A. M. VASILIEV

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Everything that is healthy and viable in the political and civil life of each country should be carefully protected... and no reform caused by the demands of the times should lead to a sudden break between the past and the present, but should be carried out gradually in order to become clear to the people and not have the character of a dangerous experiment.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire (1910-1916)

S. D. Sazonov

The collapse of the USSR meant the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the second half of the 20th century. In place of the former superpower, Russia and 14 new states have emerged. Thousands of books have been written about it. An explanation of the causes of this disaster, its course and details is beyond the scope of this article.

Let us only note that, from the author's point of view, Russia was the Soviet Union, that is, it headed the federation of its dependent countries - the Soviet republics. Its administrative borders became international (which gave rise to unsolved problems), and Russia itself found itself within the borders of the XVII century and entered a period of economic, social, military, and demographic decline.

It is simply impossible to ignore the impact of this internal situation on Russia's foreign policy in general, and on its policy in the Middle East and North Africa in particular.

According to E. M. Primakov*, who usually gave weighted estimates of events and did not support some harsh assessments of the author:

"The 1990s were a failure for Russia. This is perfectly clear. In the 1990s, we lost more economically and scientifically than during the Second World War. In the 90-ies, we were born with oligarchic structures. It was necessary to abandon everything that was bad in the Soviet period, and take all the best that was in the Soviet period, and combine these two points. And we destroyed the old one to the ground.

At that time, the Middle East was generally outside the zone of our interests. The most important thing was relations with the United States. It was clear that the Middle East could not attract Russia's special attention. On the one hand, there was no cold war, and on the other hand, there was no stability in Russia, and those in power were those who did not believe that Russia should be a great power."1

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE NEW ELITE

Within the country, fragmented and unformed political forces set out to restore capitalism (market economy, democratic and political systems and freedoms, Western European and American moral values) and to completely destroy the Soviet legacy. The tasks of foreign policy consisted in joining Western structures - economic, financial, political (many said - military) as their integral, but independent part. In use, there are still beautiful Gorbachev's statements about "about-

The article was prepared in the framework of the Russian Science Foundation project N 14 - 18 - 03615 - "Russian policy in the Middle East: opportunities and limits of cooperation with the countries of the region".

* Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (1929-2015). Soviet and Russian politician and statesman, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (1998-1999), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1996 - 1998), Head of the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (1991), Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (1991 - 1996), Chairman of the Union Council of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1989 - 1990). Economist, orientalist-Arabist. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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universal values" and "new political thinking". American and European politicians, as well as the electronic and print media of the West, kept repeating that there were no winners in the Cold War, and only "totalitarianism"was defeated. This was replicated by the Russian media and endeared to the disoriented masses and the emerging new political elite, especially its pro-Western part.

But the hopes turned to disappointment. Western leaders and their political, financial, and other elites were simply not going to accept Russia as an integral part of their world.

Russia seemed to be sinking into further chaos and weakening. At the same time, the United States provided a quarter of the world's GDP and accounted for half of the world's military spending.

Unsuited to either competition or the rigid mores of the free market, Russia was powerless against the onslaught of the West. Corrupt from top to bottom, it was looted by both its Nouveau riches and their Western partners. Over a quarter of a century, between $1 and $2 trillion has been siphoned off abroad through black, gray, and legal schemes, which can be considered a contribution paid by the country for its defeat in the Cold War. Most of the advanced industries collapsed, and the country became a raw material and oil and gas appendage of the world economy.

On the verge of death was the military-industrial complex. Scientific research has broken down, although it has partially survived. The army was weakening, morally decaying. Only the nuclear missile system has retained its combat capability.

Amid the euphoria of an unexpected and complete victory, Western leaders simply decided to take everything that was wrong, without thinking that for the stability of the new world order, a strategic partnership with Russia was required that took into account mutual security interests. Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Yu. Vedrin wrote: "Considering itself a winner in the Third World War, that is, the Cold War, the West believed in the infinity of its capabilities, and relying on technological superiority, sees no reason that would prevent it from imposing its views everywhere." 2

In fact, why consider a weakening Russia?

