Senior research assistant at the Dnipropetrovsk Branch of the National Institute of Strategic Studies
* * *
The year 2002 turned out to be critical for the Ukrainian-U. S. relations, with their drastic worsening being equally affected both by subjective factors related to actions of certain politicians and because of cardinal review by the United States government of the system of international relations. Unfortunately, Ukraine failed to respond timely to these changes. To understand the singularity of this new situation, the new imperatives and alternatives allows the analysis of the new National Security Strategy of the USA.
Late by more that a year, on September 17, 2002, the Administration of George Bush Jr. presented to the Congress a document titled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America". An accord with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, composition of such a document annually is mandatory in the interests of maintaining coordination of various branches of power in the country. However, in practice, such reports, being actually compilations of declarations already made and positions adjusted, seldom attracted interest. In this respect the document dated September 17. 2002, radically differed from the previous ones. In the given instance the question at issue is, indeed, the great strategy that was widely and openly declared even before it was started to be realized. In was, in a sense, an American formal response.
Along the twelve years after the cold war was ended, the U. S. national strategy was based on the weasel-worded notions of risks and uncertainties of the new time. The terrorist attack of September 11,2001, turned them into a completely definite threat. According to the new strategy "the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology" 1 .
Numerous collation of the new situation with the times of cold-war and even the WWII that the text of the new strategy contains lead to the conclusion that the new adversary is perceived as adequate to the Hitlerite Axis Powers and Soviet Block. From this it is readily apparent the fundamental change of approach of the USA to the functioning of structures of international security. For the USA the
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priorities become not the former treaties, agreements and understandings, but certainty of countries in the new confrontation of civilized society and barbarity. Under such conditions, any country that fails to take the side of the USA may run the risk of the role of the "Soviets" in the U. S. policy: "America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists - because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization" 2 .
The emphasis made by the Strategy on the need of spreading free and open societies is the show not so much of the U. S. messianism as the formula for the long-term solution of the problem of terrorism. It is noteworthy that the new strategy prioritized democracy and not well-being. This reflects the present-day attitude of the American political science regarding the fact that the basis of terrorism lies in dissatisfaction of certain forces with their political representation in the world system rather than their economic status. The 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by the people anything but poor. As it follows: "Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders" 3 . The priority of democracy developing, of course, does not imply ignoring economic problems that make for terrorism: "a world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable" 4 .
Important aspect of the new strategy is the change of the U. S. approach to organization of international economic help, which is deemed as one of the means to destroy the basis of terrorism. The special feature of the new approach is introduction of a new criterion to assess effectiveness. If earlier the total of funds spent was seen as one, at present the effectiveness is proposed to be evaluated through the level of economic growth reached. Nowadays the preliminary condition for the USA to render assistance to certain countries is their readiness for reforms with backing of the government that fail excluded.
The emergence of the new U. S. national security strategy may imply substantial restructuring and polarization of the international system of relations in accord with new definition of the primary threat, which is compared to the Hitlerite or "Soviet" one in scale. For Ukraine, it means reduction of the political freedom of maneuver within the new system. Let us consider the issue in more detail.
The analysis of the text of the new U. S. national security strategy allows to distinguish within the present-day international system several groups of countries, in relation to which the USA is to apply different norms and rules. The first such group includes friends and allies of the USA. One may judge about their composition from the references within the text of document in the context of friendship and allies to NATO, EU, ANZUS 5 , NAFTA, that is, the group of Canada, the USA and Mexico, as well as separate countries - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Israel.
By the composition, the group almost completely coincides with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which may be seen as the organizational personification of the West. The organization was established in 1961 from the Organization of European cooperation and development, which was created to provide for efficient assistance to Western Europe within the Marshall Plan frame. In other words, in contrast to the World Bank (IBRD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) the OECD emerged and shaped its course as a closed club of the West. At present it membership includes 30 countries plus European communities. It is worth reminding that in the middle 1990s the admission of the Visegrad Group countries happened to be the occurrence that pt an end to skepticism concerning chances of the Western institutions expansion to the East.
