D. FAYZULLAYEV

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been rather tense for many years. This conflict is developing both in the political and economic spheres. The reasons for the Uzbek-Kyrgyz confrontation have historical roots and are caused by territorial problems and religious differences between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

To understand the territorial claims of the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz to each other, it is necessary to turn to the history of the formation of national republics in the territory of Central Asia that became part of the USSR. For many centuries, Central Asia was divided according to the principle of regional rather than national affiliation. Thus, the Kokand Khanate was formed in the Ferghana Valley, the Khiva Khanate in the Khorezm oasis ,and the Bukhara Emirate in Transoxiana. ¹

After 1924, when Central Asia became part of the USSR, the Ferghana Valley was artificially divided by the borders of the newly created Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At the same time, the ethno-national principle itself, which was supposed to be the basis of the division, was violated. Thus, the cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Uzgen became part of Kyrgyzstan, despite the fact that the majority of the population living in these cities is Uzbek ^.2

During the seven decades of the Central Asian republics ' existence as part of a single state, the problem of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border did not seem so serious. The central government, acting as an arbitrator, settled disputes that arose from time to time.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former intra-State territorial issues turned into interstate problems.

In addition to the precise establishment of the state border and making decisions on more than 100 disputed places of its demarcation, ³ another serious problem in relations between the two countries was the fate of the two Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shahi-Mardan, separated from Uzbekistan by Kyrgyz territory. ⁴

The Kyrgyz side also has a number of serious claims against Uzbekistan. Since Soviet times, Uzbekistan has been developing oil and gas fields located in the border areas of Kyrgyzstan on a lease basis. If before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan did it for free, then later an agreement was reached on payments. However, this agreement has not yet been implemented, as the state border between the two republics has not been definitively defined. Uzbekistan refuses to pay rent. Kyrgyzstan, in turn, demands the return of these deposits ^.5

In addition, the Kyrgyz side requires Uzbekistan to pay debts for the lease of land under the Andijan and Kempirabad reservoirs.-

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the total amount of Uzbekistan's debt to Kyrgyzstan, according to the Kyrgyz side, is $ 180 million. ⁶

The main reason for discrepancies in the definition of the demarcation line between States is the use of maps of different years of publication as a basic document. Uzbekistan uses the map of 1927, which recorded the borders of the republics after the direct entry of Central Asia into the USSR ^.7 Kyrgyzstan supports its demands with the 1954 map, stating that it was this map that fixed the borders between the republics after the USSR was finally formed as part of 15 republics ^.8

The first open manifestation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict dates back to June 1990, when mass clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks living in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan took place. These events were preceded by the allocation of land plots for development authorized by local authorities to Kyrgyz people who moved from villages to cities with a predominantly Uzbek population (Osh, Jalal-Abad, Uzgen).

A certain role in the aggravation of the situation was played by the religious factor. It is known that the Uzbek population of the Ferghana Valley is the most Islamized in the entire territory of Central Asia. Therefore, the negative reaction to the resettlement of Kyrgyz people to Uzbek cities, characterized by a weak Islamic faith, was predictable.

However, it was hardly possible to foresee the full extent of the consequences of this conflict. Thousands of people were killed in mass clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh region in June 1990. The situation is out of the control of both Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities.

The peak of the armed confrontation was the mining of Uzbekistan's side of the border with Kyrgyzstan in 2000. Such a drastic measure was taken after the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan made a number of attempts to break through the territory of Kyrgyzstan to the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley in 1999-2000 ^.9 The consequences of these actions turned out to be tragic - in 2001 - 2002, 13 people were blown up in the mined areas. All are civilians ¹⁰ .

The process of resolving territorial disputes between Tashkent and Bishkek has taken a long time.

