The famous writer S. Zweig, using the phrase "finest hour", meant "such significant moments when the turn of events, on which not only the present, but also the future depends, takes place in one day, at one hour and even in one minute"1 . Russian liberals also had such a "golden hour" when, as it seemed to them, their most cherished aspirations were realized. What this "hour" truly turned out to be is described in this essay.

Stuttgart is located in the valley of one of the right tributaries of the Rhine. Here, on June 18 (July 1 A.D.), 1902, the first issue of the uncensored Russian liberal newspaper Osvobozhdeniye was published. Most of the circulation was printed on special Indian paper - strong but thin, to make it easier to smuggle the newspaper into Russia illegally. Its numbers were rolled up in small cartridges for this purpose. In a word, "illegality", almost like that of real revolutionary parties.

But here is a clear incongruity with this. The policy statement "From the Russian Constitutionalists", published in the first issue of Osvobozhdeniye, was addressed not to the "common people" or even to "educated society", but to the autocracy. Here is the basic point of this document: "In our program, we proceed from the assumption that in the more or less near future, the government will be faced with the need to start serious political reform." We should pay tribute to the liberals: they sensed the approach of the revolution in advance, and therefore called on the autocracy to make concessions in order to avoid the "worst". The author of the statement-a scholar - historian-recalled the ancient legend of the Sibyl (a mythical female prophetess) from Qom, who offered the Roman king Tarquinius to buy the books of destinies. He refused to pay the price. The Sibyl began to burn the books, and then the king was forced to buy the remaining ones for the original price. This was followed by an edifying conclusion: "The Roman legend gives a useful lesson to kings and augurs (priests-soothsayers-A. S.). It is dangerous to bargain with historical necessity. The further you go, the less it gives way. And anyone who does not want to read the mysterious book of destinies in its natural order will pay dearly for the last pages on which the denouement is written." The liberals immediately offered the tsar and his advisers their services in mediating between the government and the revolutionary people. They recommended, in particular, that representatives of zemstvos and dumas of large cities - local self-government bodies in which liberals usually had a majority ("it is useful to admit" also specialists from universities) - form a Zemstvo Council, which "should serve as an intermediary between the authorities and the population at the most critical moment of the implementation of the new regime."2
Such was the printed appeal of the liberals to the autocracy with a proposal to summon them to decide the fate of the state at a time of continuous growth of the revolutionary movement. It would seem that it was possible to make such requests in the censored press. But in the period of the revolutionary upsurge of the early twentieth century, how

1 sec. Zweig. Selected works, Moscow, 1957, p. 556.

2 See A. G. Slonimsky. The counter-revolutionary role of the liberal bourgeoisie on the eve of and during the first Russian Revolution. "Scientific Notes" of the Tajik University, vol. IX, 1955, p. 130.

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A.V. Tyrkova-Williams, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet party, later bitterly regretted that under the stormy pressure of the rising spring waters, " the government was lost like an old miller frightened by a flood. Instead of opening the floodgates, give them the opportunity to discuss urgent issues out loud... the government tightened its grip on the censorship press. " 3
The editor of Osvobozhdeniye was P. B. Struve, and the author of the statement "From the Russian Constitutionalists" was P. N. Milyukov. Both are first-rate stars in the liberal sky. True, there was a peculiar division of labor between them. "Milyukov is a practical politician, Struve is a doctrinaire of liberalism," V. I. Lenin later wrote about them .4 Struve, the son of the Perm governor, in the mid-1990s became one of the most prominent representatives of the so-called legal Marxists, who took the position that capitalism was more progressive than the socio-economic formations that preceded it, and on this basis called for all possible assistance to its development in Russia. And while the true Marxists became the organizers and leaders of the working class struggle not only against tsarism, but also against capitalism, the "legal Marxists" preached a Struvist-castrated "Marxism" .5 The logical and consistent development of such attempts to bourgeoisize the scientific ideology of the working class was then the complete renunciation of Marxism by the" legal Marxists", although Struve had previously been involved in the workers ' movement.

In December 1900, as a representative of the "democratic opposition" group, he negotiated with the editorial board of Iskra for the joint publication of Sovremennoe Obozrenie, an appendix to Struve's magazine Zarya. He wanted to turn Sovremennoe Obozrenie into a liberal newspaper that would take readers away from the Marxist organ and thus deprive it of its general political significance. The negotiations actually resolved the question of whether Iskra would become an effective organ for the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat in the liberation movement. Immediately after these negotiations, Lenin wrote down his impressions of the behavior of Struve, who "showed himself to be a" politician "of pure water, a politician in the worst sense of the word, a politician, a rascal, a huckster and an impudent person." 6 Struve "came with a belief in our impotence, came to offer us terms of surrender, and he did it in a perfectly skilful manner, without uttering a single harsh word, but nevertheless discovering what a rough, mercantile nature of a common liberal lies beneath this elegant, civilized shell ..." 7
Milyukov, like Struve, initially passed through the "Marxist stage" of development, read Karl Marx's Das Kapital in his junior years at the university, and, according to him, "when writing his first works, he considered what we then called" economic materialism "as the basis for historical study .8 Lenin considered Milyukov "one of the most knowledgeable historians, who learned something from historical materialism, under the obvious influence of which this historian was... when I was a historian. " 9 The scientific community considered Milyukov the most likely successor to V. Klyuchevsky in the Department of Russian History at Moscow University. But he was not only an academic scholar, but had a strong political temperament and extraordinary ambition. As a private associate professor at Moscow State University, Milyukov was at the head of the liberal student movement, for which he was deprived of the right to teach in educational institutions in Russia. Later, becoming a political par excellence, Milyukov set out to unite the entire opposition movement and negotiate with tsarism on behalf of it to turn the absolutist monarchy into a constitutional one.

Milyukov tried to "reconcile" Marxism with the liberals ' concept of the evolutionary path of Russia's development. He claimed that "in Russia, the state had an og-

3 A.V. Tyrkova-Williams. On the road to freedom. New York, 1952, p. 96.

4 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 19, p. 180.

5 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 32, p. 882. e V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 4, p. 386.

7 Ibid., p. 387.

8 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 1. New York. 1955, p. 192.

9 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 19, pp. 176-177.

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In the West, social organization has determined the state system. This thesis seems at first glance a paradox. It seems to sharply contradict the very widespread theory that the political system of any state should be a "superstructure" over the economic "foundation". However, we do not in the least deny the dependence of the political superstructure on the economic foundation. On the contrary, we intend to once again illustrate this dependence on the example of Russia. It is the elementary state of the economic foundation that has caused hypertrophy of the state superstructure in Russia and caused a strong reverse effect of this " superstructure "on the" foundation " itself. 10 Both Struve and Milyukov were representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which was "more capable of expressing the widely understood, essential interests of the entire bourgeois class, as opposed to the temporary and narrow interests of the "upper" bourgeoisie alone." 11 And to ensure the interests of the entire class, it is necessary for its representatives to enter the legislative and supreme executive bodies of the state. Getting a constitution is the main goal of the liberal movement. But the social composition of this movement at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries in Russia was primarily a movement of bourgeois landowners and bourgeois intelligentsia.

In November 1903, an illegal political association of liberal landlords, the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, was formed, and in January 1904, the liberal Zemstvos and bourgeois intellectuals were united in the illegal political organization Union of Liberation. The first of the organizations occupied a commanding position in relation to the second. As the pre-storm wind of the revolution grew stronger, the liberals began to shift from the printed exhortations of the authorities to the search for direct contacts with the" spheres", as the higher bureaucracy was then called. Favorable conditions for this were created when P. D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who became Minister of the Interior in August 1904, proclaimed the beginning of the "era of trust" of the government in society, that is, in the liberals. The goal of this course was to weaken the opposition to the autocracy and attract liberals to its side.

In October 1904, I. P. Petrunkevich, chairman of the Council of the "Union of Liberation", entered into negotiations with Svyatopolk-Mirsky and S. Y. Witte, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers. But the conspiracy failed primarily because Witte was then a staunch supporter of peasant Caesarism. He told Petrunkevich so: "The peasantry will be on the side of the autocracy." 12 Even the beginning of the first Russian Revolution did not shake this confidence of the "spheres". And in the middle of January 1905. Svyatopolk-Mirsky was dismissed. The "era of trust" is over. Meanwhile, the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in May 1905 meant the complete military collapse of the autocracy in the war with Japan. The outburst of indignation in the country was so strong that even the serf newspaper Novoe Vremya demanded the convocation of people's representatives in order to defuse the situation. The liberals considered the moment appropriate for a direct appeal to the tsar.

At the end of May 1905, the Pan-European union decided to send a delegation to Nicholas II with an address in which the liberals pleaded: "Before it is too late, for the sake of saving Russia, for the sake of establishing internal order and peace, order that the people's representatives, elected for this purpose equally and without distinction by all subjects, be convened without delay."13 After a 10-day obivaniye of palace thresholds, on June 6 the delegation of the union was received by the tsar. One of the leaders of the right wing of the liberals, Prince S. P. Trubetskoy, delivered a loyal speech in which he dissociated himself from" sedition " and begged for the trust of the sovereign. The tsar condescendingly promised what he asked, but the subsequent actions of the government-the persecution of the liberal press, etc. - showed that the autocracy did not even think of fulfilling the promise. Lenin, who closely followed these "first steps of bourgeois treachery," concluded:-

10 P. N. Milyukov. Essays on the History of Russian Culture, Part I. St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 137-138.

11 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 11, p. 199.

12 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 241.