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Differences in the composition of countries explicitly mentioned in the new strategy and the OECD membership concern Switzerland, Slovakia (members of the OECD not mentioned in the document), Taiwan and Israel (mentioned in the document, though not the OECD members). Switzerland's association with the countries of the West and, correspondingly, friends of the USA needs no special explanation. As to Slovakia, the country is, so to speak, a member of the first wave of the NATO's expansion overlooked. Absence of Taiwan among the OCRD is linked with problems of its international recognition, but the country is factually a part of the West and undisputed friend and ally of the U. S. As the new National Security Strategy claims, the USA shows "commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act" 6 , and through "America's close relationship with the state of Israel" 7 confirm this country's belonging to the political and economic system of the West, although being not party to its distinctive international institutions.
According to the new strategy the West is bound for expansion. Concrete countries to account for the process are not named, but its mechanism is pointed out, which is the NATO enlargement; the United States is to "expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests" 8 . Considering plans for the second wave of the Alliance expansion and direct link between the expansion of NATO and EU, one may predict enlargement of the circle of the Western countries within the next 5 to 7 years owing to at least 9 new members: Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus. It is highly probable that the process of enlargement will continue so that approximately in 2020 on the order of 50 countries were Western out of the total of more that 200 nations of the world.
The second group of countries is the potentially great nations that stay outside the system of the West. In view of the authors of the new U. S. national security system these countries are three, that is, Russia, China, and India. India is treated as a non- market democracy, China as a non-democratic country with market economy, while Russia is regarded as a country where democracy and market are in the making. The tone of the document's wordings suggests possible future integration of India and Russia into the Western political and economic system. For instance, the authors of the document believe that the USA and India "are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government" 9 , and mention about "Russia's growing commitment to integration into the Euro- Atlantic community" 10 . In this connection, it is appropriate to remind of India belonging to the British Commonwealth and recent creation of the NATO-Russia Council on British initiative.
The Unites States recognize the right of Russia and China to possess missile and nuclear arm and develop their technologies. In this respect, only provisions concerning guarantees of non-proliferation are primarily stipulated. As regards India, the issues of its nuclear and missile programs still remains open, but they seized to be dominating in the U. S. policy.
It is important to note that although the new strategy asserts pragmatism in the U. S. relations with other great nations existing outside the West and recognizes their potential, to judge by the modality of statements concerning relations of Russia, India and China with their neighbors it closes out their chances of forming alternative geoeconomic systems. In other words, the West is the only internally integrated international system being recognized by the U. S. with other countries thus being given the chance to exist either in association or cooperation with West or in their own right, account and risk.
The third group of countries is the rogue regimes, under which category the document subsumes Iraq and North Korea, with Libya
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also included albeit not mentioned explicitly. On the face of it, there is no unity among the countries of the West, and within the USA itself as well, concerning the associating other states to the rogue regimes. As definite, however, one may regard the following gauges of the line: the countries "that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists" 11 and "seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons" 12 .
The fourth group is represented by the underdeveloped countries. Lacking the immunity against extremism, these countries require special attention within the context of global security. It would be wrong to associate them with the rogue nations. On the contrary: "America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror" 13 . Representative example of the country, which government needs American help to fight internal extremism is Colombia: "In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people" 14 .
The fifth group is composed of the developing countries. Basically, these are relatively stable nations located on various continents that are developing on the lines of and assisted by the West, including various programs of the UN, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
To the sixth group one may refer stable countries that are associated with the West but for various reasons missing its basic institutions. They may include the British Commonwealth, Organization of American States and ASEAN countries that fall out of the groups outlined above. One may observe that they are distinct from the "genuine" West by the lack of the technological potential to produce modern weapons as well as the accessibility to such weapons through allies.
The seventh group comprises the countries of the former Soviet Union without Russia. There is only one reference of these in the document, however the allusion outlines the U. S. strategic perception of the geopolitical structure of the post-Soviet expanse: "We will continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of the former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable neighborhood will reinforce Russia's growing commitment to integration into the Euro-Atlantic community" 15 .
It follows from this perception that Russia would primarily remain true to cooperation with the West only subject to self-sufficient geopolitical system impossible close to it. Secondly, to create conditions for Russia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures there is no need for other FSU countries to join Western institutions, with the fact of their independence from Russia and stability being quite enough. In other words, in the authors' of the document view it is impossible to get to Europe for Russia's neighbors in company with it, the only alternative being the new Soviet Union. On the other hand, abandonment of the European choice by the countries of the former Soviet Union, their independence and stability preserved providing, would not prevent Russia to take up the option.