A real chance to resolve the conflict appeared when the Memorandum on the Regulation of the legal basis for the Delimitation of the State Border between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan was signed on February 26, 2001¹¹ . It, in particular, determined the fate of the Sokh enclave located inside Kyrgyzstan. It was decided to connect the Sokh enclave with the Rishtan region of Uzbekistan "along the Sokh River, bypassing Kyrgyz settlements with adequate compensation in favor of Kyrgyzstan" ¹² . For this purpose, a part of the Kyrgyz territory connecting this Uzbek enclave with the main territory of Uzbekistan was to be transferred to Uzbekistan. In return, Kyrgyzstan should receive a plot of land proposed by the Uzbek side.

This document was of a secret nature. However, its content soon became known in both republics. The content of the memorandum caused a sharp negative reaction among the deputies of the Kyrgyz parliament and among the Kyrgyz public. This was due to two things.

First, a working group of the Kyrgyz government conducted field studies of the Sokh enclave and concluded that when the Sokh enclave is connected to the Rishtan region of Uzbekistan, the latter gains control of the Sokh River and its water resources, which are of crucial importance in this region, and the Uzbek highlands received in return are completely useless for Kyrgyzstan ^.13

Secondly, the negative assessment of the signed memorandum was largely due to its secret nature and the conduct of closed negotiations on border issues. In response to the criticism, the Kyrgyz leadership hastened to state that the memorandum "is not a binding document" ¹⁴ and that the states "still have a long negotiation period ahead of them"¹⁵ .

Thus, the process of delineating the state border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is extremely difficult. To date, only 654 of the 1,270 km of the joint border have been delimited ^.16

DOES THE END JUSTIFY THE MEANS?

At the same time, the question of what means Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan use (in addition to official negotiations) to achieve their own goals, and in fact, to exert pressure on each other, is very significant.

Uzbekistan, as you know, has been a supplier of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan for many years. Currently, gas consumption in Kyrgyzstan is 0.6 billion cubic meters. m per year and is fully provided with Uzbek gas supplies ¹⁷ . These gas supplies are carried out via the 1,300 km long Mubarek - Gazli - Shymkent gas pipeline. The gas pipeline route passes through the territory of Uzbekistan, then through the South Kazakhstan and Dzhambul regions of Kazakhstan, and then through the territory of Northern Kyrgyzstan and again to Kazakhstan (Alma-Ata region). Thus, Uzbekistan also supplies gas to the southern regions of Kazakhstan through this pipeline.

During the years of the USSR, the scheme of "water and energy exchange" between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was debugged. Its essence was that in the autumn-winter period, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan supplied gas and coal to the heating stations of Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Kyrgyzstan, in turn, stopped generating electricity at the Toktogul cascade of hydroelectric power plants during this period. Thus, during this period, the water is

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It was not discharged from the Toktogul reservoir. Its reserves accumulated, and in the summer, when mass irrigation of agricultural crops (primarily cotton) began, they were supplied from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan ^.18

Interruptions in the supply of Uzbek gas to Kyrgyzstan began in late 2000. In 2000, Kyrgyzstan bought Uzbek gas at a price of $ 42 per 1,000 cubic meters. m .At the same time, 50% of supplies were paid in foreign currency, and 50% - in goods - provided that Uzbekistan was supplied with water during the cotton growing season. ¹⁹ Natural gas supplies were intended for the population and municipal facilities, mainly boiler houses (contract with Kyrgyzgas JSC), as well as for the Bishkek CHPP (contract with Kyrgyzenergo JSC)²⁰ .

However, in January 2001, Uzbek gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan were stopped ^.21 There were several reasons for this.

The Uzbek leadership explained the cessation of gas supplies in January 2001 to southern Kazakhstan and Bishkek, firstly, by the fact that a sharp drop in temperature in the gas production areas (-22 ° C) led to the freezing of hydrate (liquid fractions) in the gas transmission system and partial blockage of the Mubarek-Gazli - Chimkent main gas pipeline ²² .

In principle, emergency reserves are created for such emergencies, i.e. a certain amount of gas is pumped into the gas storage facility and then used as needed. Thus, Kazakhstan has used the reserves of its gas storage facility in the South Kazakhstan region to compensate for the temporary shortage, so that consumers receive gas in the right volumes ^.23

Kyrgyzstan did not make such reserves, so Kyrgyz consumers faced big problems in heating the housing sector in January 2001.

