadic. Thus, in November 1992, two contracts were signed between the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian "Technopromexiort". The amount of contracts for the modernization of a number of nodes of the Aswan hydroelectric power station, as well as for the construction of a high-voltage power transmission line with a length of 130 km amounted to $38 million.22
At the same time, political contacts also continued, and although they were significantly eroded in previous years, they were relatively easy to revive due to the mutual high motivation of partners who are objectively interested in rapprochement.
In the mid-1990s, several exchanges of delegations, carefully prepared by both sides, took place at once, which marked the beginning of a renewal of Russian-Egyptian relations in the political and economic fields and their legal basis.
It was necessary to solve the problem of Egyptian debt to the former USSR. Steps were taken to overcome the accumulated "blockages"in the 1970s and 1980s. At the end of 1994, in Cairo, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov signed a package of important documents - an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, a protocol on cooperation in the field of energy, and an agreement on the settlement of mutual debts based on the"zero option". The signed documents provided for the participation of the Russian side in the construction and reconstruction of a number of Egyptian industrial facilities, in particular the Helwan Metallurgical Plant, the phosphate deposit, and the ferroalloy plant.
In February 1995, the State Minister for International Cooperation of EGYPT, Youssef Boutros-Ghali, visited Moscow (his uncle Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected UN Secretary General in the 1980s with the support of the Soviet Union), who continued negotiations with O. D. Davydov. In March 1995, Russian Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev paid a visit to Cairo, where he was received by President Xavier. Mubarak. They discussed key issues affecting the interests of both Russia and Egypt: the Middle East settlement, and bilateral relations.
The gradual reanimation of political and economic cooperation was followed by attempts to restore military-technical cooperation. In July 1996, First Deputy Defense Minister A. A. Kokoshin visited Cairo, and then the Egyptian naval base in Alexandria, which was being built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union.
In March 1996, the conference "Russia and the Arab World: Prospects for Business Cooperation" was held in Cairo with the participation of the Russian delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations (since 1993) V. P. Karastin. It consists of 120 Russian businessmen, most of them from the Moscow region. The Egyptian delegation included hundreds of local entrepreneurs and was headed by the Minister of Supply and Internal Trade of Egypt, Ahmed Guaili. The conference was held under the direct supervision of ARE President Hosni Mubarak and Prime Minister Ahmed al-Ganzouri.
The author of these lines was the organizer of the conference and believed that it was a step towards finding a mechanism to overcome obstacles to business partnership, including lending transactions, insurance, transport and other pressing issues.
During these years, Russian tourism to the "land of pyramids"has become a new channel of cooperation. In 1995, visit Egypt-
page 37
about 111 thousand Russian tourists 23. Of course, this figure seems insignificant compared to what was achieved 20 years later, but the beginning was encouraging.
In 1996, following trade and economic ties, political ones became more active. In April 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Cairo as part of a Middle East trip. "My visit to the Middle East is dictated by the desire to strengthen and activate Russia's role in the Middle East settlement. Egypt can be sure that Russia will pursue a line aimed at the continuity of all the decisions taken earlier, and will do everything to ensure that:.. the agreed approaches were implemented and continued"24.
Cultural and spiritual ties between Russia and Egypt did not stop. One example was the decision of the Academic Council of the prestigious Cairo Islamic University "Al-Azhar" to approve the translation of the Koran prepared by the Russian Arabist Valeria Prokhorova. "This is the first true interpretation of the Holy Book in Russian, "Al - Azhar experts said of the new Russian translation of the Qur'an.25 Prior to V. Prokhorova, the Koran was translated in Russia twice - in the 19th century by the Russian orientalist Gordiy Sablukov and in the 20th century by the famous Soviet orientalist Ignatiy Krachkovsky.
In September 1996, the Russian Ambassador to Egypt, V. V. Gudev, donated to the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies 16 documents from Russian archives related to Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1958-1970 and the activities of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser26.
"Theater season 2000 I once again confirmed the indisputable truth that Russians make up the golden fund of world ballet, " the Egyptian media noted, commenting on the Bolshoi Theater's tour in Cairo on 27.
Traditionally, a special place in the framework of bilateral cooperation was occupied by relations in the field of education, mainly vocational and technical. In early 2001, the Egyptian capital hosted a seminar on "Higher Education in Russia", which was attended by a group of rectors of Russian universities headed by the Minister of Education of the Russian Federation V. M. Filippov.
In 1997, when new conditions for Russian-Egyptian cooperation were formed, the President of Egypt paid a visit to Egypt. Mubarak to Russia. Following the talks, a package of documents was signed. Among them were, in particular, intergovernmental agreements on the avoidance of double taxation; on the promotion and mutual protection of investments; on cooperation in maritime transport; the treaty on mutual legal assistance and legal relations in civil, commercial and family matters; the memorandum on cooperation in the prevention of natural disasters and the elimination of emergency situations; the protocol of the first meeting of the Russian-Egyptian Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.
The English-language Al-Ahram Weekly wrote: "X. Mubarak brought with him to Moscow not only the desire to raise bilateral economic ties to a new level. He wanted to make it clear to Russia that it should live up to its responsibility as a co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process, and warn that if Moscow continues to ignore relations with the Arab world, it will in turn gradually forget Russia. " 28
"Egyptians still remember the help provided by the former Soviet Union to Egypt in creating such giants of industry as the high-rise Aswan dam, the Helwan steel Mill and the aluminum complex in Nag Hammadi, "noted the influential English-language edition of the International Gazette. "Now, in the face of falling ideological barriers and radical economic and political changes in both countries, it is necessary to build relations on a new basis." 29
The political dialogue acquired a constant and trusting character - an important indicator of the partners ' responsible approach to building up bilateral relations. In the second half of the 1990s, the Russian-Egyptian intergovernmental agreements continued to be updated, which also contributed to the expansion of trade exchange.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Cairo in 2001. At a meeting with the President of Egypt, Igor Ivanov called Egypt's position "verified and absolutely correct", aimed at achieving a lasting and just peace in the region. The Russian minister pointed out his support for the Egyptian-Jordanian peace initiative and the report of the George Mitchell international commission. "We believe that the two mentioned documents, provided they are implemented, will be able to bring the situation out of the current very difficult situation," Ivanov said. Monopolizing the role of a single State as a mediator in peace negotiations will drive the situation into a dead end. Russia should play a more active role... " 30.
