February 1917. News of the revolution came from St. Petersburg and Moscow to the distant Romanian front. A new time has come for the soldiers - meetings, rallies, and elections to the Soviets. There was still a lot of confusion and misunderstanding among them, the proletarian stratum was weak, which allowed the sweet-talking Social Revolutionaries to get a majority in the elected bodies, but one thing became clear immediately: the army did not want to fight. One of the local "persuaders" sent to the unit before the June offensive, doctor Landa, wrote that at the headquarters where he was, he was advised to prepare for trouble: "Write a spiritual will in advance. At best, you are being bought out." The members of the various committees in which the compromisers sat, who trumpeted the war to a victorious end, were no longer believed by the comfrey workers ^.1

The peculiarity of the situation was that the front with the adjacent strip, where many Russian soldiers were concentrated, passed through a foreign country-Romania. On the head of the Romanian rulers, a disaster unexpectedly fell-a foreign army of millions, which came into a state of revolutionary ferment. The Romanian King Ferdinand, having learned about the overthrow of his Russian brother, wept. The government, secretly hoping for a counter-revolutionary coup in Russia, delayed information about Petrograd for ^six days . But, of course, it could not silence the revolution. In angry impotence, the Romanian reaction watched how the process of revolutionizing the Russian army was going on in the land where yesterday Siguranza (the Romanian Okhrana) stopped the slightest protest, and how it affected the city, village, and Romanian troops. She was wary of "taking measures" that were common at other times, that is, resorting to reprisals. Romania's own armed forces were still recovering from the terrible losses suffered in the 1916 campaign. Therefore, the Romanian oligarchy took a position of waiting and maneuvering.

On April 3, 1917, the first open meeting of Romanian socialists since Romania's entry into the war took place, timed to coincide with the funeral of their comrade Otto Kalin, who died of typhus. The speech was delivered by a prominent party figure, Mihai Gheorghe Bujor, who welcomed the February ³ revolution . He was an officer in the Romanian army and, fearing persecution, went underground after the rally. Soon the Okhrana began to report on the increased activity of socialists.

¹ "Voice of the Revolution", 26. VII. 1917.

² Biblioteca Academiei R. S. R. Sectia de manuscrise. A. Mossoloff. Ma mission en Roumanie. F. arhiva palatului, mapa XX, N 7, pp. 121 - 124.

³ V. Liveanu. Influenta revolutiei ruse din februarie 1917 in Romania. "Studii", 1956, N 1, p. 21.

On the day of the May Day demonstration, Bujor rode in a car in a column of demonstrators, and spies watched this spectacle from the gateways. At the rally held in Iasi on Unification Square, there were calls for the overthrow of the Romanian oligarchy and undisguised threats against the "sacred person" of the king ⁵ .

It is characteristic that the Romanian authorities did not dare to use force during the demonstration. It is also significant that none other than the Russian envoy A. Mosolov, a former tsarist general, strongly advised Romanian ministers to avoid " the slightest incident that could end in bloodshed." However, his alarmed interlocutors did not need to be persuaded: the messenger immediately received the most categorical assurances in the required spirit. Romanian troops were locked in barracks and even police officers were removed from the streets to avoid conflict ^.6 Only plainclothes informants were on duty.

A few days after the demonstration, Bujor left for Russia, much to the relief of the Romanian authorities, who preferred to keep the troublemaker away from Yass ⁷ . Soon, however, Bujor returned to his homeland to establish work among the socialists. Two of his letters have been preserved from that time: ⁸ on the restoration of the Iasi section of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and on the organization of an underground printing house. Bujor lived in the premises of the Iasi Soviet of Russian Soldiers 'and Officers' Deputies, and this was no secret to Romanian intelligence. Siguranza had set up an observation post in a nearby house and was carefully photographing the people who came to Bujor. They were afraid to arrest him. Soon the leaders of the Council found it inconvenient to provide Bujor, who was also a deserter, with their own premises. Council Chairman Aksenov had a "long and sharp" conversation with Bujor ⁹, after which the Romanian revolutionary moved to a private apartment.