The author of this article called it "The Cursed Nineties", using the title "Cursed Days" of the famous book by Ivan Bunin during the revolution and Civil War. But these words are deliberately provocative. Relatively soon, even before the country's internal stabilization began, before its economic development began, before the turn to strengthening its defense capability, Russia "suddenly" stopped "agreeing with the United States in everything." Even in the Middle East, which Moscow seems to have forgotten about...

Here is what I. S. Ivanov*said in an interview with the author of the article:

"The great Power was caught up in a profound internal transformation. It was about a general crisis and chaotic changes. This could not but affect the foreign policy course. Almost overnight, Russia found itself in a completely new geopolitical environment. Like the rest of Russian society, our foreign policy had to go through a period of "revolutionary euphoria" and get over some "childhood illnesses".

Author: But the traditions of the millennial state remained. National interests remained.

Igor Ivanov: At that time, the public consciousness was euphoric with hopes for changes for the better...

Author: All this was created and fueled by the media under the primitive slogan "The West will help us".

Igor Ivanov: Not just the media. In the early nineties, it seemed to many that the West had already turned from an "enemy"into a "friend". Therefore, it was only necessary to change the political orientation, as the problems will begin to solve themselves. We hoped that the sharp liberalization of prices and the inclusion of market mechanisms in the economy would immediately improve the situation, create positive dynamics of development, and rapprochement with Western countries would mobilize massive economic support.

Author: I remember that Yegor Gaidar, when he came to Pravda as head of the economic department, said back in the 80s: "We must close our eyes and rush into the market economy." So they rushed.

Igor Ivanov: Yes, these high expectations are reflected even in the Russian foreign policy concept adopted in 1993. In the early 1990s, Russia's accelerated integration into Euro-Atlantic structures was indeed a priority. They talked about establishing "allied" relations with the West. But neither Russia nor the Western countries themselves were ready for this. We and they understood the meaning of "allied relations" differently. Many in the United States, and indeed in some Western European countries, were ecstatic about winning the Cold War. In the new Russia, they did not see an equal ally. At most, she was supposed to play the role of a junior partner. Any manifestation of independence was immediately declared a" relapse "of the Soviet "imperial" policy.

Author: The military structure of NATO was moving towards the Russian borders. The new Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev did not object to this and was ready to follow the course of Washington. It was obvious that he only reflected the views of Boris Yeltsin himself. Oral promises of Western leaders to Mikhail Gorbachev will not work.

* Igor Sergeevich Ivanov (born September 23, 1945) is a Russian statesman and diplomat. President of the Russian International Affairs Council since 2011. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (1998-2004); Secretary of the Russian Security Council (2004 - 2007). Hero of Russia (1999), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (1989). Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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NATO's push to the east was forgotten. Processes aimed at further dismemberment of Russia were encouraged by the West. One could also welcome President Boris Yeltsin's shooting down of his own parliament, and then the blatantly rigged elections.

Igor Ivanov: I would object to categorical assessments. But, of course, NATO's advance toward Russia's borders so blatantly ignored Russian national interests that it sobered many. Russian diplomacy quickly learned the proper lessons from it. The period of a clear" pro-Western " tilt in our country's foreign policy was short and superficial.

Author: Would you be able to formulate the concept of "national interests"?

Igor Ivanov: In those years, this was a topic of lively and sometimes fierce discussions. After all, our behavior in the world depended on the answer to this question. The psychology of a "superpower" was unacceptable. An exorbitant overexertion of domestic resources broke the Soviet Union. Common sense dictated that foreign policy was designed to "serve" the vital interests of domestic development. National interests required ensuring reliable security, creating the most favorable conditions for sustainable economic development, improving the living standards of the population, strengthening the unity and integrity of the country, the foundations of its constitutional order, consolidating civil society, and protecting the rights of citizens and compatriots abroad. " 3

...The author did not comment on the assessments of the respected statesman and former head of the Russian Foreign Ministry during the conversation. But I will note: these beautiful and true words, which the author himself is ready to subscribe to, faced the selfishness and even predation of the new elite, interested only in protecting and promoting their own interests. The elite ignored these important and necessary tasks concerning the country and society as a whole.