The second reason was non-payments. Kyrgyzgaz JSC did not pay for Uzbek gas supplied to the ^republic in 200024 .

Third, Uzbekistan has complained to Bishkek about Kyrgyzstan's unauthorized use of gas intended for Kazakh consumers. The plunder of gas from the main gas pipeline on the territory of Kyrgyzstan in the period November-December 2000 amounted, according to the Kazakh company Kaztransgas, to 25.55 million cubic meters.

In addition, the Kyrgyz side allegedly diverted most of the gas intended for the Bishkek CHPP to the consumer sector, whose gas supplies were officially stopped due to non-payments. ²⁶

Uzbekistan was particularly concerned about this issue, as the electricity underutilized by the Bishkek CHPP was compensated by the operation of the Toktogul HPP in energy mode (energy production at the Toktogul HPP increased 3-fold ⁱⁿ winter 2001.27), which was accompanied by significant additional water discharge.

This threatens Uzbekistan with disastrous consequences: flooding of vast territories in winter, most of which are arable land; failure of arable land as a result of its re-salinization; and lack of water in summer. By the way, the water shortage caused by the implementation of such an energy policy in Kyrgyzstan affected not only Uzbekistan, but also Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which also receive water from the Toktogul reservoir.

Finally, of course, there is a direct correlation between the supply of Uzbek gas to Kyrgyzstan and the attempts of the Uzbek leadership to put pressure on Bishkek to delimit the state border. There is an obvious connection between events such as:

- Termination of Uzbek gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan in January 2001.,

- Signing of the Memorandum on the delimitation of the state border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in February 2001.,

- Resumption of gas supplies from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan in early March 2001 on the same terms, despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan's debt for gas supplied in 2000 was never fully repaid ^.28

The Uzbek and Kyrgyz leaders categorically deny that these events are connected, ²⁹ although the fact that Uzbekistan uses gas supplies as a means of political pressure on Kyrgyzstan is obvious.

A serious response argument of the Kyrgyz leadership is, as already noted, providing Uzbekistan with water during agricultural work.

Thus, in response to the signing of the Memorandum on Border Delimitation in February 2001, the Kyrgyz parliament adopted a law in October 2001 setting water charges for other Central Asian republics ^.30 Tashkent protested in this regard and stated that the adoption of this law contradicts international law, since Kyrgyzstan is obliged to supply water to Uzbekistan in accordance with a previously concluded contract ^.31 As a consequence, gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan were immediately cut off in October 2001. This measure proved to be effective - already in November 2001, the law was suspended indefinitely for further revision, according to the official Bishkek ³². Uzbekistan immediately responded by resuming gas supplies. To date, Kyrgyzstan has not returned to the issue of finalizing and re-enacting this law.

And in subsequent years, Uzbekistan quite often resorted to suspending gas supplies as a measure of pressure on the Kyrgyz leadership, although these actions were explained solely by Kyrgyzstan's debt for Uzbek gas supplies.

It should be recognized that Kyrgyzstan is really delaying the payment of gas supplied. By the end of 2003, the outstanding amount was $ 11 million. ³³

This fact was one of the reasons why, in early 2004, Uzbekistan insisted on concluding a new gas contract with Russia.

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Kyrgyzstan. Its terms are more stringent and less favorable for Kyrgyzstan. The price of gas remained the same at $ 42 per 1,000 cubic meters, ³⁴ but Uzbekistan insisted that payment for it should be made entirely in hard currency, and not at the rate of 50% in foreign currency, 50% in goods ^.35 This contract is extremely unprofitable for Kyrgyzstan, given its significant external debt and state budget deficit.

Naturally, Bishkek is very concerned about such dependence on Uzbek gas supplies. Moreover, in the absence of alternative options, Kyrgyzstan is forced to agree to almost any conditions of Uzbekistan.