13 Osvobozhdenie, 1905, No. 74, p. 365.

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He claimed that the leaders of the Liberals were "held by the nose" 14 . He wrote to them: "You are afraid of being left without the tsar. The king is not afraid to stay without you. You are afraid of a decisive fight. The king is not afraid of her... It is only natural that the king should despise you... You deserve this contempt, for you do not fight with the people, but only steal to power behind the backs of the revolutionary people." 15
Meanwhile, the working class, despite the police dictatorship in the country, continued to attack the autocracy. The All-Russian October political strike forced the tsar to sign on October 17 a manifesto "On improving the state Order", which "granted" civil liberties to the people, and the State Duma, previously promised as a legislative institution, was declared legislative. The liberals were jubilant. It seemed to them that the desired goal was achieved. They, who had not dared (and did not intend) to create a political party for the actual struggle for the constitution, now quickly consolidated for parliamentary activity, forming two parties: the Union of October 17, which was not far removed from the conservatives, and the somewhat more "left - wing" party of constitutionalist Democrats (Kadets). Witte, who became head of the Council of Ministers, in order to attract liberals to the side of the autocracy in order to split the forces of opponents of tsarism and at the same time to obtain credit from international capital in this way, took steps to create a government of "public trust", preferably with the direct participation of liberals. On October 18, he invited a Slavophil liberal, D. N., to negotiate with him. Shilov, whom he, together with the then Minister of Internal Affairs V. E. Plehve, led by the nose back in 190216 . But at the meeting, Shipov explained to the prime minister that since he belongs to the right wing of the liberal movement, which is in the minority, his "sole entry into the cabinet cannot matter" 17 . After that, Witte had to apply to the bureau of congresses of zemstvo and city leaders with a proposal to send representatives for negotiations. The delegation that arrived actually represented the Cadet party. It was her first political debut 18 .

Liberals have been waiting for this hour for a long time. As early as 1901, in the preface to the publication of Witte's confidential note "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo", Struve encouraged his associates: "With the existence of a bright political movement... an organized liberal opposition of any kind can play a major political role: moderate parties, with skilful tactics, always benefit from the escalating struggle between extreme social elements. " 19 But it turned out that the liberals ' hour had not yet arrived. In the conditions of the further rise of the revolution, in order not to completely break away from the masses, the liberals could not make less demands as a condition for joining the government than the convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage by secret ballot. Witte could not agree to this, because he had no authority, and tsarism did not want to give in.

However, there were some figures among the liberals who considered the delegation's demands excessive. It was to them that Witte turned after the failure of negotiations with the cadets. There was a new problem. "Public figures" in the government were supposed not only to play the role of the fig leaf of the autocracy, but also to become a reliable gear of the state machine. During a meeting with Shipov, Witte told him that "he considers it necessary that public figures who agree to join the cabinet should have a strong will, a serious attitude to the state's business, and definitely be aware of the need to maintain the authority of state power and order in the country in the current time." 20 And for

14 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 10, pp. 291, 315.

15 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 11, p. 156.

16 See E. D. Chermensky. Bourgeoisie and Tsarism in the First Russian Revolution, Moscow, 1970, pp. 23-24.

17 D. N. Shipov. Memoirs and thoughts about the experience. Moscow, 1918, p. .335.

18 The delegation included the future Chairman of the Second State Duma, F. A. Golovin, the future Minister of the Provisional Government, F. F. Kokoshkin, and the future head of the first and second Provisional Government, Prince G. E. Lvov.

19 Cit. by: V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 5, p. 70.

20 D. N. Shipov. Op. ed., p. 335.

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In his opinion, the cadets with whom he interviewed were unfit to perform such a task. E. N. Trubetskoy, the brother of S. N. Trubetskoy, was among the candidates for the post of minister. Outwardly, it was quite an imposing figure 21 . But the conversation with him caused Witte contemptuous bewilderment. Contrary to expectations, "the perfect Hamlet of the Russian Revolution"came to him, as he later recalled .22 Witta, on the other hand, needed Iago to arrange for her strangulation.

After the collusion with the cadets and the selective use of individual liberal figures failed, Witte began to invite liberal leaders to consult with him and get advice on how to end the revolution. He clearly found them to be his allies. Milyukov, who was among the invited guests, also felt a certain spiritual closeness to the head of government. "And to Witte's immediate question: What to do, I decided to answer according to my conscience and personal conviction, "Milyukov admits," without binding myself to the generally accepted political formulas of my like-minded people. " 23 What kind of "consensus" is this, if the answer" out of conscience and personal conviction " is at odds with their point of view? But this question did not arise before Milyukov. Since, the cadet leader explained, " our authority was a derivative factor of our political position, "in so far as" by reasonable calculation, we should have found ourselves to the left of Witte in 1905. " 24 Milyukov gave Witte his own advice: "Make a business office out of decent people in a hurry." "Again, to speed up and strengthen the cause," the latter continued, " call someone today and have the Belgian or, even better, Bulgarian Constitution translated into Russian, present it to the tsar for signature tomorrow, and publish it the day after tomorrow."25
Miliukov needed any constitution, even if only an octroated one, to oppose it to the further development of the revolution. But the autocracy did not agree to this either. That is why Milyukov later blamed tsarism for the failure of the liberals ' actions. "When," he recalled, "our enemies - already common enemies - had the words shibboleth (by which they distinguish their own and others' - A. S.), the masses began to speak, and the words were all simple: peace, land, the right to work, class struggle, we had nothing to oppose them. " 26 Therefore, the mastery of the revolutionary masses became, according to Milyukov, "an unfulfilled dream." It was reported that at pre-election rallies in the First State Duma, Milyukov made such proposals to representatives of left-wing parties: "You make thunder and lightning behind the scenes, and we will fight for both of them on stage." Later Milyukov called these words only a caricature of the Cadet tactics and remarked: "Rather, the situation was reversed: thunder and lightning were made on the stage... A fight for. real achievements were thwarted by this. " 27 Fighting for real achievements meant behind-the-scenes negotiations to create a government of "public figures". But the very "struggle for real achievements" became possible only as a result of the revolutionary pressure of the masses on the autocracy!

Having found themselves in the majority in the First Duma, the Cadets continued to hope to form "their own" Council of Ministers and by a series of concessions and promises to distract the masses from the revolution. On the opening day of the Duma, April 27, 1906, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, Prince V. A. Obolensky, recalled, his neighbor on the deputy's bench was "a modest-looking, somewhat stooped man with a short-cropped brown beard, in a gray house jacket." This was Prince G. E. Lvov, who became famous for organizing zemstvos ' assistance to the wounded on the fields of the Russo-Japanese War. This "Rurikovich" in his house jacket seemed to ignore the solemnity of Duma meetings, "not only did he not speak at general meetings, but also at factional meetings of the People's Freedom Party (this name was adopted by the Cadets to deceive the voters. - A. S.), he rarely visited, and when he came in, he sat down somewhere to the side, with his friends."-

21 See A.V. Tyrkova-Williams. Op. ed., p. 282.

22 - S. Y. Witte. Memoirs, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1960, p. 70.

23 P. N. Milyukov. Three attempts. Paris, 1921, p. 23.

24 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 315, 316.

25 P. N. Milyukov. Three attempts, p. 24-25.

26 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs. Vol. 1. sto. 329.

27 Ibid., p. 336.

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Vershenko is indifferent to sometimes heated political debates. But from the way our leaders treated him, who had mysterious conversations with him that we, ordinary members, were not privy to, it was felt that he was very influential." The fact was that the future head of the Provisional Government, thanks to his connections, "was then negotiating with representatives of the authorities about the formation of a cadet government."28 However, they did not lead to the desired result for the liberals.

In mid-June 1906, the "tutor" of the cadet faction of the Duma, Milyukov, began negotiations on the creation of a government with the tsar's closest adviser in those months, D. F. Trepov, infamously known for his order: "Do not give blank volleys, do not spare cartridges!". "Trepov agreed," Milyukov narrates , " that the Ministry of Cadets (Cadets - A. S.) was fraught with great risk. However, the situation of the country is such that this risk must be taken. As he told me on a date, when the house is on fire, you have to jump from the fifth floor"29 . Miliukov admired Trepov's foresight and, in connection with putting further negotiations in the hands of several ministers, remarked that "only the first initiative, which belonged to Trepov, was serious."30 Trepov's initiative was indeed serious, but not in the way that Milyukov thought it was. Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky, who took part in the negotiations, reports: "Trepov's calculations were very simple: the cadet cabinet would not have failed from the first steps to enter into a decisive conflict with the emperor; from the moment such a conflict arose, General Trepov, with the help of the St. Petersburg garrison, intended to eliminate the cadets and replace their government with his military dictatorship; then it remained to cancel the mandate on October 17, which Trepov thought quite possible."31
Negotiations with the liberal leaders were then continued by the Prime Minister and Interior Minister Pavel Stolypin. Unlike Trepov, he was going to use the government of the Duma majority for a conflict-free dissolution of the Duma. He negotiated the creation of a new cabinet with various "public figures" like Shipov. As a person close in spirit and who after October 17 became a "constitutionalist by the highest command", Nikolai I. Shipov invited him to talk to him. Shipov gave the tsar a number of tips and, above all, did not recommend appointing Milyukov as head of the government, since "his religious consciousness is poorly developed" and he is a very powerful person. If the cabinet includes cadets, then Milyukov's presence in the government as Minister of Internal Affairs or Foreign Affairs is very useful and even necessary .Shipov recommended another cadet, Duma Chairman S. A. Muromtsev, for the post of Prime Minister. 32 As you know, the first composition of the Provisional Government was formed later on the same principle. Only instead of Muromtsev, who had died by that time, Lviv became the head of the government.