EPOCH AND PEOPLE

Politics, including international politics, is carried out by real people-they are witnesses of time, participants and eyewitnesses of events. Let's give the floor to a person who gave assessments of diplomacy in the Soviet period, and in the post-Gorbachev period was the ambassador to Kuwait, Turkey, and Israel.

The author of article 4 is interviewed by A.V. Stegny*:

"In the first days after the 1991 coup, Burbulis and Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, came to us. Burbulis spoke in our assembly hall and said that a new period is coming in the work of Russian diplomacy. First, the new Russia will need every tenth of the current Foreign Ministry staff, and, secondly, everything must be done in a new way, based on the five "D's": "kindness, integrity..."and something else along those lines.

We were taken aback. It was obvious that he didn't know what he was talking about.

The task was also announced-to turn both heads of the Russian eagle in one direction, strictly to the west.

Then we were asked if anyone wanted to speak out. A hand rises. It was our then head of the personnel Department, Alexander Avdeev.

He said: "We have seen many outstanding figures of the 20th century in this hall, but none of them allowed themselves to come to the Foreign Ministry unprepared. There are top-level professionals here, and they fought not for communist ideals, but for the interests of their country."

Burbulis was covered with red spots, the meeting quickly turned off. It was a civil act, and we all remember it.

Author: How did the Foreign Ministry generally view perestroika and the post-Gorbachev period?

Pavel Stegny: Most of the diplomats, especially the junior and middle-level ones, were ardent supporters of Gorbachev's Perestroika. Although his limited vocabulary and Stavropol sayings were disconcerting, his ideas were fresh. The head of the country, who spoke without a piece of paper, seemed like an alien from another planet... We agreed internally that democracy, as the best organization of society at the moment, is the most acceptable option for a common future, which avoids conflicts and creates a certain harmony of interests as much as possible. But it soon became clear that real politics was still dominated by individual and group interests.

Author: What was the leitmotif of the nineties?

Pavel Stegny: The Nineties were a difficult, tortuous path, but it was clear that it was necessary to go through it. At that moment, the West's policy of double standards began to rise to its full height. At a crucial turn in our recent history, in 1993, the West unanimously supported the shooting of the parliament. Then came 1996, when Yeltsin's re-election was paid for by privatizing strategic extractive industries. And then there was the crisis of 1998, when the IMF team that had advised, if not directed, our economic reforms since the Gaidar era recused itself from responsibility for its mistakes, which finally dispelled the illusions of Russia's smooth entry into the world economy.-

* Pyotr Vladimirovich Stegny (born January 14, 1945) is a Soviet and Russian diplomat, historian, and writer. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Kuwait, Director of the Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Turkey, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Israel.

** Alexander A. Avdeev (born September 8, 1946) - 1987-1990 - USSR Ambassador to Luxembourg; 1991-1992-Deputy Minister of External Relations of the USSR; 1992-1996-Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria; 1996-Deputy, October 1998-2002 - First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 2002 - 2008 - Ambassador to France; 2008 - 2012 - Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation. Since 2013 - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to the Vatican.

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the world market economy. They realized that they had gone wrong with wild capitalism, that democracy is nothing more than a tool, and that the West is playing a double game. Nevertheless, they continued to follow the democratic path, trying to adapt to global trends.

Author: And how did you view the challenges and opportunities in the Middle East in the context of all these ideas? In particular, what did we expect from the restoration of relations with Israel? What did we really get?