This situation pushed the Kyrgyz leadership to search for alternative sources of gas supply. Thus, in May 2003, the Russian company Gazprom and the Kyrgyz government signed a 25-year agreement on cooperation in the gas industry ^.36

Gas supplies will be provided using existing main gas pipelines. Apparently, Gazprom plans to supply Kyrgyzstan with some of the gas purchased by the company from Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan.

Under the same agreement, Gazprom will also participate in the reconstruction and construction of main gas pipelines, compressor stations, and other infrastructure facilities of the Kyrgyz gas industry. In addition, the agreement provides for joint operation of existing gas pipelines with the prospect of gas transit through the territory of Kyrgyzstan to other countries. Gazprom is also going to invest in geological exploration in the Republic ^of Belarus .

The signing of this agreement may significantly affect the current balance of power in the Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict.

The appearance of Gazprom as a gas supplier to Kyrgyzstan to a certain extent equalizes the position of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in negotiations on the delimitation of the state border between the states.

Uzbekistan's position on them is becoming more vulnerable. The signing of the agreement between Gazprom and Kyrgyzstan in the near future leads to the loss of Tashkent's leverage over Bishkek on the settlement of territorial disputes. In addition, if gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan are carried out by Gazprom, Uzbekistan may have difficulties with water supply, taking into account the law on water charges adopted by Kyrgyzstan in October 2001.

Uzbekistan, however, did not react in any way to the signed agreement between Gazprom and Kyrgyzstan. Taking into account the fact that just six months later, in December 2003, an agreement was signed between Uzbekneftegaz and Gazprom on long-term gas purchases in Uzbekistan for 2003-2012, joint implementation of projects in the field of gas production (development of the Shakhpakhty field) and reconstruction and development of the gas transmission system of the Republic of Uzbekistan. assume that the terms of the agreement signed with Kyrgyzstan were agreed in advance with the leadership of Uzbekistan.

This assumption is also confirmed by the fact that, despite the agreement signed in 2003 between Gazprom and Kyrgyzstan, in early 2004 Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a new contract for the supply of Uzbek gas to Kyrgyzstan, and on more stringent terms for Kyrgyzstan.

In principle, it is more profitable for Uzbekistan to sell gas previously intended for Kyrgyzstan to Gazprom for a number of reasons:

- Gazprom is a much more reliable partner than Kyrgyzstan, always paying for Uzbek gas supplies on time and in full;

- the price at which Gazprom buys Uzbek gas is the same as that at which Uzbekistan sells it to Kyrgyzstan - $ 42 per 1,000 cubic meters.;

- cooperation between Uzbekistan and Gazprom is much more important for the republic, as the volume of Uzbek gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan is insignificant - 0.6 billion cubic meters annually.

Russia's position in the face of Gazprom as one of the parties to the" triangle " seems to be the least clear, since the details of the agreement signed with Kyrgyzstan are not disclosed. However, it is obvious that the interests of the Russian gas giant in Kyrgyzstan are not related to gas production. According to Alexey Miller, Chairman of the company's Management Board, Gazprom "has no illusions about the gas reserves in Kyrgyzstan." ³⁹ According to Gazprom, Kyrgyzstan has only 5.7 billion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves. m ⁴⁰ . Moreover, the development of gas fields in the republic is quite difficult due to geological features and underdeveloped infrastructure. Thus, its own fields are not able to meet Kyrgyzstan's natural gas needs even in the medium term. They can only help create a reserve of stability in the event of interruptions in the supply of imported gas to Kyrgyzstan.

In addition, the state of affairs in the Kyrgyz economy does not allow it to regularly and fully pay for imported gas supplies. It is hardly to be hoped that changing the gas supplier will significantly improve the situation. Given the current trends in the global gas market, Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to be able to respond adequately to higher gas prices.

Taking into account the above, Kyrgyzstan is currently a rather unreliable partner as a buyer of Russian gas. This raises the question of Gazprom's true goals in signing this agreement.

