As promised to readers, this academic year the editorial board is holding a correspondence "round table" to discuss the problems of reforming the army and navy. Today's participant in the interesting conversation is well known in the army, especially to those officers, warrant officers, and soldiers who went through the crucible of the Chechen war. Combat General Gennady Troshev commanded the 58th Army. Currently, Lieutenant-General Gennady Nikolaevich Troshev is the Deputy Commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

- Comrade Lieutenant-General, it is now no secret to anyone in what extreme conditions military personnel of the Armed Forces, including soldiers of the North Caucasus Military District, have to live and work, perform their assigned tasks. How would you assess the past academic year, what, in your opinion, is the level of combat readiness of the personnel of formations and units of the district?

- Right away, I would like to point out the most fundamental and pivotal moment of the current situation. And the essence of it is that the Armed Forces are now one of the few state institutions that can fully perform the functions assigned to it. In other words, the army maintains the necessary level of combat readiness, carries out the process of combat training of personnel in a certain mode.

Another question is, what kind of effort is it worth, what kind of self - sacrifice-I'm not afraid of this word-does it require from people? The troops of the North Caucasus Military District are no exception in this regard. We were convinced of this during the last final audit. Units of the 136th separate motorized rifle brigade stationed in the Republic of Dagestan, in the city of Buinaksk, became the objects of special attention of the district command and headquarters.

So, in general, the district command is satisfied with the level of combat training of personnel. People have proved by their deeds that they are engaged in military labor with maximum tension. And this is despite significant material and financial difficulties.

I understand that the situation in other districts is no better, the poor financial situation of the army is on everyone's lips. But I repeat: it is here, in a number of regions of the North Caucasus, that military personnel have to be on the edge of extreme situations, experience, in addition to the traditional army hardships and hardships, huge moral and psychological loads, and be constantly ready to respond immediately in case of an aggravation of the situation. Nevertheless, I will say once again that people serve conscientiously, with full dedication of their forces and capabilities.

Talk of funding disruptions has already filled my teeth. And yet the commanders and superiors somehow got out of the situation, realizing that, no matter what, people need to be taught, and taught seriously.

No funds were sent to the district for any other purpose, except for the payment of monetary allowances, and then, as I have already said, with a delay. Unfortunately, the needs of combat training, improvement and maintenance of the training and material base in due order were no exception. Although in a smaller volume than we would like, we received fuel and lubricants, spare parts for equipment, ammunition for training. The positive results that we achieved in the 1998 academic year are primarily the result of rational use of the experience and methodological skills of commanders of various levels, high moral and combat qualities of officers and ensigns, and all personnel.

As for the methods of training personnel in conditions of insufficient provision and supply, we have made certain adjustments to them. They were based on planning and conducting classes to minimize costs. So, in 1998, we conducted an educational and methodical experiment. The essence of it was to combine the performance of shooting exercises with elements of driving directly on the tank director, director of infantry fighting vehicles. For example, instead of sending a company to shoot an exercise separately and then sending it to drive, we organize things so that these related tasks are performed simultaneously. So much for saving fuel and lubricants, motor resources, and time.

Or such a moment. Almost everywhere, the improvement of the knowledge and skills of mechanics-drivers of combat vehicles is "run-in", in general, and previously known, but received in the current conditions additional development method, when the head of the class first tells the trainees in all the details of the sequence of actions, then shows them on the ground. The technique is being worked out on foot in the machine mode or on foot in the tank mode. And only after making sure that the soldiers thoroughly understand what is required of them, and have mastered the topic, the class leader moves on to the practical side with the use of technology, and again, first by elements, and only then - in general. This also allows you to avoid unjustified consumption of fuel and motor resources.

Increasingly widespread in the units and formations of the district is the method of conducting a comprehensive lesson on managing units and fire in battle, which allows you to limit yourself to the territory of the rifle and artillery range (VAP).

- Gennady Nikolaevich, you are well known and respected in the district's troops as a combat general with extensive experience in managing areas of local conflicts. How effectively, in your opinion, do units and formations take into account and use the experience of combat operations in Chechnya, and what additions and changes have been made to the combat training program of personnel?