Of course, even in these unusual conditions, the Romanian reaction continued to create reprisals. But the very fact that, out of fear of the Russian army and its own people, it had to abandon the death penalty in court [¹⁰] and resort to secret murders (for example, the socialist Max Wexler) speaks for itself.

The purpose of this article is not to reconstruct the whole complex picture of class relations in Romania after February 1917. However, it is necessary to reproduce some very peculiar features of it, because they had an impact on the content and spirit of those documents, which we will consider later. The first of them, the "Report-Appeal" on behalf of the "Romanian Social-Democratic Party and the Committee for the Preparation of the Revolution established in Iasi", we have read only in the Russian translation (from French-

⁵ TsGAOR USSR, KMF-14, za 14, pl. 154, part 1, leaflet "Cetateni!" of the Odessa Action Committee.

⁶ See Pravda, 31 (18). I. 1918; TsGAOR USSR, f. 1001, op. 1, d. 227, l. 4.

⁷ Archive of Foreign Policy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs( WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), f. 125, op. 1, d. 10, folder 1, l. 3.

⁸ Photocopies of the letters can be found in the Museum of the History of the Communist Party, Revolutionary and Democratic Movement of Romania (Bucharest).

⁹ TSASA, f. 28361, op. 2, d. 148, ll. 25-26. Meeting of the Romanian group of fellow internationalists on June 17, 1933. Even many years later, M. G. Bujor, speaking with the Romanian historian V. Liveanu, expressed deep dissatisfaction with this act, considering it an act of conciliationism towards the Romanian authorities (see V. Liveanu. Op. cit., p. 24).

¹⁰ Prime Minister Bratianu assured the new Russian envoy, Poklevsky, that the death penalty would not be carried out (CVIA, f. 2003, op. 1, d.1232, l. 6).

Russian language)¹¹ . The report is dated June 24, 1917 and was written in Iasi. It is accompanied by a letter marked on the 30th day of the same month. Although the translator points out that the caption is illegible, nevertheless, in our opinion, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the author is M. G. Bujor ¹² . The letter informs about the dispatch of the "promised report on the situation in Romania", requests "necessary and even necessary assistance", and indicates that responses should be sent to the "Russian Executive Committee in Iasi", for Mikhailovich ¹³ . (The very method of correspondence-through the Iasi Soviet of Soldiers ' Deputies-shows how close ties existed between the revolutionaries of the two countries.) It begins with a brief description of the political and economic situation in Romania, accompanied by sharp, class-focused conclusions: "To tell you the truth, we don't have a political life" - the Romanian oligarchy is only ostensibly divided into political parties. The "so-called Romanian Parliament"is mentioned. There is talk of rampant anti-Semitism: "The policy towards Jews is the same. They are all indiscriminately considered spies. They are mistreated in the army, terrorized, beaten, and shot. " ¹⁴

The situation in Romania "has been unbearable and desperate for many years, but now it has reached its climax... Agricultural work this year was carried out in the most scandalous way. At the direction of the government, recruits, convalescing soldiers, old peasants, women and children with their tools, livestock and seeds were forced to work the landowners 'fields with the usual rudeness under the supervision of gendarmes." ¹⁵ But many peasant plots remained uncultivated. The report mentions some of the most famous historical facts of the massacre of the workers 'and peasants' movement in Romania. It refers to the brutally brutal suppression of the peasant uprising of 1907, the arrests of socialists after the outbreak of the war, and the closure of their newspaper: "Romania is the only country in which socialists could not say a single word during the war." The fate of the conscripted members of the movement is unknown - they are "under vigilant supervision". The police warn the command of the relevant units that these are "dangerous people who are hostile to the army, against the war, against the country ..." ¹⁶ . There are known cases of open and secret reprisals against revolutionaries: M. Wexler was killed, seven socialists were executed in Bakau; here the authorities were preparing to kill thirty-three more. On the way to the execution, the convicts met with a Russian detachment and asked for help. The Russians intervened and repulsed the suicide bombers from the guards. Later, however, these socialists became victims of the terror of reaction. The letter tells about the protest demonstrations of the Russian troops,

¹¹ The translation is not stylistically flawed, as can be seen from the following excerpts.