During Milyukov's meeting with Stolypin in July 1906, a conversation was held that was incomparably cynical. When it came to the portfolio of the Minister of the Interior, Stolypin asked whether the cadet leader understood that "the Minister of the Interior is at the same time the chief of gendarmes, and therefore he is in charge of functions that are not familiar to cadets?" we should not judge them by their role in the opposition." Milyukov explained the meaning of creating a Duma majority government in a very popular way:"If I give a nickel, society will be ready to accept it for a ruble, but if you give a ruble, it will not even be accepted for a nickel." This phrase is quoted in the memoirs of Milyukov's co-editor in the newspaper" Speech " I. V. Gessen. Milyukov, quoting this explanation later, doubted only the tone, but not the meaning of what he said .33 I drove him from Stolypin's dacha

28 V. A. Obolensky. About Prince Lviv. "Latest news" (Paris), 16. IV. 1925.

29 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 384.

30 P. N. Milyukov. Three attempts, p. 26.

31 Cit. by: T. I. Poehler. The Life path of Prince G. E. Lvov. Paris. 1932, p. 115.

32 D. N. Shipov. Op. ed., p. 457.

33 See P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 385.

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Milyukova home Izvolsky. "When we reached the Neva River," Milyukov recalls, " I pointed out to the minister that it would be inconvenient if he was recognized accompanied by such a dangerous interlocutor. Izvolsky agreed, only remarking that his cadet companion was in the same danger. I thanked him and we parted. " 34 Good companions-statesmen and politicians who are afraid to get into the eyes of a random passerby together! Miliukov is particularly pitiful, trying to play the noble game towards the owner of the carriage, who nevertheless acted on orders, while the liberal leader even hid from the Central Committee of his own party.

In early July 1906, the First Duma was dissolved. Trying to soften the impression of this act, Stolypin appealed to the leaders of the right wing of the liberal movement to join the Cabinet of Ministers he was forming. The liberals agreed, but asked for guarantees that the activities of Stolypin and the entire government would comply, at least outwardly, with constitutional norms, which Stolypin categorically refused. On this occasion, Mr. I. A. Geyden, addressing other participants in the negotiations, said: "Obviously, you and I were invited to play the role of hired children for ladies of easy virtue." 35 Despite the obvious goals of Stolypin, the right-wing cadets did not refuse to negotiate with him during the meetings of the Second State Duma. "Stolypin started a secret affair," reported Tyrkova - Williams, who belonged to the right cadets, "with the" Black-hundred " cadets, as the cadets to whom he addressed them called themselves. There were four of them-S. N. Bulgakov, V. A. Maklakov, P. B. Struve and M. V. Chelnokov... The cadets, on the other hand, kept these negotiations secret from their party. Meetings were arranged verbally, over the phone, so that there were no records. " 36 The cadet Black Hundreds continued to maintain some illusions even when they became aware of Stolypin's impending dissolution of the Duma. They went to pay their respects to him.

It was a colorful meeting. Two former "legal Marxists" who outwardly were very contrasting: Struve, red-bearded, twirling, waving his arms, with his hysterical shouts and laughter; Bulgakov, quiet, taciturn, pinching his dark beard. And two half-octobrists and half-cadets who did not recognize party discipline: a born businessman, self-taught, very agile, despite a severe limp, Chelnokov; a highly educated aristocrat, athletic in build, dressed with artistic carelessness Maklakov. They all looked at Stolypin expectantly and hopefully. And he did not even tell them that the decree on the dissolution of the Second Duma had already been signed. On June 3, 1907, the decree was published simultaneously with the new electoral law, which, according to the manifesto of October 17, could not become law without the approval of the State Duma. Thus, one of the gains of the revolution was legally overturned, and a period of reaction began with the accomplished coup d'etat. A group of Duma deputies responded to the appeal adopted in Vyborg to the people with a call for passive resistance. But the next Congress of cadets in September of the same year adopted a resolution refusing to implement the appeal. The revolution was over , and the autocracy no longer needed to conspire with the liberals to create a government of "public trust."

Discouraged, the liberals continued in both the Third and Fourth State Dumas to strive for a division of power with the autocracy. One of the scenes that took place during the sessions of the Third Duma gives a lot to understand the nature of the liberals ' attitude towards Stolypin. Cadet "tenor" F. I. Rodichev made a speech against the military field courts that sentenced completely innocent people to death. Directly addressing Stolypin, who was listening to the Duma debates from the ministerial box, Rodichev exclaimed: "Stop these massacres... We've had enough of being called... here he made a circular motion with his hand around his neck, "what is called a Stolypin tie." Stolypin demanded an apology, which the accuser readily offered, and the right gave Stolypin a standing ovation. And together with them, Milyukov applauded. At a meeting of the cadet faction that followed the incident, Tyrkova-Williams asked Milyukov: "How could you do that

34 Ibid., p. 473.

35 D. N. Shipov. Op. ed., p. 473.

36 A. V. Tyrkova-Williams. Op. ed., p. 359.

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do it?". Milyukov replied: "I did what my gut told me to do." 37 Not a flair, but a feeling! After all, both Stolypin and Milyukov ultimately aimed at the same goal - to suppress the revolution and make it impossible to repeat it. Milyukov was secretly grateful to Stolypin for his decisive actions, and the fact that the liberals were making political capital out of denunciations of the executioners was a matter of their sober calculation. At the end of 1909, Lenin wrote that the liberals and the government "go out of their way to 'copulate' and bring Bismarck's Russia to the people, but they do not succeed. It doesn't work. Impotent" 38 .

The question of creating a government of "public trust" was again put on the agenda when, under the influence of the defeat of the Tsarist troops on the fields of the First World War, the revolutionary crisis began to develop again. It was a heavy blow to the exploiting classes, whose ideologues were sure that the fruits of victory in the war would help them implement reforms that would reduce the severity of social conflicts in the country. The inability of the tsarist government to secure such a victory caused not only liberal parties, but also some conservative groups that had never been in opposition before, to go into open opposition. Lenin noted that this time the liberal bourgeoisie put forward a program of reforms and agreements with tsarism not alone ,but "even with the broadest strata of the conservative bourgeoisie and the landlords." 39 On August 22, 1915, an agreement was signed on joint actions between six factions of the Fourth State Duma-the cadets, progressives, left Octobrists, Zemstvo Octobrists, moderate rightists (group of the center) and progressive nationalists who broke away from the nationalist faction. This opposition majority of the Duma was called the "progressive bloc" 40 . His main demand was the creation of a government of "public trust" composed of persons capable of pursuing policies in the general interests of the exploiting classes of Russia, and not just the palace camarilla, behind which stood a handful of landlords who were in close alliance with the magnates of finance capital. The autocracy did not consider it necessary to meet the demands of the majority of the Duma, and by tsarist decree the work of its 4th session was interrupted on September 3, 1915.

In the autumn of 1916, "an immediate revolutionary situation developed" and "the country was rapidly approaching revolution." 41 Already in September, the leaders of the liberals sensed the approach of events that "1905 is a toy" compared to .42 Under these conditions, the leaders of the" progressive bloc "decided to" storm the power". It was launched on November 1, 1916, at the first session of the 5th Duma session. Chairman of the bureau of the progressive bloc S. I. Shidlovsky announced a declaration in which, in the name of achieving victory over the enemy, the demand was put forward: "Persons whose continued stay at the head of the department threatens the successful course of our national struggle and who cause open distrust, should give way to persons united by the same understanding of the tasks of the moment rely on the majority of the State Duma in its activities and implement its program." To much applause from the majority of deputies, he warned:"From now on, we will strive to achieve this goal by all legal means available to us." 43
After such a notification, Milyukov was the first to launch an "assault". For a Duma speaker, his appearance was not imposing. When you looked at him, the first thing that caught your eye was a pink bald head, pince-nez, and a sparse mustache. For the peculiarities of his far from masculine figure, he received the nickname "Kangaroo"in his youth. Getting excited during the performances, he jumped up and down on tiptoe. But Milyukov ho-

37 Ibid., p. 373.

38 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 47, p. 224.

39 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 26.

40 See for more information: V. S. Dyakin. What is a "Progressive Block"? Voprosy Istorii, 1970, No. 1.

41 I. I. Mints. History of the Great October, Vol. I. M. 1967, p. 470.

42 "The Bourgeoisie on the eve of the February Revolution", Moscow, 1927, p. 129.

43 "State Duma". Verbatim report. 4th convocation, session V. Ptgr. 1917 (hereinafter - "State Duma"), one hundred. 13.