- Of course, recent events on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in some other hot spots of the former Soviet Union have put on the agenda the introduction of significant adjustments in the training of military personnel. Now we have hundreds of officers and warrant officers who have experience of operating in the most difficult conditions of local conflicts. And we are doing everything in our power to skillfully manage this baggage and put it at the service of the training process for military personnel.

I will give some of the most illustrative examples of what conclusions we have drawn from the experience of combat operations. So, practice has shown that such concepts as "attack in the battle line" and "attack in the chain" provided for in our combat regulations and instructions are probably good in the vastness of a" large", large-scale war. When conducting limited combat operations with signs of guerrilla warfare, especially in mountainous and wooded areas, this tactic is generally ineffective and leads to unjustified losses.

We have developed sets of exercises for firing and maneuvering on the ground in small combat groups of three or four people, when one of the servicemen moves to the battlefield, covered by his comrades. Having taken a favorable line or position, this soldier in turn covers the maneuver of another with fire, and so on.

The actions of pairs and groups of snipers are also practiced, taking into account the specifics of the terrain and its engineering equipment, as well as actions as part of assault groups and detachments. This experience, by the way, was born in the days of the Battle of Stalingrad, its effect is well known.

New methods of warfare are widely practiced in almost all, and not just in selected units and divisions, and these are also lessons from Chechnya. Another characteristic feature of the new look at combat tactics is the dynamism of its improvement. The situation in many areas of the North Caucasus remains tense even after the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya. This, of course, affects the conditions of service and training of personnel, the nature of combat training tasks. Various combat situations in hot spots, in particular the infamous bandit attack on the General Staff inspection team, make it necessary to pay special attention to the protection of military columns. Now we are working out a new topic specifically - tactics for escorting convoys.

We understand that potential saboteurs also have the opportunity to improve their tricks, so based on the experience we already have, we strive to train our military personnel in methodical foresight and the ability to work tactically ahead of time.

- Comrade Lieutenant-General, given the relief and natural and climatic features of the North Caucasus region, it is not difficult to assume the importance and necessity of mountain training for military personnel. What measures are being taken in this regard by the command of the SKVO, the commanders of formations and units?

- Of course, mountain training is an important component of combat training of personnel.

What a sin to hide there - often young men come to us to serve, who previously knew about the mountains only from movies and songs by Vysotsky. In part, unfortunately, this also applies to officers, because today in Russia there is not a single military school with enhanced mountain training. The circumstances have developed so that the main educational, methodological and applied base for mountain training of military personnel in the territory of the North Caucasus Military District and, I think, the entire Russian Federation has become a mountain training ground located in the Daryal Gorge in the Terek River Valley.

- Is this the landfill that was damaged during the Ossetian-Ingush conflict?

"That's the one. Indeed, as a result of the events of autumn 1992, the landfill was largely destroyed. "Under the guise" of interethnic strife, there were dashing guys who stole the educational and material part there, disabled communications, so for several years we could not use the landfill. The first to sound the alarm was the current chief of the General Staff, Army General Anatoly Vasilyevich Kvashnin, who is well aware of the peculiarities of the North Caucasus region and understands the great practical and methodological significance of this training ground. His efforts, supported by the current commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel-General Viktor Germanovich Kazantsev, began to restore the landfill. Some funds were allocated to us by the leadership of North Ossetia.

- Gennady Nikolaevich, you spoke about the absence of military educational institutions with enhanced mountain training in our country. Who then teaches soldiers and sergeants this difficult science?

"Yes, the mountains don't like amateurs. We saw this in Chechnya. And there is a real problem. It can probably be resolved at the state level. Many old-school officers who had previously received the appropriate education, passed the mountain school of Afghanistan, left for the reserve. I will say more, now in the North Caucasus Military District, as a result of cuts and transformations, a number of units have lost their mountain status, only two full - time positions of mountain training instructors remain-directly at the district headquarters and in the 58th army.

However, this does not mean that we have no one to teach people. First of all, many officers and ensigns went through a good school during the fighting in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Secondly, there are a lot of mining enthusiasts among them.