Pavel Stegny: First of all, the restoration of relations with Israel was seen in liberal circles in Russia as a necessary part, perhaps even a symbol of turning the course in the direction of"universal values". All this neoliberal rubbish, which we had to deal with for twenty years and still understand where the "flies" are and where the "cutlets"are. This was to some extent a symbolic step.

After 1967, during the period when we did not have diplomatic relations, we launched very serious anti-Zionist activities at the state level, and an Anti-Zionist Committee was created. This was already an ideological confrontation not just with Israel, but with the Western pyramid that was built up, in which the main component of the base was still world finance, and Jewish financial circles were seriously involved in them. This also included the mass media, where Jewish influence has always been very strong.

And now we were suggesting that we should be included in the space where politics were made, serious financial decisions were made, that is, we intended to swim back into the world community.

Author: As far as I know, Gorbachev's entourage persistently convinced him that there was an impressive force behind the Zionists and Freemasons. So he flirted with them, seeking recognition from the United States and Western Europe.

The anti-Zionist campaign was curtailed. Zionists and Freemasons were allowed to open branches in the USSR and then in Russia. The first B'nai B'rith Lodge was opened on Gorbachev's personal order in 1988, and others followed. The United Nations has repealed a well-known resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1975, which recognized Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination.

In June 1992, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was stripped of all his posts, was received at the highest level in Israel. We hoped that this way would open one of the channels through which we wanted to become part of the West, one of its constituent parts, so that we would be respected, our interests would be taken into account, although we ourselves did not understand our interests at that time.

Is this how you interpret these events?

Pavel Stegny: I think, yes, we had rather vague, completely Soviet ideas about our interests: we had quarreled, now we will put up with each other. We believed that we were still one of the two natural leaders of the world community, despite the decision to unbundling that was born in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

Author: But maybe through the restoration of relations with Israel, there was a desire to restore relations with the international Jewish elite? So that it turns from our enemy into our partner, if not an ally? So it was in the late 20s of the last century, so it was in the Second World War. We wanted to use them, and they wanted to use us...

Were these naive hopes?

Pavel Stegny: This point of view probably has a right to exist. But most importantly, we disappointed the West and our Israeli partners: we were not inclined to bargain. We were expected to make concessions, but we were still caught up in the idea of convergence. They say that the Cold War ended in a draw, we all benefited from the victory over "totalitarianism", over the communist ideology.

Author: This is a set of words, fashionable then...

P. V. Stegny: These are very serious, deep ideas.

But the next step is to make my position clear at all: From the mid-90s to the beginning of the noughties, these were attempts to adapt to the harsh realities of a one-polar world under the leadership of America.

Author: A very painful process.

Pavel Stegny: Yes, so since the noughties, or rather, since Putin's Munich speech in 2007, a different era has come. We have called for the creation of a new world order, including the idea of a multipolar world, broad cooperation, and the elimination of double standards...

Author: All this is a beautiful passion. After all, declarations and hopes are one thing, but realities are another.

P. V. Stegny: If you go back to the beginning of the 90's...

Then we realized that the Cold War was draining our economic and financial resources. There is no military solution in terms of parity. Some new rules of the game are being created, when great powers cannot, do not have the right to enter into a direct clash.

Proxy wars have spread. This is what both the Americans and we in the Middle East have been doing for an era.

But after 1991, the world was formed on the basis of ambiguity and ambiguity. The lack of agreement in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the open question of what happened, why did this geopolitical catastrophe happen, why did a huge country collapse so quickly? What is the main thing there: external influence, internal contradictions, the fifth column?.. This was a period when the West, including Israel, did not talk about its victory in the Cold War in order not to antagonize us.

In 1991, no things were called by their proper names yet. We were prisoners of Francis Fukuyama, the end of history,

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joint transition to a new quality of human community, countering universal threats. That is why we returned to the Middle East with such sentiments.

We didn't have any special expectations from the State of Israel. Israel itself was at a difficult stage of transition from romantic Zionism to harsh realism.

