М.: ОЛМА-ПРЕСС, 2003. 383 с.

(c) 2004 MILAN HAUNER

There are at least three reasons why a book on Afghanistan during the last World War would today attract large audiences. As the book title suggests one reason could be that the fast expending genre of World War II literature on spies, agents, conspiracies, and cipher wars has finally reached Afghanistan and offered to combine unknown suspense with exotics. The second reason is more sober, namely the sensitivity of Russian readership to the subject of Afghanistan, where less than twenty years ago a vicious Soviet-Afghan War was fought. The third reason is unique. It deals with the fascinating episode of escape

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through Afghanistan of the most important Indian revolutionary of the period, Subhas Chandra Bose. He was also the only Asian revolutionary who, after escaping from India, pursued his aims in both Europe and Asia. First he came to Europe by land via the Soviet Union during the Nazi- Soviet Pact to collaborate with Germany. When he found Hitler unwilling to support India's independence struggle from the British rule, he returned in 1943 to Asia by submarine to seek Japan's support. Within the same year Bose proclaimed in Singapore the Azad Hind (Free India) government and himself as a quasi-Fuehrer (Netaji).

Although Bose spent less than two months in Afghanistan between January and March 1941, his escort from India Bhagat Ram, alias Rahmat Khan, became after Bose's departure to Berlin the chief conduit between Axis agents in Kabul and Indian underground for the preparation of a large-scale uprising against the British Raj. As a result of this unique function Bhagat Ram turned into a multiple agent collaborating with practically all intelligence services available in Kabul during the war. His exploits no doubt would make a wonderful script for a Hollywood spy movie. In his memoirs published after the war Bhagat Ram only fully admitted that he was working for the Axis Powers, made some allusions that he also had unspecified contacts with the Soviets, but he never disclosed that he was working for the British after the Soviet Union had been attacked by Nazi Germany. Anglo-Soviet wartime cooperation in Afghanistan to a great extent consisted in briefing, debriefing and manipulating Bhagat Ram so that he could supply credible information to Axis legations in Kabul about imaginary anti-British activities in India. The British were also assisting the Soviets with intelligence to keep at bay any potential anti- Soviet movement among the former Basmachi who found refuge in Afghanistan. After the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran both powers increased their pressure on the government of Afghanistan resulting in the expulsion of Axis nationals including most of the diplomatic personnel. The skeleton staffs, which were allowed to remain at the Italian and German legations, were too weak to permit any ambitious intelligence work and subversion to continue.

It is important to bear in mind the larger picture of the war, which the book often does not tell. The activation of the German schemes for a tribal uprising had to do with preparations before the spring of 1942 for a pincer operation in Southern Russia and Northern Africa, with the aim of crossing the Caucasus and the Suez Canal and meeting at the head of the Persian Gulf. The nest stage would have been a follow-up operation through Iran and Afghanistan to reach the border passes of Khyber and Bolan guarding the gates to British India. This kind of ambitious operation had been already discussed in early 1941 by the German High Command (OKW) as part of the so-called "post-Barbarossa" planning, but the operation failed to take any specific form because of the failure of the German Blitzkrieg in Russia.

The advance overland toward India should have been preceded by airlifts to drop small arms and ammunition in Waziristan by German aircraft. One must be, however, cautious not to take mere schemes for real action. Although the Luftwaffe had succeeded in dropping very small groups of paratroopers into Iran and Russian Turkestan, no such action had ever taken place on the North West Frontier. To bring about an airlift between nearest German airfields in Northern Caucasus and Waziristan to supply the tribesmen with small arms and ammunition would have been a major logistic operation. An airlift to support the "Operation Tiger" could not have taken place in the winter of 1942/43 since all available air transport would be required for Stalingrad to extricate the besieged 6 ^th Army. Although Abwehr estimated over the capability of the tribal lashkars, to be led by the legendary Faqir of Ipi, a half saint and half guerrilla leader, were usually vastly overrated, one could never exclude a nasty surprise whenever tribal uprisings hit the North West Frontier. A number of factors seemed to favor anti-British forces if they could act together in the second half of 1942, when German troops were advancing towards the Caucasus and the Suez Canal, and British India suffered from the "Quit India" Rebellion, the largest anti-colonial uprising since the Great Mutiny of 1857. If the Japanese navy could have been persuaded to attack the British in the Indian Ocean at the same time, the Allies might have been confronted with a military disaster of the first magnitude with incalculable consequences for the outcome of the war in Asia.

This is the seemingly bizarre Axis conspiracy to incite the tribes on the North Western Frontier mattered. In this context Tikhonov's book performs a very useful function. He fills in the gap between popular and academic literature. While his facts are scrupulously based on documents in several languages, his style is very direct and free of footnotes. Apart from the various schemes developed by the Abwehr for the subversion of the tribes between India and Afghanistan, Tikhonov also mentions the Amanullah Plan, which was actually not developed by the Abwehr, but by the Foreign Ministry itself. The main idea behind the plan was to install in Kabul with Soviet help the ex-King Amanullah and his exiled supporters. His arrival in Afghanistan was supposed to be combined with a large-scale tribal uprising on the North

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West Frontier which was supposed to revolutionize British India. However, before any details could have been negotiated with the Soviet government the Amanullah Plan was cancelled by Hitler himself.

Two-fifths of the book consist of appendices, such as twelve documents from British, German and Soviet sources. The last appendix is very useful survey of six biographies of Soviet agents of the Razveduprav and NKVD, serving in Central Asia. The book also contains interesting photographs of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan and two maps of the North Western Frontier Province.