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rosho knew about the absolute predominance of political philistines in the Duma audience. And so the leader of the party, which was considered among the "public" by the union of aristocrats of the spirit, decided to use chauvinistic sentiments and rumors to create the desired impression. Rumor blamed the Tsaritsa for the defeats of the Russian troops at the front. Rumors of this kind intensified when the head of government was a protege of the Camarilla B. V. Sturmer, who was considered a Germanophile already for one of his last names. These rumors, picked up and used by the foreign press, with reference to her and brought Milyukov to the rostrum of the Duma. Proving their validity, he pointed out various actions of the government that were harmful to achieving victory, and after each such report he asked: "Is this stupidity or treason?" Subsequently, Milyukov confessed to a kind of provocation: he himself leaned towards the first version, but presented the material in such a way that "the audience supported the second one with their approval" 44 . Of course, the Camarilla's policy was not only anti-national, but also anti-national. There is no doubt that its appointees, who were not appointed to high positions based on their business qualities, aggravated the inconsistency of the state apparatus with the tasks that it faced. Yet the policies of both the Camarilla and its proxies were an expression of their social nature, not treason in the proper sense of the word. According to the Okhrana's assessment, Milyukov's speech "was obviously intended for the so-called general public, which is sufficiently embittered against the government to accept the most serious charges against the latter without scrutiny or criticism." 45 Please specify here. Milyukov himself intended his speech for the proteges of the Camarilla. You are convicted - go away! But the Camarilla was not afraid, and its minions did not become scapegoats. Consequently, the anger of the "general public" was not localized against individuals and turned out to be directed against the regime as a whole. The publication of Milyukov's speech was banned by the censors, who, according to Shidlovsky, were engaged in "protecting the non-existent prestige of the authorities." 46 This only served to increase interest in the speech and strengthen the impression it made. It was distributed, according to the Black Hundred organ, "almost in millions of copies"47 . It quickly became known throughout the country and in a certain way influenced the public mood. Thus, the writer V. G. Korolenko reported from Sorochintsy, Poltava province, that "Milyukov's speech makes a huge impression in various, even very conservative circles." 48
The "Storm of power" was continued at the Duma meeting on November 3 by V. V. Shulgin. The "progressive bloc", like the coat of arms of the Russian Empire, was two-headed. One head was the leader of the most "left", cadet, faction of the bloc - Milyukov; the second was the leader of the far-right progressive nationalist faction in the bloc, Shulgin. This staunch reactionary turned against the Government in the name of preserving the autocracy. An asthenic with an exaggeratedly correct manner, he spoke softly, slowly, with restraint, but with impressive sincerity. Shulgin admitted that he was speaking with a heavy heart; however, fighting his own government until it leaves "is the only way to prevent what is perhaps most to be feared," 49 and explicitly pointed out the bloc's main goal-preventing revolution.."Duma Chrysostom" Maklakov, who previously worked out his speeches in such a way that they then gave the impression of brilliant improvisation, was in the habit of not finishing his thoughts to the end. This time, he spoke with complete certainty, without equivocation or omissions. Russia feels, Maklakov said, that it is being led to its doom. And this is "not an accident, this is a regime, this is a cursed old, obsolete, but still tenacious regime" 50 . And don't let them think that he is

44 P. N. Milyukov. Istoriya vtoroy russkoy revolyutsii [History of the Second Russian Revolution]. 1921, p. 33.

45 TsGAOR USSR, f. DP, 00, op. 1916, d. 307, letter A, vol. 3, part 2, l. 2.

46 "State Duma", stb. 11.

47 "Moskovskie Vedomosti", 11. XI. 1916.

48 Manuscript Department of the State Library of the USSR named after V. I. Lenin (RO GBL), f. 224, cardboard 4, 68.

49 "State Duma", stb. 68.

50 Ibid., stb. 131.

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and his supporters are calling for a revolution. No, the revolution is being provoked from the ministerial benches. Maklakov went on to explain the expediency of an "assault on power": "if our voice is not heard," we will still save the country's trust in the Duma, and "The Duma may still become the only pillar of power, the only bulwark of order in the future."51
The bloc's leaders seemed to have outdone themselves. Already on the day of the speeches by Shulgin and Maksakov, the Okhrana recorded "a general opinion that both speakers had finally exhausted the issue of the current moment - the impossibility of joint work of the people's representation with the current government, and that the solution of the crisis does not allow for a third solution: "either we or they", meaning by the word "they" - members of the current Council ministers " 52 . Although the word is also a deed, but after it is said, the actions that reinforce it must follow. They followed, but not in accordance with the words. Having essentially declared a boycott of the Sturmer government, the blokists did not actually carry it out, but continued to sit together with representatives of the Government they had branded in special meetings and in sub-commissions of the budget commission. Moreover, on November 6, the chairman of the Duma Commission on military and naval affairs A. I. Shingarev - Milyukov's closest associate-agreed to the speech of the Minister of Railways A. F. Trepov at its meeting. To members of the blok bureau who were interested in how this had happened, Shingarev justified himself by saying that Trenov had taken him by surprise by making a phone call on Sunday evening; "he got in by way of vaseline, "as the Zemstvo Octobrist D. P. Kapnist sympathetically commented. 53 The chairman of the Duma commission also referred to the fact that he did not attach serious importance to the formulation of Trepov's report. Meanwhile, according to Kapnist's figurative definition, after the commission received Trepov, it became clear that instead of the sword of Damocles hanging over them, as they thought, the ministers "will see a penknife" 54 .

The bloc's leaders apparently hoped for a political miracle: that the announcement of the declaration and the speeches of the bloc's leaders, like the trumpets of Jericho, would crush Sturmer's cabinet, which would end the "storm of power". And although the words did not work, the liberals did not consider it possible to apply any other forms of pressure on the autocracy. This position was defended by Maklakov in a well-known newspaper feuilleton about the "mad driver": you can not pull the steering wheel out of the hands of a driver driving a car in which the motherland is sitting on a dangerous road. Nevertheless, the leaders of the bloc, by denouncing the government, unwittingly contributed to a further decline in the prestige of the autocracy, especially in those strata where it still existed to some extent. The immediate goal, pursuing which the blokists launched an "assault", was not achieved. Shturmer was, however, replaced, but by the minister of the same cabinet A. F. Trepov. This did not lead to any tangible changes in the government's policy towards the bloc, especially since Trenov, who was trying to maintain some independence from the Camarilla, was soon replaced by its direct protege N. D. Golitsyn. The latter's legal capacity was characterized by the words of the minister's doorman: "What kind of chairman is he when he can't get into galoshes himself?" 55 Golitsyn served only as a screen for the all-powerful Minister of Internal Affairs, A.D. Protopopov, who had been one of the leaders of the "progressive bloc"before joining the Shturmer government. A renegade of liberalism, he then, like all renegades, became a fierce opponent of the camp devoted to him. But the circumstances were stronger than he was. It was not the efforts of the liberals, but the onset of the February Revolution, that forced Protopopov to turn to former like-minded people.

The revolution began on the International Day of Women Workers, which was celebrated in Russia on February 23 (U.S.S.R.). Workers of Petrograd-mothers of hungry children, wives and widows of front-line soldiers and cripples, themselves engaged in back-breaking work in factories and factories.

51 Ibid., stb. 135.

52 TsGAOR USSR, f. DP, 00, op. 1916, d. 307, letter A, vol. 3, part 2, l. 10.

53 Ibid., l. 51.

54 "Red Archive", 1933, N 1, page 117.

55 TsGAOR USSR, f. 102, op. 265, d. 10 (58, l. 16.

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factories were particularly affected by the continuation of the imperialist slaughter. The Bolsheviks decided to organize anti-war rallies, demonstrations and strikes at industrial enterprises of the capital on Women's Day. According to their call, more than 100 thousand people did not come to work on this day. Meetings and demonstrations were held violently. The soldiers of the Petrograd garrison - not only the mobilized workers, but also the peasants enlightened by the hardships of war-were sympathetic to these demonstrations from the very beginning. On the morning of the second day of the revolution, there were already more than 200,000 strikers. The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks decided to turn the actions of the METROPOLITAN proletariat into a general political strike and strengthen the struggle for the soldiers to join the revolution. The movement of the working masses grew rapidly and rapidly, like a spring flood. The driving forces of the revolution were the proletariat and the peasantry under the hegemony of the former and under the general leadership of the Bolshevik Party.

On the evening of February 24, 1917, the Council of Ministers decided "to make an attempt to persuade the progressive bloc to reconcile with the government and to calm the popular unrest by joint efforts" 56, in pursuance of which meetings were organized between representatives of the Government and the opposition. The leaders of the Duma majority demanded that the existing Council of Ministers be replaced by a government "made up of people who enjoy public confidence," and expressed a faint hope that "this measure can calm the people down." But the ministers did not want to withdraw themselves. At the cabinet meeting in the evening

On February 25, "the deputies' demand was declared unacceptable" and it was decided to "interrupt the State Duma sessions" starting from February 26 .57
However, on February 26, as Protopopov later recalled, the ministers who clung to power realized that the revolution was gaining the upper hand over the defenders of the old system .58 This forced the rulers to resume negotiations with the leaders of the bloc. It seemed that the "finest hour" of the liberals had finally arrived. But at such a moment, they did not even think of joining the government. Maklakov directly advised "immediately to form a ministry with a prime minister - general at the head (Alekseyev, for example), and invite virtuous bureaucrats as ministers - gr. Ignatieva, Krivosheina, Polivanova " 59 . In other words, a military dictatorship against the revolutionary masses and a change of Camarilla minions as a concession to "society". In the evening of the same day, the Chairman of the Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, appealed to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Alekseyev, to "save Russia from catastrophe", since "the government authorities are completely paralyzed and completely powerless to restore the disturbed order" .60
The tsar's decree on the dissolution of the Duma, according to the majority of its deputies, eliminated "the last bulwark of order." But they accepted this act without a murmur, fearing that their protest would strengthen the struggle against the autocracy. Meeting for their last meeting on February 27, the Duma members shared information "about street clashes between workers and the police, in which the soldiers took the side of the people." 61 Stunned by the onset of the revolution, they listened to the decree already known to them about the dissolution of the Duma, but they could not disperse without doing something. The seignioren-convention, the council of leaders of the Duma factions, met spontaneously. All these political figures, regardless of their tendencies, were preoccupied with one question: how to "restore order" in Petrograd as soon as possible? Meanwhile, the "mess" was already invading the Tauride Palace. The rebel soldiers came to inquire about the Duma's intentions. They have posted guards around and. inside the building. The deputies had to hurry up with the definition of a line of conduct in relation to an armed uprising. A meeting of the Duma members still remaining in the building was called. The meeting was chaotic due to the utter confusion of "only parliamentary" politicians. Characteristically, like the magnetic needle of a compass pointing north, Lieber's thought-

56 "The fall of the tsarist regime". Vol. VI. l. 1926, p. 98.