But we quickly realized when we got to Israel that this country on the chessboard of global politics (the image that Brzezinski likes to use) is not a king or a queen. This is a figure, I would say, of medium strength-an elephant or a horse. This feeling came to us at a fairly early stage in the recovery of our relationship. Without such an understanding of regional and global politics, it is difficult to understand the further turns of our affairs in the Middle East.

Author: Absolutely, I agree. This is our current position. But then there was an exaggerated assessment of the weight of the Jewish community in the world and an exaggerated assessment of the strength and significance of Israel. This was the time of the Madrid Conference, "Gorbachev's last tango," when a crumbling country puffed up, stood on tiptoe to pose as a superpower.

What did Israel say in response? Middle East settlement? Not at all.

Wasn't our role in this process purely decorative? With the exception of our words, initiatives, then participating in the "quartet", repeating our correct ideas about what should or should not be done, was there anything real?

Pavel Stegny: I fundamentally disagree. When we restored relations with Israel, of course, we did not mean to strengthen our positions, but rather to harmonize them in the framework of all these beautiful words about "new thinking", about "a new quality of global human society". I would single out this factor as the dominant one. We were counting on convergence.

Author: And what was our role at the Madrid Conference and after it? Or were we not needed?

Pavel Stegny: Our role was leading and comparable to the American one.

Author: You are, however, too much of an optimist.

Pavel Stegny: No, I'm a realist. In any case, in 1991 there was the logic of the Madrid Conference. This is the last thing Gorbachev did. It was a joint co-sponsorship scheme. This was an extremely serious attempt to harmonize relations in the most complex key region of the world. We worked honestly and professionally, but in the early 90's our tools became less and less effective. The computer age was beginning, and we weren't even technically armed.

But there was a completely different level of trust between us and the Americans. We were not the wingmen, they were not the leaders. But the process itself showed that we are not up to the Soviet role of a full-fledged state. The world was becoming uncontested. Only one superpower, one only possible American (Western) way of life, a Western democracy with a huge number of double standards. The left-wing alternative that was associated with us has disappeared in the world. This, of course, affected the specific performance of our functions as Middle Eastern diplomats.

Author: You yourself, to some extent, contradict yourself. On the one hand, we seem to be co-sponsors. There was a certain degree of trust in us by the Americans. On the other hand, there are realities. You are highly qualified and dedicated diplomats. But you had a collapsing country with a deteriorating economy behind you. A country that was torn apart by new forces, seized, drove hundreds of billions of dollars to the West, and corrupted society from top to bottom. This could not but affect your role!

We had a bad toolkit... What does the toolkit have to do with it? The Americans may have had poor tools-although they were good, they had power behind them. What was behind your back? Those were some damned years for us.

Pavel Stegny: I think that the difference in our perception of the 1990s is dramatic. I was inside the process. And you are a person who observed the processes, stood very close to them, but still outside the decision-making mechanism. We never had a sense of disaster in the 1990s. There were many reference points that fueled our enthusiasm.

Author: They were illusions.

Pavel Stegny: It is very good to be an intelligent and also very confident person who has seen the light after 25 years, and it seems to him that he has already seen the light on the second day after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Author: That's what I said and wrote back then. I'll give you an example. There was a meeting at the Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev sang hosanna to the West. I spoke out and said that in Africa and the Middle East, we have no Western friends and allies, but there are competitors.

Kozyrev said: "Here is an example of the old political thinking."

Some helpful foreign ministry employees stopped greeting me just in case.

P. V. Stegny: I can't say that about myself. For a significant part of the 1990s, until 1996, I didn't have a sense of disaster. I had a sense of increasing difficulties. After Kozyrev was replaced by Primakov, this increased our optimism, because we absolutely believed in Primakov...

Author: That's another matter. In our country, when the social and political essence of the state changed, some levers and gears continued to operate. In the Foreign Ministry, in the army, and in intelligence, there were many people for whom state interests still came first. They acted in accordance with these beliefs. Your posy-

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This is exactly what the problem was. Primakov's extremely important role in this was. He thought about the state interests, did a lot and tried to do even more.