Let us make a number of assumptions. First of all, we would like to draw your attention to Gazprom's activity in Kyrgyzstan: gas transit through the territory of the republic to other countries. It is quite possible that this direction will become the main one, since this republic is directly on the border-

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cheat with China. It is known that Gazprom and China have been working on the possibility of supplying Russian gas to China for several years. One of the main issues in these negotiations is the route of Russian gas exports. As one of the options, it can pass through the territory of Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, it becomes clear why Gazprom intends to radically modernize the gas transportation infrastructure of Kyrgyzstan.

THE ANTI-AKAI REVOLUTION IN KYRGYZSTAN AND THE EVENTS IN ANDIJAN IN THE LIGHT OF UZBEK-KYRGYZ RELATIONS

The events that took place in Kyrgyzstan at the end of March 2005 and led to a change of power in this Central Asian republic confirmed the Ferghana Valley's reputation as one of the most serious hotbeds of tension in Central Asia. It was the opposition rallies organized in Osh and Jalal-Abad that served as the starting point of the revolutionary events in Kyrgyzstan.

The reasons that caused these events can be divided into two groups. The first group includes political reasons, namely, the general public's disagreement with the results of the elections to the Kyrgyz parliament and the ever-increasing influence of the" family " clan of President A. Akayev on the politics and economy of Kyrgyzstan. The catalyst for discontent was the election to the Kyrgyz Parliament of several of Askar Akayev's closest relatives, in particular, his son and daughter. General indignation was caused by the control of the most profitable enterprises of the republic by persons belonging to the "Akayev clan".

The reasons for the second group are socio-economic in nature and represent such realities of life in modern Kyrgyzstan as a strong social stratification, when most of the population lives below the poverty line; low wages, high unemployment, low level of medical care and education, a high percentage of child mortality and, as a result, an extremely low overall standard of living.

Therefore, it is very important how the events that took place in Kyrgyzstan are perceived in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan's closest neighbor, in relations with which the republic has many political and economic problems.

First of all, the Uzbek leadership is clearly aware of the danger of the growing conflict that has arisen in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the conflict originated in a region that has long been characterized by its instability. Uzbekistan is taking active measures to prevent the escalation of the conflict and its development into an interethnic Uzbek-Kyrgyz confrontation with the transition to its territory. Such a situation cannot be allowed, as the consequences of this can be dramatic for both states, due to the fact that then not only political and economic differences will come into force, but also religious ideas and slogans that are much more significant for the population. In this regard, Uzbekistan almost completely closed its border with Kyrgyzstan, as it was concerned about the instability of the situation in the border areas. However, if the new government controls the situation in the region, preventing the spread of chaos on the territory of Uzbekistan and ensuring free communication of Uzbekistan with its enclaves, Uzbekistan is ready to cooperate with representatives of the new government.

Despite the fact that the events in Kyrgyzstan are hardly covered in the Uzbek mass media, it is obvious that the Tashkent leadership is concerned about the events that led to the change of power in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. A very popular topic of discussion was forecasts about which next CIS country will have a similar change of power.

The fact is that all the socio-economic phenomena that caused the events in Kyrgyzstan are also characteristic of Uzbekistan. This also applies to "nepotism" and "clan rivalry" as factors that determine the configuration and content of the internal political life of Uzbekistan. However, these factors are historically typical for any Asian society, and they are extremely difficult to deal with.

The possibility of "exporting democracy" to Uzbekistan theoretically exists. But the probability of success of any "color revolution" there is quite small, since we are talking about a completely different state. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the main reasons for the events in Kyrgyzstan "the weakness of the government and its inability to solve socio-economic problems." The power of the government is shown, as is well known, not only in its ability to solve socio-economic problems, but also in its ability to resist the opposition and control its activities. In this sense, Uzbekistan has a much more authoritarian regime than Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan has never even tried to "flirt" with democracy and liberalism. On the one hand, these are negative stories-

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The impact on the investment attractiveness of the republic has been and continues to be significant. On the other hand, the level of "closeness" of the state has a positive side, as it allows the authorities to control the political situation in the republic quite confidently. Therefore, it was possible to state with a high degree of confidence that the Kyrgyz scenario in Uzbekistan is unlikely to be possible. The May events in Andijan proved this. Moreover, it is highly likely that a repetition or continuation of events similar to the Andijan events in Uzbekistan is unlikely to follow.