In addition, we regularly hold training sessions for non-standard mountain training instructors from among the unit commanders. We managed to put things in such a way that such events are attended by high-class climbers, masters of this type. And not only our military, but also from neighboring structures - the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Russian Defense and Sports Technical Society and others.

I will once again turn to the lessons of combat operations in Chechnya. After all, there it was necessary to operate in the mountains not only the military personnel of, say, the "foothill" 58th army, but also parts of the "plain" Volgograd connection, Moscow, Leningrad and other military districts. It turns out that they also need mountain training. Therefore, the command of the North Caucasus Military District requires that even in units located far from the mountains, such training should take place.

- One of the results of the military reform should be the creation of permanent readiness formations and units capable of performing any tasks in a modern war. What is being done in this direction in the SQUAW troops?

- I would like to note that the tasks of the reform cannot be reduced only to the reduction of parts and connections. This is the first stage, and it is being implemented as planned. The next step is rearmament, transfer to new equipment, and a significant increase in the combat training of personnel. Motorized rifle divisions should become the reference center, so to speak, the standard of this process in our district. They provide for a new organizational and staff structure that would allow them to independently perform any task set.

But again, it all comes down to financial opportunities. I will not reveal a big secret if I remind you that the Russian Defense Ministry in 1998 was unable to purchase a single modern tank, helicopter, or ship from the defense industry. Unfortunately, this also applies to the connections of our district.

This situation can be fully attributed, for example, to the 205th motorized Rifle Brigade stationed in Budyonnovsk. Many copies are broken over the issues of its quickest arrangement, ensuring normal service and combat training. Of course, we managed to do something. A solid housing and barracks base has been created here, most military families have received apartments, and communications have been carried out. But the team currently owes astronomical sums for bath and laundry services, utilities, bread, and other food products.

I'm not even talking about the conflict situation that has developed around the brigade training ground. The local authorities have allocated us about 2.5 thousand hectares of land for these needs, and we have started equipping them accordingly, adapting them for educational needs. There was a question of paying for the land. You can understand people - they worked it, hoped for a harvest, and now they are forced to withdraw from the crop rotation. But again, we don't have any money to pay for it, it's a vicious circle.

- Gennady Nikolaevich, it is becoming increasingly clear that many operational, tactical and strategic tasks that have to be solved in the area of responsibility of the North Caucasus Military District require the joint efforts of all law enforcement agencies, interested departments and organizations. In this connection, the Cossacks are often mentioned...

In 1998, not one of our exercises was held without representatives of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, border guards and other law enforcement agencies located in the area of responsibility of the North Caucasus Military District. In particular, operational groups of the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Military Flotilla came to us for command and staff exercises, which solved tasks together with our generals and officers, and issued their proposals directly to the head of the exercises. The work was not carried out conditionally, but, as they say, live, these or other operational and tactical situations were dynamically played out.

Significant in this respect was the recent exercise in Makhachkala and Kaspiysk, which was led by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and his first deputy was the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Joint actions were carried out by the troops of the Ministry of Defense (this role went to the servicemen of the North Caucasus Military District), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and border guards. Joint sea and air landings were landed.

Now about the Cossacks. I have sincere sympathy for them and highly appreciate their services in the history of Russia. But I will be frank: I am skeptical about the issue of creating purely Cossack formations in the structures of the Ministry of Defense. Let's take a sober look at the situation. We are now forced to lay off hundreds of military professionals with appropriate training and extensive service experience. What, instead of them, will we recruit people who, although determined, are still, frankly, very far from real army problems, who have long lost their combat training skills? By the way, Chechnya has shown all the inexpediency of such a step.

The Cossacks would provide invaluable assistance by actively engaging in military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training of young people. We will say a big thank you if the Cossacks fully restore the old traditions of patronage over military collectives, help them solve urgent everyday problems. In short, we need to find an applied niche in the relationship between the Cossacks and the army. Then there will be mutual benefit and understanding.

The conversation was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Seleznev, a permanent correspondent of the Orientir magazine for the North Caucasus Military District.

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