57 Ibid., vol. IV. l. 1925, p. 100.

58 See ibid.

59 P. Surmin. A "real" politician. "Morning of Russia", 5. IV. 1917.

60 "Red Archive", 1927, N 2 (21), p. 6.

61 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

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lov, twirling and trembling, turned again and again to the repressive apparatus of the autocracy. The" left " cadet N. V. Nekrasov suggested asking the government to grant dictatorial powers to Comrade Minister of War General A. A. Manikovsky. Far from being a liberal, the Cossack officer M. A. Karaulov objected: "I don't understand Nekrasov at all: almost the entire Duma, especially his faction, has been calling government members fools, scoundrels, and even traitors for the past six months, and now he's offering to go to these 'traitors' and ask for them... from whom? You have heard that they were all frightened and hid; are we going to drag Prince Golitsyn out from under the bed? " 62
Meanwhile, the rebels filled the Tauride Palace. The Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers ' Deputies met simultaneously with the Duma meeting and in the same building as them. It was difficult for the Duma members to imagine how the events that took place before their eyes would end. Milyukov's proposal to "wait at least until the evening to make a definite decision" was accepted, and in the meantime the seignioren-convention was instructed to form a Temporary Committee of the State Duma. "This," Miliukov explained, "was the minimum necessary to ensure that the Duma members did not lose even the share of influence in the movement that they were still able to exert." 63 By 3 p.m., a Temporary Committee of the State Duma had been formed "to restore order and establish relations with individuals and institutions." Milyukov explained: "This clumsy formulation had the advantage that, while satisfying the tasks of the moment, it did not prejudge anything in the future. Limiting itself to a minimum, it still created a body and did not bring the Duma members under the crime " 64. The committee consisted mainly of members of the bureau of the progressive bloc, as well as the Menshevik N. S. Chkheidze, Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers ' Deputies, and A. F. Kerensky, a fellow Trudovik, who had been invited by them.

The announcement of the creation of the committee was reduced to reading the list of its members before a group of Duma deputies gathered in the semi-circular hall of the Tauride Palace. It seemed that the formation of the committee was for the Duma members at least to some extent an achievement on the way to the goal that the "progressive bloc" had been striving for since its inception. But this act did not arouse enthusiasm among those present, because they did not have the feeling that they were witnessing the division of real power. After all, the Duma members were going to share power with tsarism, which, in their opinion, had a powerful repressive apparatus, and they had to share it with the leaders of the Soviet, who gained power thanks to the uprising. The agreement for the blocists was forced, unreliable and fraught with unpleasant consequences for them. "My comrades and I," recalled a cadet deputy from Lithuania and Poland, " felt as if we had elected members of a fishing commission or some other Duma commission. No one had any enthusiasm. " 65 But there was confusion. "It is reported," Z. I. Gippius wrote that day, "that Rodzianko walks around beating himself with his hands in confusion:' They have made me a revolutionary! We did it! " 66 . Moreover, fear reigned among Duma members. The same hour after the list of committee members was announced, he said to the deputy standing next to him: "If the revolution fails, then we will... we will hang with you on the same aspen tree. " 67 So pitifully for Russian liberalism began its "finest hour".

The Duma Committee, like the progressive bloc, has been two-headed since its inception. One of his goals (instead of Shulgin) was now Rodzianko. This was determined not only by the status of the presidency (as chairman of the Duma, he automatically became chairman of its committee), but also by his connections (which seemed especially important at the time) with the "leaders of the army". He strove to preserve both the Duma and the monarchy, and on this basis to create a military dictatorship covered by a democratic institution that had never existed in Russia before - a ministry responsible to the Duma. Around 6 p.m. Rodzianko, Nekrasov and other members of the

62 S. P. Mansyrev. My memories of the State Duma. "Istorik i sovremennik", Collection III. Berlin, 1922, p. 27.

63 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

64 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2. New York. 1955, p. 293.

65 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

66 " Renaissance "(Paris), 14. IX. 1928.

67 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

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They went to the Mariinsky Palace , the seat of the Council of Ministers. It turned out that" out of bed " Golitsyn had already submitted a letter of resignation and flatly refused to take any independent actions. The committee members focused their efforts on processing the tsar's brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, who was in the palace. Judging by the memories of the participants in the negotiations, they did not have unity. Nekrasov urged Mikhail Alexandrovich to "accept the regency temporarily, until the tsar's arrival from Stavka, remove the Council of Ministers and put a Provisional government of public figures headed by a popular general at the head of the administration." 68 This would be a classic version of the long-awaited liberal power sharing with the autocracy in a national crisis. Rodzianko, on the other hand, recommended that he "assume the dictatorship over the city of Petrograd without fail" and demand from the tsar the "gift" of a responsible ministry .69
The tsar's younger brother was a typical officer of the Guards cavalry in terms of outlook, character of thinking and interests: a womanizer and a horseman. But he was by no means a cavalry daredevil. When Nikolai I, invited by him to a direct wire for negotiations, did not even want to approach the device, Mikhail Alexandrovich did not dare to take independent actions. Returning to the Tauride Palace, supporters of the division of power with the autocracy were convinced of the futility of their hopes. "At 9 - 10 o'clock in the evening," Nekrasov recalled, " we were driving back through the revolutionary city... A continuous revolutionary wave has flooded everything. " 70 Since the Duma committee had no forces of its own, the only alternative to military dictatorship was to rely on the Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which consisted mainly of compromisers who were convinced that the leadership of the bourgeois revolution should belong to the bourgeoisie. The need to rely on the organ created by the revolution led to the transition of the initiative in the Provisional Committee from the chamberlain of the court of His Majesty Rodzianko to the leader of the opposition of His Majesty Milyukov. "In general, from the moment of the general recognition that the revolution had begun," Milyukov noted, "a recognition that also somehow took place by itself , the preponderance among the bloc passed to its left-wing elements as the most familiar with the left wing of the public." 71
While Rodzianko and Nekrasov unsuccessfully tried to encourage Mikhail Alexandrovich to take decisive action, the commissars for military and food affairs from both the committee and the Council entered into business cooperation. For the liberals, this signaled an opportunity to "ride" the revolution. In coordination with the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet, the Provisional Committee was able, as a body designated by the legislative body, to take over the administration of the old state apparatus and use the "organized public" to strengthen its position in the field. Late in the evening, Milyukov told Rodzianko: "It's time to decide!" "Well, I've made up my mind," Rodzianko replied, " I'm taking power into my own hands. But now I ask everyone to obey me without question... Alexander Fyodorovich, "he added, turning to Kerensky," this applies especially to you. " 72 Kerensky remarked that he was also a comrade of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. The Committee needed Kerensky precisely in this guise.

However, what Milyukov had in mind, Rodzianko had on his tongue. The latter had a distinguished appearance, a loud voice, but as a political figure he was not independent, stupid and tactless. In Milyukov's transfer, Rodzianko demanded not only unconditional, but also blind submission to him. Quoting these words of his,

68 Cit. by: E. N. Burjalov. The Second Russian Revolution, Moscow, 1967, pp. 233-234.

69 M. V. Rodzianko. The State Duma and the February 1917 Revolution. Rostov n / A. 1919, p. 40.

70 Cit. by: E. N. Burjalov. Op. ed., p. 235.

71 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

72 B. E. Revolutionary days. (Memoirs of a participant in the February Days of 1917). " Common Cause "(Paris), 16. III. 1921.

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Milyukov exclaims: "O great Shakespeare! How correctly you pointed out that the most dramatic moments of life are not devoid of elements of humor. Mikhail Vladimirovich already felt like a dictator of the Russian revolution! " 73 . Psychologically, it is quite understandable that the sarcastic irony addressed to Rodzianko was just a release for the feelings that Milyukov himself felt at that time, confident that he would become the arbiter of Russia's fate, regardless of who takes the presidency. About midnight Sukhanov saw Milyukov. "He had a solemn look and a suppressed smile on his lips. "A decision has been made," he said, "we are taking power." 74 Milyukov himself, describing this episode, sums up: "The path to power actions and orders was open; it was necessary to hurry to use it" 75. Thus came the" finest hour " of Russian liberalism.

In its first appeals to the citizens of Russia, the Provisional Committee reported that it "found itself compelled to take over the restoration of State and public order" and that its members "had the urgent task of organizing a spontaneous popular movement." In a telegram to the "leaders of the army" - the commanders of the fronts and fleets-the committee promised that it would "soon restore calm in the rear and restore the correct functioning of government institutions." 77 The Provisional Committee hoped to restore the "normal" course of the state mechanism by confirming the powers of the "old bureaucrats", but this proved impossible due to their arrest by the rebels or flight. The remaining local officials demanded that the Provisional Committee legalize the activities of their departments in the name of "people's representation" and "begged to send a member of the State Duma." This prompted the committee's decision to send members of the State Duma as "commissars" - that is, Shulgin explains, "acting temporarily as gardeners." 78 These commissars sought to fully preserve the old state apparatus and even cooperate with "dignitaries" if they found themselves on the spot.