Hence, for the United States the views of certain portion of the Ukrainian elite on the chances to join Europe in company with Russia are chimerical, which it would fight in words and deed. Most likely, the United States of America are afraid not of the change of priorities of the Ukrainian foreign policy, since being capable to block them, but of the reality that Ukrainian actions may tempt Russia to stop moving towards the West. As the authors of the new strategy state, the Unites States "are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition" 16 .
Within the international system outlined by the new national security strategy of the
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USA, Ukraine is offered several foreign policy alternatives. The first is to get to the Western political and economic systems through NATO membership (EU is a more remote perspective), which based on the experience of other countries would also mean membership in the OECD. Secondly, to become the country associated with the West through mechanisms of the special NATO and EU partnership, membership with the WTO, and participation in regional European initiatives. Such association would probably require dropping it own development and production of modern weapons. The third choice is to degrade to the level of developing countries through fixing on cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and various transnational corporations. The fourth option is to become a rogue country. It is the latter that would follow attempts to "scare" the West by feasibility to restore the USSR and military and technical cooperation with objectionable for the West countries. In this respect, it is worth reminding browbeating of the West by the later- date Yeltsin, the latter's retirement and decisive change of the foreign policy course by the new Russian president. The Ukrainian capabilities for the demarches on the external political arena are even less that those of the Russians.
To judge by the new strategy, the norms and rules applied by the USA in relations with other countries of the West will remain without substantial change. The Unites States is to continue recognizing the same rights for their allies and friends as it assumed for itself, and assess their internal matters by using criterions similar for itself.
The U. S. requirements for membership in the Western institutions towards the candidate and the countries associated with the West will, evidently, be analogous though differing by narrowness. Reaching consensus with these countries will not be binding.
In relations with Russia, China and India, to judge by the new national security strategy, the Unites States will apply universal rules and demands without insistence of the compliance. Contradictions will be ignored for the sake of reaching common strategic goals. The USA will recognize no other social models apart from democracy and market economy and in bilateral relations will proceed to "make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes" 17 . However, the United States will not attempt making the divergence in these spheres insurmountable obstacles for cooperation. The issues, on which compromise on the part of the U. S. will hardly be possible, include security of Taiwan, independence of the former USSR member countries, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, missile and high technology armaments of modern warfare.
The United States will try to keep itself from set political dialogue and abstain from solving their day-to-day problems except the ones that are connected with global threats. In the authors' of the new strategy views, chief mentors of these countries should be such structures as the UN, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.
The rogue countries will be constantly scrutinized by the United States, however, with no political rights allowed. In this regard, actions of the United States will be limited devoid only of military, economic and political recourses.
In characterizing general features of the novel foreign policy doctrine of the USA one may note the following. To begin with, the Unites States does not believe in existence of geopolitical antagonism. Global confrontation, in their view, exists between different mentalities, democracy and tyranny, civilization and barbarianism, but not in the middle of the "land" and "sea", or Atlantic and Eurasian affiliation. Eurasia is an exclusively geographic notion for them. Judged by the views of the document's authors, differences between the U. S. and other great nations are lacking objective ground and spring out from outdated mentality of a portion of the Russian and Chinese elite. It is highly doubtful that
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the USA would understand the domestic discussions in Ukraine concerning its civilization choice since their watchtower allows only deciding on between civilization and barbarianism. The United States reasons in more practical categories such as whether Ukraine is worth NATO membership or not.
Secondly, the United States intends to render assistance only to those who, in their view, deserves it: "The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves" 18 . In such a sense, the assistance to the Ukrainian government institutions suspended is rather a show of change of global approach than the result of particular attitude of the USA towards political structure in Ukraine, which was always critical.
Thirdly, the USA will not be 'buying' loyalty of any country outside the West except, maybe, Russia, China, and India. It concerns equally the disarmament of the countries that cause the U. S. concern and the observance of non-proliferation by them. It is probable that these issues will increasingly be solved through political and military pressure. It is likely that such changes would have retroacted as money already spent. One may assume that in the case of further U. S. pressure on the Ukrainian power structures, accusations of inexpedient spending of the goal-oriented funds for nuclear disarmament are to mount.