¹² This assumption is supported not only by the fact that Bujor was the most active of the Romanian socialists in the Romanian territory not occupied by the enemy, but also by a number of other evidence. The second letter (December 1917), which will be discussed below, preserved in the original (French) under the signature of M. G. Bujor, contains a direct reference to sending a "Report-appeal" to the international department of the Petrograd Soviet (says: "we sent it"), although the deadline is somewhat inaccurate-the beginning of July. Probably, Bujor's memory changed at that time, or he meant dating according to the new style (WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, d. 5, folder 1, ll. 20-21).

¹³ Ibid., l. 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., l. 3.

¹⁵ Ibid., l. 2.

¹⁶ Ibid., l. 3.

which were also attended by local citizens in a number of cities ¹⁷ . The Government was forced to abolish the death penalty. But the "death penalty without trial" and "crimes without witnesses" continued.

The author of the letter notes that two leaders of the Second International, Vandervelde and de Brucker, had a conversation with A. Dobrogeanu-Gerea and another Romanian socialist while visiting Iasi. Dobrogeanu was in the military service at the time, and the army immediately issued an order to arrest and bring to a military tribunal those who spread "false or biased rumors about the military and political situation of Romania." This section of the "Report-address" ends with the words:"The Romanian oligarchy, this decaying class, incapable of any creative effort, which lives like a parasite and disorganizes everything that falls into its hands, hinders the democratic development of the country." And as the conclusion follows: "It must be swept away!" ¹⁸ .

Here a kind of invisible line passes through the document: a brief summary of the situation ends, and the actual appeal to the Petrograd Soviet begins. It is said that in the "clash between the Romanian people and their ruling class, the revolutionary army of the new Russia must play an important and decisive role... If desired, she can become the master of the situation at any time. We think that this privileged and dominant position of the revolutionary army should be used for the country, for its liberation from the internal enemy. In other words, it should really seriously help the cause of the revolution that we want to make. " ¹⁹

The authors of the "Appeal" were by no means inclined to downplay the revolutionary role played by the Russian army. This was also stated directly (and this role was divided into "automatic" and "active") and indirectly, for example, when mentioning that Russian soldiers liberated Romanian socialists and achieved the abolition of the death penalty. But the authors wanted more. The aim of the army, they stressed, " must be to weaken and compromise our Rumanian tsarism day by day... All the strength at its disposal, all its revolutionary impulse, all its generosity, it must devote to the service of the Social-Democratic Party, to the struggle against the oligarchy, that is, to the service of the Revolution. For we think that the time has come to put an end to this evil system, which is a disgrace and a scandal throughout Europe and which keeps the Romanian people under the yoke of the most terrible slavery. There are few Romanians who will call themselves its defenders." The authors considered the appearance of the workers ' party to be evidence of widespread discontent in ^the country20 .

The "Appeal" expressed the opinion that the oligarchy has "no strength at all". It remains in power "because of its outward splendor, its usual insolence, and the respect that power always inspires." The conclusion was quite optimistic: "And it will not be too difficult, not too hard work to overthrow it." The Romanian Social Democrats are scattered all over the country; in the current circumstances, establishing communication between them is "impossible" or at least involves "thousands of difficulties." Therefore, "it is necessary for an external, so to speak, immune force to come on the scene, which could not be placed under the guardianship of our oligarchy and subjected to its barbaric blows in order to,

¹⁷ There is an obvious typo in the translation: it refers to "Russian citizens".

¹⁸ WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, d. 5, folder 1, ll. 4, 5.

¹⁹ Ibid., l. 5.

²⁰ Ibid. (referring to the Bourgeois-Democratic Party of Labour).