The actions of the members of the Provisional Committee and Duma deputies were determined by their desire to limit the gains of the revolution to the creation of a "ministry of confidence"; as the committee's report indicated, "a new government corresponding to the wishes of the population and able to enjoy their confidence" 79 . Summing up her observations of the activities of the Provisional Committee on February 28, Gippius concluded that its members "still have a glimmer of hope that the tsar will approve this committee as an official government." 80 But on the evening of February 27, Nicholas II, refusing to negotiate any concessions with his brother, personally instructed General N. I. Ivanov, who was appointed to" pacify the capital " as commander-in-chief of the Petrograd Military District with dictatorial powers. A punitive expedition against the revolutionary capital was being hastily prepared at Stavka. Ivanov, who suppressed the Kronstadt Uprising in 1906, remarked before leaving for Petrograd:: "We missed you too late!"81 . An experienced punisher correctly assessed the situation. And the Duma members still continued to hope, to some extent, for an agreement with Nicholas II, clearly overestimating the real strength of the autocracy.

In the first hours of their return to action, the members and commissars of the Provisional Committee became convinced that they could only control events to a certain extent. Even if the apparatus of their subordinate departments was fully executive, the activities of the Provisional Committee commissars were fruitless if they did not enter into business contact with the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. The outcome of the Provisional Committee's attempts to "take power" depended on whether it succeeded in seizing power.-

75 "Latest news", 12. II 1.1927.

74 Nickname. Sukhanov. Notes on the Revolution. Book I. Berlin, 1922, p. 142.

75 "Latest news", 12. III. 1927.

76 "The revolutionary movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy". Documents and materials, Moscow, 1957, p. 402.

77 Ibid., p. 404.

78 V. V. Shulgin. Days, Belgrade. 1925, p. 186.

79 "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy", p. 402.

80 "Vozrozhdenie", 14. IX. 1928.

81 "The Abdication of Nicholas II." l. 1927, p. 87; for more information, see: V. S. Dyakin. The collapse of General Ivanov's counter-revolutionary campaign. Voprosy Istorii, 1969, No. 3.

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those who decided the fate of the revolutionary capital. There could be no question of leading the masses of the workers. The Committee could only try to subdue the armed forces. Rodzianko and Colonel of the General Staff B. A. Engelhardt, appointed by the committee as "commandant of the insurgent Petrograd garrison", managed to seize the leadership of the Military Commission created by the Petrograd Soviet, whose task was to establish communication with the insurgent units and organize their management. Engelhardt transformed the commission into an organ of the Provisional Committee. The commission was instructed to attract officers to the side of the committee and with its help achieve "organization of the military masses". But at the moment when the Provisional Committee made such an appeal to the officers, they themselves asked him to take them under protection. In response, the Provisional Committee sent members of the State Duma headed by Milyukov and Rodzianko to military units. Throughout February 28, Duma agitators traveled, talked to officers and spoke to soldiers, trying to convince their listeners that the only legitimate authority was the State Duma Committee. Therefore, soldiers must obey the officers who act under his direction.

Persuasion proved ineffective due to the rapid revolutionization of the mass of soldiers. It was even worse when representatives of the Duma committee tried to take on administrative functions. For example, when committee member A. I. Guchkov and Major General N. M. Potapov, who soon took over the leadership of the Military Commission from Engelhardt, tried to "restore order" in the Izmailovo regiment, they were saved only by the speed of their car. And the Petrograd Soviet's "Order No. 1 of March 1 on the Petrograd garrison" finally deprived the Provisional Committee of the possibility of subjugating the armed forces of the capital. Now military units "in all their political actions" had to submit only to the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and soldiers ' committees .82 And on March 1, the members of the Provisional Committee felt, in Engelhardt's words, "the rise of the second revolutionary wave": "New notes were heard in the speeches of the representatives of the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. The day before they had smashed the tsarist government; now they were attacking the entire bourgeois system. " 83 The "second wave" caused alarming associations among liberal figures. When on the morning of March 1, in the premises of the Military Commission, someone started saying that "today is a significant day, that maybe it will be celebrated like the French - Bastille Day", a member of the commission P. I. Palchinsky, who became chief of defense of the Winter Palace on October 25, remarked that " maybe we are now we are sitting in the Bastille ourselves. " 84 And on the evening of March 1, when Kerensky said to Engelhardt: "We can be congratulated on our victory," Engelhardt replied: "I see the victory, but I can't help but think of the fate of the Girondins with sadness." 85 Summing up the activities of the Provisional Committee, Engelhardt stated:"We accepted the revolution as an accomplished fact and for three days ostensibly led it, but in fact trailed behind events, while at the same time making hopeless attempts to delay its development." 86
On March 1, the commander of the Northern Front, General N. V. Ruzsky, informed Rodzianko that Nicholas II had decided to "give a ministry responsible to the legislative chambers" and instructs him to "form a cabinet". But the expected agreement was not followed. The situation seems paradoxical: since the organizational consolidation of liberalism in Russia, the limit of the liberals ' aspirations was to get permission from the tsar to form a government, and the government responsible to the legislative chambers seemed to them generally a matter of the distant future. And when such an assignment is finally given, the liberals reject it. But the paradoxical nature of the situation was purely external. Behind it was the one for-

82 See for more information: E. S. Mikhailov. Order No. 1. Voprosy Istorii, 1967, No. 2.

83 RO GBL, f. 218, k. 36, d. 3, l. 746.

84 P. A. Polovtse V. Days of the eclipse. Paris. B / y, page 21.

85 RO GBL, f. 218, k. 36, d. 3, l. 746.

86 Ibid., l. 726.

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uniformity: the autocracy only makes such concessions when the revolution becomes the master of the situation. What was special was that the majority of the Executive Committee of the Soviet was composed of conciliatory elements, as a result of which the representatives of the Provisional Committee did not have to bow down to the Soviet, because the latter's representatives were the first to arrive.

The issue of creating a government was discussed at a meeting of the Council's Executive Committee on March 1. The three Bolsheviks who proposed forming a government out of members of the parties that were part of it remained in the minority. The compromise majority passed the decision to grant the Duma Committee the right to appoint ministers of the Provisional Government, but to oblige it to proclaim political freedoms, to grant a full amnesty to political prisoners, and to take immediate measures to convene a Constituent Assembly. After that, late in the evening, four representatives of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, headed by its Chairman Chkheidze, appeared in the room of the Provisional Committee and began negotiations on the conditions for the transfer of power to the bourgeois government, which should be created by the Provisional Committee.

Milyukov negotiated in an effort to reach an agreement that suited both sides. The only unacceptable demand of the Soviet was the third point for Milyukov: "The Provisional Government must not take any steps prejudging the future form of government." 87 He strongly insisted on preserving the monarchical form of government and, moreover, the Romanov dynasty, limiting himself only to the replacement of Nicholas II by his son Alexey under the regency of Mikhail Alexandrovich. Sukhanov admitted that it was rather unexpected for him and, apparently, for the other representatives of the Soviet that Milyukov made of this "the most militant point of all our conditions." Only later did Sukhanov realize that in acting in this way, Milyukov, from his point of view, "was absolutely right and very astute", considering that only with the preservation of the monarchy and dynasty could the bourgeoisie as the ruling class count on success .88
After an agreement on the Provisional Government's program was reached, Milyukov asked the Soviet delegation which of its members "are being nominated for the posts of ministers." When they were told that the Council members had no intention of joining the Provisional Government, the Duma members expressed their "indignation at this decision" .89 The leaders of the" progressive bloc "wanted compromisers to cover up the class essence of the government being formed, which, in order to be successful, had to enjoy the confidence not only of "society", but also of the working people. After receiving the refusal, Milyukov demanded that the representatives of the Soviet publish a declaration stating that "this government was formed by agreement with the Soviet of Workers 'Deputies:' in so far ' this government must be recognized as legitimate in the eyes of the masses of the people and deserve their confidence." And when the delegates accepted this condition, Milyukov demanded that "this declaration should call for confidence in the officers and for soldiers to recognize the command staff." 90 Representatives of the Council agreed to this as well. Here Miliukov desired that the declaration of the Soviet should be printed together with the declaration of the Provisional Government. On the evening of March 2, the texts of both declarations were finalized and submitted to the printing house. Milyukov recalled with satisfaction: "Both statements appeared in the press side by side: their statement, edited by us, on behalf of the government, and my statement, edited and supplemented by them, on behalf of the Council of R. and S. Deputies." 91 Miliukov wrote in full the third and final paragraph of the declaration of the Soviet, and on the question of the nature of the state structure, he declared it his task (in the declaration of the Provisional Government) to urgently prepare for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly that would "establish the form of government and the constitution of the country."92
87 Nickname. Sukhanov. Op. ed., p. 277.

88 Ibid., p. 278.

89 M. G. Rafes. My memories. Byloye, 1922, No. 19, p. 196.

90 Nickname. Sukhanov Edict. op., p. 282.

91 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 308.