In summarizing changes of the U. S. relations with various groups of countries one may be deduce that the only chance to have full-size dialogue with the USA remains to be the country of the West if not by the fact, then by the course of development. Aside from this principle conclusion for the development of Ukrainian-American relations, the analysis of the new strategy and political situation in the USA allows for several important observations to be made. One of them is connected with the Middle East problems, while the other concerns the issue of the U. S. foreign policy making.
A critically important question for the American-Ukrainian relations is the latter's attitude towards the Middle East problems. Although the crisis in the area is barely mentioned in the new strategy, one cannot help noticing its adaptability of its basic provisions to the international security system that may form in case of successful U. S. actions against Iraq. What is more, under these conditions the strategy is thus capable to rid itself of certain internal contradictions, permitting to speak about it as of, indeed, great strategy planned for the future.
One of the contradictions is linked to the confusion in defining methods to counteract terror and tyranny. The document clearly tends to equate these two phenomena. The new adversaries of the USA are said to be not susceptive to restraining and intimidation. This is true for the majority of lurking terrorist nets. Meanwhile, the tyrannical regimes to no degree belong to this category since they have a definite, comprehensible and vulnerable system of values, which is quite enough to arrange their restraint. Evidently, the contradiction is sure to be overcome in case of disappearance of tyrannies themselves, which under the new strategy only Iraq and North Korea are ascribed to.
Also makes itself conspicuous the fact of understanding lack between the USA and European Union concerning the priority of solving the Middle East problems ; those in Europe believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be reconciled first, while Americans are willing to start the war against Iraq even before that. In accord to traditional logic of the past, the strike on Iraq before peace is established in Palestine poses a threat to Israel, which security is the common concern of the whole Western community.
The U. S. readiness to take immediate action and Israel's support of such intents attests to the existence of long-term plans of global change-over in the Middle East that go beyond traditional European and Russian visualization. One may assume that in case of
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successful British-American military action the Middle East would become still another zone of Western domination.
In this respect the advances towards Iraq of the portion of Ukrainian elite at the background of exacerbation of situation in the Middle East (irrespective of whether there was the sale of weaponry or not) turned out to be the first-rate political blunder not only related to the Middle East, but Europe as well. It is highly probable that in a short while the Middle Eastern course of economic cooperation will cease to be an alternative to the one towards the West.
Now, let us consider the basic internal sources of the new U. S. security strategy mapping out. The document bears the impress of two rival approaches representing different political trends in the U. S. Republican Administration. The predominating in the document is the influence of the 'traditionalists', to which category may be attributed George Bush himself (due to his father's influence), and the highest authorities at the State Department and the CIA 19 . Thanks to this group of people the document displays features of classical American messianism of the Founding Fathers, identifying the fate of the World with that of the United States: "The U. S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests" 20 . "the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" 21 . It follows from such a position the need to rebuild the system of international relations in accord with the American ideals, and general application of the system restrictions on actions of certain countries.
The opposite approach is the neo-conservatism of the Pentagon leadership and majority of the presidential advisors, which postulates that any restrictions on actions of the United States by the international security system are inadmissible. In this connection, the provision that the Armed Forces of the Unites States of America should be "strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States" 22 calls attention. In other words, "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge" 23 . The thesis on the need to have firm military domination had appeared first thanks to Paul Wolfowitz as a draft of one of political documents in 1992, but was disavowed by the Administration of the father of the present U. S. president 24 . Now, Paul Wolfowitz holds the post of assistant to the Secretary of Defense and, evidently, has considerable power over the formation of American policy.
One may explain total disregard by the United States of the International Criminal Tribunals by the influence of neo-conservatives: "We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept" 25 . Such a position poses the second in scale political problem of general character after the Kyoto Protocol in relations between the USA and their allies. In this connection, it is significant to note that the "regional" International Tribunals, such as the one for former Yugoslavia, is employed actively by the United States to exert direct pressure on political elites of other countries.
The issue of the International Criminal Tribunal is of great importance also in the context of fighting terrorism. Organization of anti-terrorist coalition of stated with the U. S. at the head provides for arranging uniform procedures to call international criminals, which are terrorists, to account. However, the denial by the United States of the International Tribunal ideas forms grounds for other countries' distrust concerning the U. S. intents.