In May 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Ahmed Maher, visited Russia. One of the main topics of the talks in Moscow was
page 38
building up trade and economic ties, the volume of which "did not suit either Moscow or Cairo." Of course, they also discussed traditional topics: the Middle East peace process, mainly the Israeli-Palestinian track, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and the problems of solving the region's problems by political and diplomatic means.
Since the mid-1990s, Russia's political dialogue with the Arab-Muslim world and Egypt, in particular, has focused on the problem of the North Caucasus, with an emphasis on Chechnya.
On Chechnya, Cairo adhered to the position of "positive neutrality". It came down to the fact that, taking into account the international role of Egypt in the Islamic world, on the one hand, and Cairo's desire to develop friendly relations with Russia, on the other, the leadership of Egypt sought to contribute to the denouement of the "Caucasian knot".
Cairo advocated a peaceful political solution to the accumulated problems, which would take into account the interests of the peoples of the Caucasus as much as possible, while recognizing the Chechen conflict as an internal matter of Russia. Although the local media maintained a calm tone in assessing the events in the North Caucasus, they drew their facts from Western sources, which could not but influence the growth of anti-Russian sentiment among Egyptian Muslims.
In the 1990s, Russian-Egyptian relations went through two stages in their evolution: the "stagnant" stage, which spanned the first half of the last decade of the twentieth century, and the stage that replaced it, when Moscow and Cairo were reviving their efforts to overcome the decline and clear the rubble on the way to renewing cooperation in accordance with the realities of a globalizing world. Since the mid-1990s, more reliable conditions - economic and political-have been formed to fulfill this urgent task for both sides.
By the early 2000s, the international and regional agenda has become a central part of interstate contacts between the two countries. The coincidence of their positions encouraged them to deepen their cooperation. But Russia's economic weakness, Egypt's dependence on U.S. aid, and the extent of its trade and economic relations with Western countries determined its foreign policy course.
Egypt was a welcome partner for Russia. But in the specific circumstances, it simply could not be the main door through which Russia could return to the Middle East.
And this return, as well as to the Middle East and the African continent, was bound to take place after the cursed 90's. For, in the essence of geopolitical interaction in the world, Russia is inevitably destined by its historical fate to play the role of a great power.
It has no other choice, no matter how much the situation inside the country affects its foreign policy.
But this problem gives rise to the topics of subsequent publications.
1 Interview with A. E. Bovin, April 1992
2 Interview with E. M. Primakov, January 2014
3 Arguments of the week, 04.09.2008
4 Interview with P. V. Stegnii, September 2014
5 Ibid.
6 Cit. By: Opimpiev A. Yu., Khazanov A.M. Mezhdunarodnye problemy Mizhne Vostoka, 1960 - e-2013. Moscow, UNITY-DANA, 2013 p. 104.
7 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
8 Ibid., p. 152.
9 Ibid., p. 153.
Primakov E. M. 10 Confidential: The Middle East on stage and behind the scenes (the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century). 2nd edition, supplemented and revised. Moscow, "Rossiyskaya Gazeta". 2012. p. 326.
11 The section uses materials collected by A. S. Khodunov.
12 Interview with P. V. Stegnii, March 2015
13 Ibid.
14 The Middle East, Russia and the New States, a monthly report, June 1998. European Press Agency, Brussels.
15 Material for this section was collected by N. A. Filin, L. M. Ravandi-Fadai, and A. S. Khodunov.
Dunaeva E. V. 16 New turns of Caspian Diplomacy (on changing the positions of the Caspian states on the legal status of the Caspian Sea). Middle East and Modernity. Collection of articles. Issue 11. Moscow, 2000, p. 87.
Gresh Alain. 17 Russia's Return to the Middle East // Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 28, No. 1 (Autumn, 1998). p. 70.
18 Treaty on the Basis of Relations and Principles of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 12.03.2001 - http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/A3B11AE8762B343257E75004897F4.
19 International Herald Tribune, 15.05.1998.
20 Section is based on the manuscript of M. L. Bogdanov "Transformation of relations between Russia and Egypt (1991 - 2011)", dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences.
21 Russia in the Middle East and North Africa in the Era of Globalization, Moscow, 2011. PML IAfr RAS, p. 74.
22 Russian-Egyptian relations. Economics / / Africa. Encyclopedia. Moscow, LLC "Publishing House "Encyclopedia". 2011. pp. 814-818.
23 Pulse of the planet. November 20, 1996.
24 ITAR-TASS. October 31, 1996.
25 Pulse of the planet. September 12, 1996.
26 ITAR-TASS. September 16, 1996.
27 Pulse of the planet. August 3, 2000.
28 Pulse of the planet. September 24, 1997; The Jamestown Foundation. September 11, 1997; Egyptian President to visit Moscow; www.egypt.mid.ru/arab/hist/Index.html
29 Russian-African relations. History / / Africa. Encyclopedia. Moscow, LLC "Publishing House "Encyclopedia". 2011, pp. 125-127.
30 www.miri.ru/bdomp/dip-vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567870042ее43/Ь954а8е/; ИТАР-ТАСС. May 31, 2001.
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