The most interesting document is a Russian translation of a British document of March 1943, summarizing a meeting of three intelligence services in Oxford on masterminding jointly with the Soviets the Bhagat Ram network. The main point of discussion was the recent information (presumably obtained through ULTRA: decoding German naval radio communications) that S.C. Bose was on board of a German submarine on his way to Asia. The British knew in advance the date and location of the rendezvous with a Japanese submarine off the coast of Madagascar. The intelligence officials assumed at the time that the plan developed by the British Admiralty to capture Bose at the rendezvous point should be carried out. Why this secret plan was not carried out is open to speculation. My personal view is that the British did not want to risk the disclosure of ULTRA - in contrast to the Americans who risked to give away their ability to read Japanese radio communication (MAGIC) when they ordered the killing of Admiral Yamamoto one month later.

I have reached the end of my book report. I cannot, however, quit without returning to Subhas Chandra Bose, who appears to be, after all, the central figure of Tikhonov's book. Even after Japan's surrender in August 1945 Bose wished to continue the struggle against the British, this time with Soviet help. However, four day after the Japanese unconditional surrender, he died in an air crash when his aircraft took off from Taiwan in the direction of Manchuria. Since then many Indians have asked the same questions: if his plane had not crushed and Bose reached Manchuria, how would the Soviets have received him? Would they have arrested him and handed over to the British? Or would they have interned him and told the world that he died because of an accident? Would they have used him as a potential leader to challenge independent India under Jawaharlal Nehru? I am sure the answer will be found in Mr. Tikhonov's next book, provided he will be given access to the relevant files in his own country.

(c) 2004 Ю. Л. КУЗНЕЦ

История международных отношений в Центральной Азии накануне и в годы Второй мировой войны является объектом пристального внимания российских и зарубежных исследований. Большой интерес у историков вызывают вопросы, связанные с острой борьбой великих держав за укрепление своих позиций в Афганистане. В последнее время в нашей стране начался новый этап в изучении деятельности спецслужб стран "оси Рим- Берлин-Токио" и антигитлеровской коалиции на Среднем Востоке.

В рецензируемой книге перед читателями развертывается панорама антибританской борьбы пуштунских племен Афганистана и Британской Индии. На большом фактическом материале автор убедительно показал, что Афганистан в течение двух мировых войн интересовал Германию и ее союзников лишь как плацдарм для разведывательно- диверсионной деятельности против Индии и российского Туркестана. Аргументированно доказан тезис, что в 1930 - 1940-х годах в Афганистане и приграничных районах имелись благоприятные условия для проведения масштабных подрывных акций против Великобритании и СССР.

Ю. Н. Тихонов в своей работе успешно решил ряд взаимосвязанных задач: осветил повстанческое движение пуштунов; вскрыл причины сближения афганского правительства, возглавляемого Хашимханом, с Великобританией; рассмотрел деятельность спецслужб стран "оси" в Афганистане; изучил сотрудничество советской и британской разведок в этой стране в 1941 - 1944 гг. Отмечу, что перечисленные проблемы столь глубоко и всесторонне изучены в российской историографии впервые. Это стало возможным благодаря богатой документальной базе, использованной автором в ходе работы над книгой. Впервые в научный оборот введены многочисленные материалы Архива внешней политики РФ (докладные записки советских дипломатов в Кабуле, донесения военных атташе, записи бесед сотрудников советского посольства в Афганистане и т.д.), а также переписка В. М. Молотова с британским послом А. Керром о совместных мерах для пресечения германских авантюр в Северном Афганистане и зоне пуш-

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тунских племен. Ценные источники позволили Ю. Н. Тихонову осветить многие малоизвестные факты из истории советско-афганских отношений 30 - 40-х годов XX в.

Особое внимание в работе уделено деятельности советской разведки в Афганистане в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Автор отразил основные этапы противоборства кабульской резидентуры советской внешней разведки с абвером. Из содержания книги видно, что автор главное внимание уделил "пуштунскому направлению", так как именно против Британской Индии была направлена основная активность спецслужб стран "оси". Для освещения интриг фашистской Германии в Афганистане и Британской Индии впервые в столь значительном количестве использованы донесения советского резидента в Кабуле М. А. Аллахвердова ("Замана"), а также другие первоисточники из Архива Службы внешней разведки РФ.

Для российских специалистов особый интерес представляет глава "Ловушка для "Тигра"", в которой изложены события, связанные с окончательной ликвидацией фашистской агентуры в Афганистане. Благодаря научному анализу документов посольства СССР в Кабуле и материалов внешней разведки автору удалось раскрыть механизм взаимодействия советских и британских разведчиков в афганской столице. При этом он не замалчивает тот факт, что сотрудничество спецслужб Советского Союза и Великобритании налаживалось крайне медленно из-за их соперничества в Афганистане, что многие акции Интеллидженс сервис в этой стране осложняли деятельность советской разведки.

Сильной стороной работы Ю. Н. Тихонова является подробное освещение политической ситуации в Афганистане в годы Второй мировой войны. Убедительно доказано, что в афганском руководстве были сторонники сближения с Германией и вступления в войну против СССР и Великобритании. Впервые изложены неизвестные факты о деятельности видного афганского политика принца М. Дауда в период Второй мировой войны.

Книга написана хорошим литературным языком, удачно проиллюстрирована картами и фотографиями афганских деятелей, а также советских дипломатов и разведчиков. Значительно обогатили ее документальные приложения, в которых впервые опубликованы ценные трофейные документы германского министерства иностранных дел и материалы из Архива Службы внешней разведки РФ.

Книга "Афганская война Третьего рейха" является удачным образцом публикации монографического исследования в коммерческом проекте известного издательства "ОЛМА-ПРЕСС". Она будет интересна не только историкам спецслужб и востоковедам, но и широкому кругу читателей. Хочется пожелать издателям и автору не бояться того, что более обширный научный аппарат снизит интерес массового покупателя к результатам их сотрудничества.

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