This force is the "revolutionary army of Russia", which "occupies almost all the cities and important points of the country". The Romanian garrisons in the rear are small, there are also mobilized socialists, and " everywhere there is already great discontent with the ruling class." "It will be enough to master Iasi and Galac to consider the first part of our task of overthrowing the oligarchy completed."²¹ . In both these cities, as in other places, there are many workers evacuated from enemy-occupied areas: "This is a real gathering of workers who can provide us with great support. In this revolutionary movement, we can count not only on the peasants and workers, but also on the majority of other strata of the population and on the remaining healthy part of the bourgeoisie. In all these social categories, we will find elements that can become leaders of the Romania of the future on new foundations."

"We appeal to you for help, citizens of revolutionary Russia." Once the French revolutionary troops " brought to the peoples of Europe the ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity... Now it is the turn of the Russian revolutionary troops to bring to the peoples with whom they come in contact, in particular the unfortunate Rumanian people, the great ideas associated with the red banners... They can bring with them Revolution, the emancipation of oppressed peoples, and socialism... The Russian Revolution must save the Romanian people not only from their external enemy, but also from their internal enemy. " ²²

The report ended with business messages and requests: it is impossible to print revolutionary manifestos in the printing houses of Iasi; so far the socialists have used the services of the Odessa section, but they need "a small secret printing house"; "we need money." It was pointed out that two manifestos had been distributed so far - an appeal from the Petrograd Soviet "To All the peoples of the World" and on the occasion of the May Day demonstration in Iasi. Prepared the other two ²³ .

The "Report-appeal", in our opinion, is not just an interesting, but also a deeply significant document. Before the war, Romanian social democracy was firmly based on the program principles of the Second International. The key to opening the gates to socialism was universal suffrage. The February revolution overturned the belief in the omnipotence of the ballot paper. And now, perhaps, for the first time, not at a rally, not in a newspaper article, not in a personal statement, but in an appeal on behalf of the Social Democratic Party of Romania, there was a call for revolution, for armed insurrection ^.24 Thus, the "Report-Address" was a definite step towards overcoming the "theory of socialism in backward countries", which was very influential in Rumanian social democracy, developed by Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gerea, and which claimed that in these countries (to which the author also referred Romania) the proletariat was too weak to fight the entire apparatus of oppression and oppression. suppressions. The report was imbued with a sense of proletarian internationalism and class hatred. On one side of the barricade is the "own "oligarchy; on the other - the "alien" one, the Russian army and the Romanian people.

²¹ Ibid., l. 7.

²² Ibid., l. 8.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ In the manifesto issued earlier on the occasion of the May Day demonstration in Iasi, this appeal was not yet so clear, although it was formulated in the most energetic terms: "We will sweep away the vile and idle scum who rule the country and suck the juices out of it, and give our enslaved people complete freedom" (TsGAOR USSR, KMF-14, za 32, pl. 154, part 1).

Finally, unlike some of the materials published later by the Romanian revolutionaries, which somewhat underestimated the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolutionary process, the "Appeal" refers specifically to it. Hence the high assessment of the Party of Labor (referring to its "laudable opposition") and the classification of the " healthy part of the bourgeoisie "among the forces that can be relied upon, indicating that representatives of various" social categories "will become the"leaders of the Romania of the future".

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who made up the majority in the Petrograd Soviet, were busy up to their necks trying to force the anti-war Russian army to move into battle-and not against it, but in alliance with the Rumanian rulers. It is not surprising that the "Report" did not find a response from them25 . And one more remark. Inspired by the rapid success of the February Revolution in Russia and the relative ease with which tsarism was overthrown, the authors of the Appeal clearly underestimated the strength, capabilities and reserves of the Romanian oligarchy. The latter did not hold on only "because of its external splendor, its usual arrogance" and even more so "the respect that power always inspires". The revolutionary situation in Romania has not matured to such an extent that one can say: "It will not be too difficult, not too hard work, to overthrow it (the oligarchy - V. V.)."