In the nearest future, the preference is for the traditionalistic ideas, but the balance may
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change as a result of transformation of the U. S. national security institutions. The issue of "strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to lead the development and actions of the Nation's foreign intelligence capabilities" 26 is worth of special attention. On the connected with this reforms in the U. S. intelligence community depends how the balance is to strike in affecting foreign policy strategy of the country between the traditionalistic CIA and neo-conservative Pentagon. Traditionally, the Director of the CIA holds the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, although 80 percent of the intelligence community's budget belongs to Pentagon. Thus, financial and operations power of the military is counterbalanced by the political influence of the CIA. The strengthening of the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence accompanied by putting an end to combining posts, on which the Pentagon insists, may alter the balance either way.
As "kremlinologists" of the White House testify, big and often implacable economic interests are at the back of each of the said groupings of Republicans. Annual turnovers of the companies backing some or other politicians often exceed budgets of certain countries, including Ukraine. Rivalry between them may entail foreign policy actions pointed at countries that are partners of the competitor. To a great extent the situation that has formed in relations between the USA and Ukraine results from inattention of Ukraine to the commercial interests (as well as conflicts between them) of different business groups within the U. S.; at least the ability of Ukraine to pay heed to such interests turned out to be not as remarkable as in balancing between the West and Russia.
Proceeding from the assumption that the primary source of the U. S. leadership's negative attitude to the president of Ukraine is George Bush Jr. himself, one may deduce that dissatisfaction with Ukraine is linked primarily with the traditionalists in the U. S. Administration. This imply that in the possible political confrontation it is inadmissible to endanger relations of Ukraine with those forces within the Republican leadership that are not supporting categorical position of their President, that is, the Pentagon. With the said in view, it is expedient to reserve for the USA the right to cross the Ukrainian territory by the American planes, and continue work over the treaty on the hosting nation support.
It is also in the Pentagon's interests that there are chances of using by Ukraine of such a powerful political tool as the agreement on non-extradition of American servicemen to the International Tribunal. Bilateral treaties of the sort with as many countries as possible concluded being one of the U. S. foreign policy priorities, the mere possibility of signing such a document with Ukraine cannot but remain in the interests of the United States. The instrument, however, must not be employed for reaching secondary political goals or receiving "pardon", since it is connected with potential complication in relations with influential countries of Europe. The first country to take such a step was Romania that used it as a last resort that once and for all persuaded the USA to support that country as a candidate for the NATO membership.
The controversy among the Republican groupings outlined will still remain topical during shaping of the U. S. long-term foreign policy strategy. On this assumption the problem becomes challenging of balancing between different political and economic interests within the United States instead of today's swaying between the USA and Russia.
Thus, the analysis presented allows to give an answer to the major question of this article: to normalize relations with the USA, Ukraine should become a country of the West if not by the fact, then by its course of development. The new National Security Strategy of the United States of America excludes other ways of reaching the goal. In action, it implies conclusive rejection of Soviet tradition in political, economic and social life
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of the country, as well as of the habit of imitating Russia in the process of reformation. In addition, a great practical significance for such normalization would be a closer heed on the part of Ukraine to the U. S. concerns in the Middle East, as well as to the rivalry of various business interests and political institutions inside the USA.
References
1 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The cover letter of the President. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter VII Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.
5 Australia, New Zealand, United States.
6 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter VIII Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.
7 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter IV Chapter IV Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.
8 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter VIII Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Op. cit. in note 1, The cover letter of the President.
12 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter V Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.
13 Op. cit. in note 1, The cover letter of the President.
14 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter IV Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.
15 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter VIII Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.
16 Ibid.
17 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter II Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity.
18 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter IV Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.
19 Dana Milbank. Who's Pulling the Foreign Policy Strings. Washington Post. - Tuesday, May 14, 2002. - Page A19.
20 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter I Overview of America's International Strategy.
21 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter II Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity.
22 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter IX Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.
23 George Bush's speech in West Point, New York, on June 1, 2002.
24 John Lewis Gaddis. Grand Strategy of Transformation. Foreign Policy. - November-December 2002. http://www. foreignpolicy. com/issue_novdec_2002
25 Op. cit. in note 1, Chapter IX Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.
26 Ibid.
Translated by Viktor Mylovzorov
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