The events of recent months in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may lead, strange as it may seem at first glance, to a certain warming in Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Today, neither Bishkek nor Tashkent is interested in aggravating bilateral relations and will most likely seek solutions to problems and contradictions in the plane of political and economic compromises that would suit both sides at least for a certain period of time.

What should be Russia's position? Should it take part in resolving the problems that have arisen? Of course, Russia should take an active position both in providing economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan, which is currently being done, and in providing moral support for Tashkent's actions to ensure constitutional order. If necessary, Russia could act as a mediator in future Uzbek-Kyrgyz negotiations. Russia's overall strategy towards Kyrgyzstan should be aimed at supporting the new Kyrgyz leadership, which assures that Russia is still the main strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan, and all political and economic plans of this state are primarily related to Russia.

Russia's active position, particularly in the intra-Kyrgyz settlement, was determined not only by its desire to stabilize the situation and prevent an escalation of the conflict, but also by its desire to protect its political and economic interests in Central Asia, as well as to maintain its dominant influence in this region.

^{Sitnyansky G.} 1 Kyrgyzstan: national problems, internal and external / / Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1998, N 15. - Sweden.

² Ibid.

^{Olimova S., Olimov M.} 3 Integratsionnye protsessy v Tsentral'noi Azii: vzglyad iz Tadzhikistan [Integration processes in Central Asia: a View from Tajikistan].

^{Sitnyansky G.} 4 Kirghizia: natsional'nye problemy [Kyrgyzstan: National problems]...

^{Panfilova V.} 5 Kyrgyzstan is shrinking in size? // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.04.2001.

⁶ Ibid.

^{Dmitriev A.} 7 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan quarreled over 27 kilometers of the border / / Novye Izvestiya, 19.02.2004.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

^{Dubnov A.} 11 Declassified Kyrgyzstan / / Vremya novostei, 26.04.2001.

¹² Ibid.

^{Panfilova V.} 13 Is Kyrgyzstan shrinking in size?..

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

^{16. Niyazmatov V.} 16 Issues of state border delimitation discussed at the meeting of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz commission / / Materials of RIA Novosti, 19.11.2003. - www.novosti.ru

¹⁷ Gazprom builds gas pipelines in Kyrgyzstan / / Materials of the Prime-TASS agency, 19.05.2003. - www.rjb.ru

¹⁸ Materials of the agency "Zhakhon" of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Uzbekistan. - www.jahon.mfer.uz

^{Dubnov A.} 19 Declassified Kyrgyzstan...

²⁰ Materials of the agency "Jahon"...

^{Dubnov A.} 21 Declassified Kyrgyzstan...

²² Materials of the agency "Jahon"...

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

^{Panfilova V.} 28 Is Kyrgyzstan shrinking in size?..

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The Prime Minister of Uzbekistan considers it illegal for Kyrgyzstan to introduce fees for the water of cross-border rivers / / Materials of the Caspian News Agency, 16.10.2001. - www.gazeta.kg

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Gazprom builds gas pipelines in Kyrgyzstan / / Materials of the Prime-TASS agency, 19.05.2003. www.rjb.ru

³⁴ For$ 42 for 1000 cubes. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan finally sign new gas contract // Materials of the agency "CentrAzia", 06.01.2004. - www.CentrAsia.org

³⁵ Ibid.

^{Panfilova V.} 36 Gazprom will come to Kyrgyzstan for 25 years / / Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22.04.2003.

³⁷ Gazprom builds gas pipelines in Kyrgyzstan...

^{Grivach A.} 38 Gazprom dug in in Uzbekistan / / Vremya novostei, 15.04.2004.

³⁹ Gazprom builds gas pipelines in Kyrgyzstan...

⁴⁰ Ibid.

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