The events of the next few weeks, not even months, refuted the exaggerated hopes. Ironically, the Romanian rulers were able to extract political benefits even from the country's plight, which they were directly responsible for. The military unpreparedness of the army led to its rapid defeat in the tragic autumn-winter campaign of 1916 for Romania. Suffice it to say that by the end of December, barely one-tenth of those soldiers who were called up to the banner in August remained in the ranks. For six months, the Russian troops had to bear the brunt of the fight against the enemy on their shoulders. Meanwhile, a new Romanian army was created, equipped and trained in their rear. The occupation of most of Romania by the enemy, the threat of seizing the remaining unoccupied territory, caused an upsurge of patriotic feelings and a passionate desire to liberate the motherland. In heavy battles near Maraşti, Maraşeşti, and Oituz in July - August 1917, the reorganized Romanian divisions withstood the onslaught of enemy hordes, inflicted serious damage on them, and showed the ability to successfully conduct not only defensive, but also offensive battles. Undoubtedly, after these victories, the Romanian rulers felt more confident at the helm of power. With promises of reforms, agrarian and electoral, they managed to mitigate discontent in the country. And if it was clear to the revolutionary Rumanian socialists that they should not, in the words of the "Appeal", "have even the faintest confidence in the reformist activities" of the oligarchy, the same cannot be said of the peasant masses who believed the royal promises to give them land, nor even of a significant part of the workers.

In autumn, the oligarchy, emboldened, increasingly began to resort to terror and demand the extradition of revolutionaries who had left for Russia ^.26 Therefore, in the second "Report-appeal" there are no longer any notes of unfounded optimism, that obvious underestimation of the forces of the "internal enemy",

²⁵ In the report on the work of the Department of International Relations of the Petrograd Soviet, relations with the Romanians were not mentioned (Izvestia, 27.VIII.1917).

²⁶ Thus, in August, a Romanian delegate to the Russian headquarters, General Coanda, requested the extradition of Bujor (CVIA, f. 2003 / s, op. II, d. 142, ll. 432, 4326).

which show through in the first one. The French text of this document, ²⁷ drawn up in Odessa on December 4, 1917, on behalf of the Action Committee of the Romanian Social-Democratic Party, which was located there, was signed by M. G. Bujor. Bujor himself brought it to Petrograd, where he wrote a cover letter marked December 15, ²⁸ . Both documents were sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and personally to V. I. Lenin. The letter reported that with the help of comrades from the Odessa Soviet and Rumcherod, ²⁹ revolutionaries who had escaped from Romania managed to create a small propaganda and organizational center (Action Committee) in Odessa. Russian soldiers who went to the front willingly took with them revolutionary materials, both written on behalf of the committee and translated from Russian. In this way, 85 thousand copies of manifestos and leaflets were sent to Romania, including 15 thousand copies of Lenin's "Decree on Peace", not counting the newspaper" Lupta "("Struggle"), which was published in Odessa since September 1917.

M. G. Bujor mentioned the previous "Report-appeal". "Events prevented our request from being listened to," he says, and continues: "We allow ourselves to make a new appeal, even more urgent, in the same spirit. We believe that from the political and social, internal and external points of view, the time is very favorable for starting the final struggle in Romania. And we hope that our appeal will have a different fate this time. " ³⁰

The very "Report-Appeal of the Romanian Socialists to the Russian Revolution" began with a warm greeting to October: "Today the Russian revolution holds the banner of socialism in its hands, it has become the support and hope of the proletariat of neighboring countries, and therefore of the Romanian proletariat as well." The Address went on to sum up the previous activities of the Romanian social-democracy. It was pointed out, in particular, that its program was modeled on the German one, that in the course of a long struggle it had succeeded in achieving a certain increase in wages for the workers, that the proletariat had become an important factor in the political and social life of Romania, and that, taking this into account, the bourgeoisie had to introduce the basics of social legislation in the country. But " a state of siege and the rule of a military dictatorship established since the beginning of the war... they made it impossible for our party to be even slightly active after August 14, 1916. " ³¹ The situation changed dramatically in February of the following year: the Russian Revolution opened up new prospects for the party and the people. Rakovsky's release made a deep impression on the working class community. "Underground organizations began to form spontaneously in various centers." The socialists who fled to Russia found a "hospitable refuge" here. They set up an Action Committee, "which currently directs the entire movement." ³² The Committee, in addition to

²⁷ " Rapport-appel du socialisme roumain a la revolution russe "(WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, d. 5, folder 1). The" appeal "in an abbreviated form was published in Pravda on January 19, 1918. Unfortunately, some typos have crept into this text. The cover letter was not published. We use the original French version.