92 Russkie Vedomosti, 3. III. 1917.

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So the liberals won a victory over the representatives of the Council on the issue of power sharing. This was due to unfavorable circumstances for the revolution, which gave the compromisers the opportunity to speak on its behalf. The liberals succeeded, and it was very important for them, in concealing to some extent the social nature of the Provisional Government by introducing the "democratic" red-mouthed Kerensky. They have long been preparing lists of ministers in case it becomes possible to create a government of "public trust". On the basis of these lists, taking into account the current situation at that time, the composition of the first Provisional Government was determined by Milyukov. Instead of Rodzianko, Prince G. E. Lvov was invited to the post of chairman. The replacement of the chairman of the Duma by the chairman of the zemstvo organization was a well-thought-out tactical move. "The political role,"Miliukov explains," which the Duma played, so to speak, in a tacit editorial, had to pass to the Russian public, if this public could serve as an emphasis against the onset of the next 'stages'. In this sense, the change of Rodzianko kn. Lviv was the first revolutionary step and an inevitable inoculation against further exacerbation of the disease. " 93 At the same time, after the first meeting with Lviv, Milyukov called him a "hat". The reason was that L'vov turned out to be a figure burdened with intellectual ideas and principles, and was not inclined to go to the goal without fear of dirt and blood, as a bourgeois politician should have done for good luck. Milyukov later wrote about him even with a palpable sense of disgust: "Hamlet's indecision, covered with Tolstoy's non-resistance and clothed in a sweetly unctuous official-optimistic style - it was.this is exactly the opposite of what was required of a revolutionary prime minister. " 94
The question arises: why didn't Milyukov himself head the government, which he actually led? The fact is that he had a special type of ambition-he sought not to represent, but to decide, achieved not popularity, but success, preferred the role of a director rather than a first actor. In addition, Milyukov did not want to be prime minister of the Provisional Government that had emerged during the revolution, and probably intended to sit in the chair of Prime Minister of His Majesty's government after a while. On the evening of March 2, during the final coordination of the government program with representatives of the Council, Milyukov said: "The government is me." Sukhanov assured that he could vouch for the accuracy of his words. "Directly to the face of his cabinet colleagues and the Prime Minister himself, Milyukov, addressing us, said with emphasis and apparent sincere conviction. "The Constituent Assembly can decide anything. If it speaks out against the monarchy, then I can leave. I can't leave now. Now, if I don't exist, then the government won't exist at all. And if there is no government, then... you understand... " 95 .

By party affiliation, the Provisional Government was mostly cadet. The Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, G. E. Lvov, who was not formally a party member, joined the Cadets. They also held the following portfolios: Minister of Foreign Affairs-N. N. Milyukov, Railways - N. V. Nekrasov, Agriculture-A. I. Shingarev, Education-A. A. Manuilov, and Finnish Affairs-F. I. Rodichev. Finance Minister Mikhail Tereshchenko, a nonpartisan liberal, was close to the Cadets. In addition, cadet V. D. Nabokov became the head of government affairs. The government also included two Octobrists-the Military and Naval Minister A. I. Guchkov and the state comptroller I. V. Godnev, then the representative of the center group-the chief prosecutor of the Synod V. N. Lvov, the progressive Minister of Trade and Industry A. I. Konovalov and the Trudovik Minister of Justice A. F. Kerensky. In its political essence, this government did not correspond to the time of its creation, immediately becoming the government of yesterday. This was clear even to the tsarist bureaucrat A.V. Krivoshein, who, upon learning about the composition of the Provisional Government, said that "it is too right-wing", does not correspond to the current situation and therefore is not viable .96
93 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 275.

94 P. N. Milyukov. Russia is at a turning point. Vol. I. Paris, 1927, p. 82.

95 Nickname. Sukhanov. Op. ed., p. 339.

96 Yu. V. Lomonosov. Memories of the March Revolution of 1917 Stockholm-Berlin. 1921, p. 63.

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Milyukov, apparently, thought about the same thing in a different way. He announced the formation of a Provisional Government on March 2 before an audience of thousands in the Catherine Hall of the Tauride Palace, hoping for a friendly reception. A member of the Military Commission, S. D. Maslovsky (a literary pseudonym - Mstislavsky), recalled that Milyukov "could not be looked at without a smile: so "birthday" he was, so openly felt "at the top of the mountain" 97 . And not surprisingly. After all, for Milyukov, this "was the first official act that was supposed to bring the new government, so to speak, public investment", that is, to perform the rite of introduction to office. However, his "very elated mood" quickly fell when his speech was interrupted by shouts of questions: "Who chose you?". Milyukov replied: "We were chosen by the Russian Revolution!". Since such a fanfaron response did not satisfy the audience, Milyukov had to explain: "No one chose us, because if we waited for the people's election, we could not wrest power from the hands of the enemy. While we were arguing about who to choose, the enemy would have organized and defeated both you and us... It was so fortunate that at a moment when it was impossible to wait, there was such a handful of people who were sufficiently well known to the people for their political past and against whom there could not be a shadow of the objections that the old government fell under." But the audience's attitude to Miliukov's explanations was such that he had to hurry to assure them: "We will not retain this power for a minute after the representatives freely elected by the people tell us that they want to see other people in our places who are more worthy of their trust." 98
Milyukov's words that a handful of liberals had made the revolution happy and wrested power from the autocracy were surprisingly unabashed demagogy. But even more brazen and treacherous, since he violated the agreement reached last night with representatives of the Council, was Milyukov's answer to the questions " And the dynasty? What about the Romanovs?"99 . Milyukov, making a reservation ("I know in advance that my answer will not satisfy all of you"), clearly formulated it: "The old despot who brought Russia to the brink of ruin will voluntarily give up the throne or be deposed... Power will pass to the regent, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich... The heir will be Alexey " 100 . Milyukov sought to impose the broken Romanov trough on the revolution. But this attempt, as expected, was unsuccessful. Milyukov's statement was met with shouts of protest, and he did not immediately get a chance to continue his speech. Nevertheless, Milyukov tried to convince his audience that it was not a matter of dislike for the old dynasty, and he explained in a "raised tone": "We cannot leave the question of the form of the state system unanswered and without a solution. We imagine it as a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Perhaps others think otherwise, but now if we argue about it, instead of immediately deciding, then Russia will find itself in a state of civil war and only a destroyed regime will be revived. " 101 One part of the audience was affected by Milyukov's argument, but the other part immediately understood its demagogic nature. "The noise and protests continued unabated." 102 Milyukov was forced to make a promise: "As soon as the danger is over and a lasting order is restored, we will begin preparations for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot. A freely elected people's representative office will decide who is most likely to express their opinion.

97 S. D. Mstislavsky. Five days. The beginning and end of the February Revolution. Berlin-Ptgr. - M. 1922, p. 56.

98 "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy", p. 411.

99 Nickname. Sukhanov. Op. ed., p. 324.

100 "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy", p. 413.

101 Ibid., pp. 413-414.

102 Nickname. Sukhanov. Op. ed., p. 325.

103 So in the text published in Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies (3. III. 1917). In Milyukov's own program, "a lasting peace will be established" (P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 312). Apparently, the editorial staff of Izvestia found it impossible to preserve Milyukov's proposal to delay the convocation of the Constituent Assembly until the end of the war and introduced a more "hopeful" wording.

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the general opinion of Russia - we or our opponents " 104 . Milyukov later admitted that "there was not much logic in this final chord." 105
The desire of the "vremennye" to preserve the monarchy caused indignation in Petrograd, which grew as news of Milyukov's speech spread. Late in the evening of March 2, a "large crowd of extremely excited officers" came to the Tauride Palace, who demanded that Milyukov retract his words, because without this they could not return to their units. Milyukov was forced to explain that "his words about the temporary regency of V. K. Mikhail Alexandrovich and the succession of Alexey are his personal opinion." Regarding the issue of giving them the "required statement", Milyukov, speaking later as a historian, wrote:: "This was, of course, incorrect, because in all the previous discussions this issue was considered to have been resolved together in the very sense that P. N. Milyukov stated it. But, frightened by the growing wave of excitement, the Provisional Committee tacitly repudiated its previous opinion. " 106
At the same time, the Provisional Government sent two ardent monarchists, Guchkov and Shulgin, to Pskov, where Nicholas II was staying, to save the monarchy by transferring the throne to the heir Alexey under the regency of Mikhail Alexandrovich. The tsar agreed to hand over the throne only to Michael. It was a trick: Nicholas II had the right to abdicate the throne himself, but not for his son. Thus, the act of abdication appeared to be illegal, and therefore it could be declared invalid if the occasion was right. Then Nicholas II "legitimized" the Provisional Government by signing a decree appointing G. E. Lvov Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, it is one thing to announce the abdication of the "old despot", and quite another to impose a new tsar on the rebellious people. When the two "knights of the monarchy" returned to Petrograd and Guchkov proclaimed "Long live Emperor Michael!" at a railway workers ' rally, the audience's outburst of indignation showed that attempts to preserve the monarchy could cost the Provisional Government dearly.

Around noon on March 3, a meeting of members of the Provisional Government and non-members of the Provisional Committee was held with Mikhail Alexandrovich at the apartment of monarchist M. S. Putyatin. Rodzianko, taking over the chairmanship, opened the meeting with a speech explaining the need for Michael's abdication .107 Kerensky, who spoke after him, proved the same thing. Milyukov, who then received the floor, urged Mikhail Alexandrovich to " accept the imperial power." In a recording of the end of 1917, Milyukov narrates his speech as follows: "I pointed out that in Russia, given the political unpreparedness of the masses, the concept of the state still merges with the concept of the sovereign, and that it is impossible to eliminate the latter without obscuring the former. I argued that such a small boat as the Provisional Government would not be able to reach the Constituent Assembly through the ocean of popular passions, which would probably become rampant and expose the country to all the horrors of disintegration and anarchy."108
But this time Milyukov did not receive the usual support of the majority of liberals who took part in the meeting. It was clear to them that revolutionary Petrograd was resolutely opposed to the monarchy. Milyukov spoke again. His speech, according to Shulgin, was amazing: "His head was white as a harrier, his face was blue from insomnia, he was completely hoarse from speeches in barracks and at meetings, he did not speak, he cawed hoarsely"109 . Miliukov foreshadowed the demise of Russia in the event of Michael's abdication, for the monarch is its only axis, the only center around which the Russian mass can gather. "I suggested," Milyukov recalls, " that we immediately take cars and go to Moscow, where there would be an organized force necessary to support the Grand Duke's positive decision. I was sure that this exit was relatively safe. But even if he is dangerous - and if Polo is-

104 "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia after the overthrow of the autocracy", p. 414.