²⁸ In his memoirs, M. G. Bujor reports that one copy of this memo was sent to the NKID, and the other to V. I. Lenin (see the collection On the October Revolution. Memoirs of foreign participants and eyewitnesses, Moscow, 1967, p. 41).

²⁹ Rumcherod - Central Executive Committee of soldiers', Sailors', Officers', Workers 'and Peasants' Deputies of the Romanian Front, Black Sea Fleet and Odessa Military District.

³⁰ WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, d. 5, folder 1, ll. 20-21.

³¹ That is, from the date of Romania's entry into the war. Ibid., l. 23.

³² WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, folder 1, 5, l. 24.

"I have taken measures to organize refugees and restore the cadres of our party in exile on the territory of free Russia." The Odessa section has more than 500 members ³³ . Cells are being formed in other places of Romanian emigration. During the strike of 300 workers employed at the Fernik shipyard evacuated from Galac to Odessa, it was possible to achieve an increase in wages. The Lupta newspaper is published three times a week. In Romania, they have "good comrades who, at the risk of their lives, secretly distribute our literature and gather members of the movement into underground revolutionary committees." The war has already claimed 400,000 lives. Workers still have no voting rights. There is no parliamentary regime. And the rulers "play an old comedy, promising "reforms". In this way they want to deceive European democracy, and especially the Russian revolution. This is an evil joke! " ³⁴ .

The war showed the urgent need for the complete abolition of the existing social and political system in Romania: "This is the main goal of our current work." The authors appeal "with a fervent appeal to Russian revolutionary democracy", asking for help in the liberation of Romania. The Committee feels a great need for money - it is necessary to print tens of thousands of manifestos and pamphlets, a newspaper. There are no other ways to receive funds other than assistance. The committee called on the Russian revolution not to conduct any negotiations with the Romanian oligarchy, which, " having sown misery and death, being on the verge of death, brazenly dares to take actions hostile to Russia and openly unites with the notorious enemies of the revolution... The Great Russian Revolution... it should extend its noble influence primarily to Romania." From Moldova, the movement will spread to German-occupied Wallachia and "resound with a mighty echo in the Balkan countries." The revolution "will save the dying peoples, liberate them from tyrants, and enable them to develop in conditions of democracy and socialism." ³⁵ The "appeal" ended with a toast in honor of the revolution in Russia and Romania.

This was followed by a "Supplement"³⁶ listing specific measures that the Romanian Socialists considered to be a priority. They proposed: to completely abandon food supplies to the Romanian oligarchy; to put pressure on the Romanian government to put an end to the persecution of socialists and achieve recognition of their party's equal rights to coalitions and the publication of literature; to expand contacts with Transylvanian Romanians, prisoners of war of the Austro-Hungarian army, many of whom could become "good soldiers of the revolution." The monthly subsidy required for the newspaper "Lupta" was determined at 10 thousand rubles. "We want to know," it said in the last lines of this document, "how effective military assistance can be in the event of a revolution - in people, equipment, cars, etc. - especially the assistance of (Russian - V. V.) troops in Moldova." ³⁷ This is the content of the second "Report-appeal" and the materials attached to it.

The report is imbued with the same revolutionary passion, boundless hatred of the class enemy, and a fervent sense of internationalism as the previous one, drawn up at the end of June. But meet-

³³ By way of comparison, in 1915 the Social Democratic Party of Romania had 827 members; in addition, there were 439 members in youth circles and 73 members in women's circles. См. "Lupta zilnica", 17.X.1915.

³⁴ WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, d. 5, folder 1, ll. 25, 26.

³⁵ Ibid., ll. 25-28.