105 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 312.

106 P. N. Milyukov. History of the Second Russian Revolution, vol. I, issue 1, p. 52.

107 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 316.

108 P. N. Milyukov. An old forgery. "Latest news", 8. X. 1921.

109 V. V. Shulgin. Op. ed., p. 298.

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If the situation in Petrograd is really like this, then we must still take a risk: this is the only way out. " 110 Guchkov alone supported Milyukov, and even then only weakly and listlessly. The participants in the conference clearly imagined that the revolutionary people would not accept the representative of the "old dynasty" as the bearer of supreme power, and that Romanov in this capacity would have to be imposed on the country by force. But there was none. Moreover, Rodzianko claims in his memoirs that it was not possible to take Mikhail further: "Not a single car would have been released from the city, just as not a single train would have been released from it." 111
The argument, which lasted for several hours, reached its limit. "Both sides," Milyukov reports, "have stated that in the event of a decision that does not agree with their opinion, they will not obstruct and will support the government, although they will not participate in it." 112 It was now up to Mikhail Alexandrovich to decide in what forms the further struggle between reaction and revolution would unfold, and not only did he not want to become a Napoleon, but he also had little understanding of the situation. When they met at Putyatin's apartment with Milyukov, Mikhail Alexandrovich, a youngish officer with a long, thin face, jokingly said: "Well, it's good to be in the position of the English king. Very easy and convenient! Eh? "" 113 . It turned out that he could expect neither ease nor comfort. And when the time came for him to make his own decision, this supporter of the parliamentary monarchy said that he wanted to think about his answer again, went into the next room, invited Rodzianko and Lvov there ,and then directly asked Rodzianko if he could "guarantee his life if he accepted the throne." 114 Rodzianko gave a negative answer, which stopped the hesitation of Michael, who said that he decided to give up the throne. Milyukov admitted that this refusal plunged him "into a state of complete despair". " 115
Not daring to embark on the path proposed by Milyukov, the bourgeois leaders took care to provide legal support for the elevation of Mikhail Alexandrovich to the throne under favorable conditions that a counter-revolutionary coup could create. The tsar's brother abdicated conditionally-until the Constituent Assembly decided on the way of government, but for now he transferred full power to the Provisional Government. This ensured both the continuity of power of the Provisional Government and the "legitimacy" of a possible restoration of the monarchy. After Milyukov's demands were rejected, not only he, but also Guchkov refused the ministerial portfolios. The Minister of War and Navy, addressing the members of the Provisional Government, said:: "I cannot go down this path with you, I believe that you are pushing the country to destruction, I cannot participate in this matter together with you." 116 Miliukov was of the same opinion. But in the evening of the same day, members of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party persuaded him not to resign from the government. Together with him, Guchkov remained in the government. The change in their decision was determined primarily by the fact that they tried to use the power as much as possible in order to prevent the further development of the revolution.

In his memoirs, Milyukov describes the contents of the official telegram of the French Ambassador M. Palaiologos, sent on March 10, 1917: "Until now, the people have attacked the dynasty and the bureaucracy. Then economic, social, religious, and national problems will quickly become the priority. From the point of view of war, these are terrible problems... until they are resolved, public opinion will be captured by them. But we should not wish for this resolution to be accelerated, as it will not be implemented without profound upheavals. " 117 Agreeing with the Paleologist, Milyukov notes that the course of the process, its pace and results really could have been foreseen. The question was, " Was it possible

110 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 317.

111 M. V. Rodzianko. Op. ed., p. 45.

112 P. N. Milyukov. History of the Second Russian Revolution, vol. I, issue 1, p. 54.

113 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 316.

114 M. V. Rodzianko. Op. ed., p. 45.

113 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 318.

116 "The Fall of the Tsarist regime", vol. VI, p. 267.

117 P. N. Milyukov. Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 349.

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warn them by foreseeing them? " 118 . To warn them to concentrate all their efforts on bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, and to try to ease the tension of class contradictions, while doing everything possible to hinder the development of the revolution, especially the solution of its primary and most urgent socio-economic tasks!

The solution of the question that tormented Milyukov and his associates was clear to the leader of the proletariat. On March 11, 1917, Lenin wrote:: "Under certain circumstances, in the best case for it, the new government can somewhat delay the collapse, relying on all the organizational abilities of the entire Russian bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia. But even in this case, it cannot avoid collapse, for it is impossible to escape from the clutches of the terrible monster of imperialist war and famine created by world capitalism, without leaving the ground of bourgeois relations, without passing to revolutionary measures, without appealing to the greatest historical heroism of both the Russian and world proletariat. " 119 There is nothing surprising in the fact that "after the collapse of tsarism, the bourgeois Provisional Government lasted only eight months without relying on this 'symbol of power familiar to the masses'. " 120 You can put it another way: it's amazing that it lasted for eight whole months!

On the tenth anniversary of the February Revolution, while justifying his refusal to celebrate "the sad and deplorable days of February 27 - March 2, 1917," Struve wrote:: "This revolution in the history of Russia and the whole world has no independent significance. Not only its entire significance, but also its very existence is reduced to the fact that it was the prelude to the Bolshevik October Revolution."121 Even earlier, he concluded that "the entire revolution as a popular movement was born and was born out of the spirit of Bolshevism." 122 That is why Maklakov concluded that the February Revolution was "not a victory, but a defeat for liberalism." 123 In exile, he repeatedly said that the liberals did not do what they should have done to prevent the revolution-to become a bridge between the government and the people. Miliukov, on the other hand, insisted that "the autocracy itself hastened its own catastrophe" by its reactionary policy. The Progressive Bloc "wanted to give the tsar one last chance to save the dynasty and Russia, to prevent a revolutionary catastrophe," but due to the intransigence of Nicholas II, "the last chance to build a bridge between the supreme power and the country passed in vain." 124
The liberals 'divergences on such an important issue may seem all the more strange at first glance, since" Milyukov and Maklakov... men of action who perfectly understand the meaning of the class struggle when it concerns them. " 125 At the heart of the divergence was their unwillingness to recognize the pattern of the collapse of liberalism. Therefore, they began to look for subjective reasons for an objectively inevitable outcome. "The experience of the cadet constitution failed,.. Lenin pointed out, not because the Cadets or the government did not have a good will, but because the objective contradictions of the Russian revolution turned out to be too deep. These contradictions turned out to be so deep that it was impossible to throw a cadet bridge over the abyss. " 126 Shingarev understood this earlier than many of his associates. As early as December 1917, as if predicting the outcome of a future foreign dispute among other leaders of his party, he wrote, referring to the revolution: "Many people had a presentiment of its possibility, many foresaw and anticipated its appearance in our country, especially since the autumn of 1916; no one

118 Ibid., pp. 349-350.

119 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 31, p. 37.

120 E. D. Chermensky. Op. ed., p. 418; see also N. K. Strelkov. The emergence of dual power in Russia. Voprosy Istorii, 1967, No. 3.

121 P. B. Struve. The politician's diary. "Vozrozhdenie", 12. III. 1927.

122 P. B. Struve. Past, present, and future. Russkaya Mysl, 1923, books I-II, p. 225.

123 V. A. Maklakov. From the past. Sovremennye Zapiski (Modern Notes) (Paris), 1929, vol. XXXVIII, p. 310.

124 P. N. Milyukov. Russia is at a turning point. Vol. I, p. 17.

125 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 32, p. 300.

126 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 16, p. 60.

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I was not at liberty to warn her, or even to change her forms. " 127 So Shingarev recognized that the liberals not only did not make the revolution, but in general could not delay it or change its course.

"The Russian Revolution is a long process," Miliukov wrote in the editorial of his Paris organ. - Its beginning can be formally attributed... by June 18, 1902, when the first issue of Osvobozhdeniye was published in Stuttgart under the editorship of P. B. Struve " 128 . This is the usual Russian liberals ' exaggeration of their role in the liberation movement, which has also been adopted by Western bourgeois historiography. The publication of the first issue of Osvobozhdeniye was indeed a definite milestone, but only in the history of Russian liberalism: "The Liberals came up with an independent body and a special political program." 129 Almost 15 years after that, they waited for their "finest hour". And when it came, power had to be shared not with the autocracy, which could use bayonets and prisons to protect them "from the fury of the people", but with various representatives of the revolutionary people, who constantly demanded the further development of the revolution.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution put an end forever to the liberals ' clinging to State power. After the attempt to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup in Petrograd on November 28, 1917, the Cadet Party was declared by Lenin's decree a party of enemies of the people, with all the consequences that followed .130 Thus ended the history of Russian liberalism, which never entered into a decisive struggle against the autocracy, but dared to oppose its own revolutionary people and the socialist transformation of the country.

127 A. I. Shingarev. As it was, Moscow, 1918, p. 33.

128 "Latest news", 1. XI. 1925.

129 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 9, p. 78.

130 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 35, p. 126.

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