³⁶ The specified issue of Pravda (19.I.1918) did not contain the" Supplement".

³⁷ WUA of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 125, op. 1, 5, folder 1, l. 29.

it also has significantly new features. We have already mentioned one of them - in the second appeal, the somewhat disdainful attitude towards the forces of the Romanian oligarchy that can be traced in the first one is no longer present. The question of the aims and objectives of the struggle is also posed differently. The authors of the June report had in mind the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This reflected the general mood of the revolutionary wing of Romanian social democracy. The Odessa Action Committee, formed at the same time, broke with reformism and headed for an armed uprising. "The time has come for the Romanian people to make their own revolution and free themselves from oligarchy and monarchy,"³⁸ the manifesto issued in July said. But there was not a word about the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one, about the necessity of overthrowing the power of capital.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, this limited interpretation of the tasks facing the Roumanian revolutionary movement was done away with. From the idea of a bourgeois-democratic revolution ("Down with the monarchy! Down with the oligarchy!"), the left and Social-Democrats moved to the idea of a socialist revolution, demanding "to drive out the world-eaters and traitors from power, so that the people themselves, through their own people, take control of the country." ³⁹ This qualitatively new stage in the interpretation of tasks was also reflected in the second "Report-Appeal", where the elimination of the existing social and political system is referred to as the main goal. It is true that the "Address" does not contain a detailed analysis of the alignment of class forces, nor does it put forward a thesis about the necessity and inevitability of completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution as a stage in the development of the revolutionary process, nor does it contain a plan of action, including for attracting the peasant masses to the side of socialism. All of this required time and class combat experience, still insufficient. But the initiative was made. The socialist revolution in Romania was put on the agenda.

In the second "Report-appeal" one can still catch echoes of excessive hopes for help and support of the Russian army stationed in Romania, for which in December 1917 there was not the slightest reason. The old Russian army, as a fighting force, ceased to exist. Soldiers eagerly sought to return home, entire regiments and divisions left their positions. A new army of workers and peasants had not yet been created. The Romanian oligarchy took advantage of this and in the same December delivered a treacherous blow to the Russian units leaving the trenches, disarming and capturing thousands of soldiers.

Of course, it is not the individual shortcomings of a theoretical and practical nature found in these documents that determine their significance, but the revolutionary passion and selfless readiness to serve the proletariat, the break with the old views of legalism and reformism, the ardent proletarian internationalism, and the deep belief in the victory of the cause that was begun by the February Revolution and Great October.

Only a month has passed since the second "Report-appeal"was compiled. The Romanian reaction, taking advantage of the difficult situation in which Soviet Russia found itself, encroached on its territory by launching an invasion of Bessarabia. And then the members of the Odessa Action Committee, along with hundreds of other Romanian internationalists, picked up rifles and went to the front. The newspaper "Lupta" wrote on January 13, 1918: "On the day when the land of Bessarabia began to be trampled under foot.-

³⁸ "Documente din istoria Partidului Comunist din Romania". Vol. I. Bucuresti. 1956, p. 13.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 19 - 21.

the communist troops of the oligarchy, the Romanian workers, peasants and soldiers living in Odessa, organized a demonstration in the streets of this large Black Sea city and appealed to the Russian revolutionary organizations for weapons to go out to fight against the government, which, having destroyed the country, cowardly turned its weapons against the Russian revolution."⁴⁰ They inextricably linked their resistance to the interventionists with the class battles in their country: "Our revolution is beginning!" ^the Committee proclaimed. The internationalists set out on a long, painful and glorious journey. Many were not destined to live to see victory; many met death and found immortality in the battles for the Russian and Romanian revolutions. And now, half a century after the Great October Revolution, their exploits are still alive in the memory of their contemporaries and descendants.

⁴⁰ Cit. by: V. Rozhko. A battle-hardened friendship. Chisinau. 1965, pp. 32-33.

⁴¹ TsGAOR USSR, KMF-14, za 32, pl. 154, part III ("Muncitori, tarani si soldati romani din Odessa! Revolutia noastra incepel").

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