But behind you, all of us, was a crumbling state, a crumbling society, betrayed by its elite, for which both the Middle East and the interests of Russia, in general, were not even in tenth place.

This is also the tragedy of the situation of those times! It is a tragedy for you, who participated in this case, and for us, who stood together, that is, scientists who somehow fussed, put forward some ideas in the interests of the country. And those who had real levers of influence and power did not care from a high tree about all these aspirations: yours-ours-others. You are trying to justify yourself - not yourself personally, but your generation.

Pavel Stegny: I'm trying to explain. We never had the feeling that there were traitors at the top. We have a feeling of great wariness and disbelief in the course of fraternization with the West: we have seen its almost double-triple-quadruple game in specific situations in the Middle East. But to bring this uncomfortable psychological state to the opinion of some kind of betrayal - this has never happened. Even a figure as characteristic of this time as Kozyrev (if you add up all the pros and cons that he practically created on the MFA path), still this figure comes out to neutral assessments.

Author: Because on the Iraqi problem, on the Iranian problem, with all his desire to reject the past, to please the Americans, he was forced to take into account the interests of his country. That is, Russia continued to be Russia and demanded some action.

Pavel Stegny: At the Foreign Ministry, we believe that if it weren't for Kozyrev, only one-tenth of the Foreign Ministry would remain. He spent a long, humiliating time explaining to Yeltsin that the potential of professionals must be preserved. And I think that this was the main task of the Foreign Ministry in those very peculiar conditions.

THE DIFFERENCE IS IN VERBS?

Author: That is, the task was to survive? How is the structure?

Pavel Stegny: No!

Author: Like what Primakov did with the intelligence service? Survive?

Pavel Stegny: No, there is a fundamental difference - you use the verb "survive", and I use the verb "save". To preserve all the positive things that we had in Soviet times - that at some stage some groups in power tried to destroy. But they were so unsure of themselves that all their decisions were half-hearted, not completed, and the potential of the Foreign Ministry was preserved thanks to Primakov, who decisively turned the course of both foreign policy and our internal feelings in general in a different direction. All this he managed to keep, I think, in full.

Author: I don't see much difference in the semantic shades of verbs.

Can you name these groups of "destroyers" now? Or will it remain "behind the scenes", in contrast to what has already been said in my previously published book, where I was able to dig up a little the relationship of the Foreign Ministry, the International Department of the Central Committee, the KGB, some ministries, the military? So can you give us an objective picture? For example, how did the history of our debts to the Gulf countries develop?

Pavel Stegny: I don't think we can talk about this yet, because...

Author: Are those people alive?

Pavel Stegny: Not only that. I, in principle, respect many who stood at the very top. I understand that they had to make compromises, possible deals with their conscience several times a day. There was a radical change in the socio-economic formation. And since we have focused on private initiative, it is very difficult to draw a line here: what was rational, what was irrational.

The operation itself is a revolution from above... It already has such a potential for immorality and anything else that, I think, now we are not yet at the historical distance to give estimates.

Someone in certain situations behaved rationally, and in others aroused well-founded suspicions about the purity of intentions. When we entered capitalism, there were such completely new things for us as "commissions" that corrupted the state apparatus. We are now openly talking about "kickbacks", about the problem of this "black" money. In the West, all this exists. In other forms, wrapped in cellophane, sanctified by centuries-old tradition.

So I don't think we can put all the dots on the "I's"here right now.

Author: Okay. By the way, Primakov in his book "Meetings at intersections" very harshly and frankly assessed the situation with corruption and talked about his attempts to limit it. Perhaps this was the main reason why Yeltsin dismissed him so quickly.

BUT YOU CAN'T INTERFERE...

Well, let it be as described by my interlocutors. Let relations with the United States and the West dominate the foreign policy thinking and activities of the Russian leadership. Officially, relations with the CIS may have been a priority, although over time there will be both successes and obvious failures.

The Russian leadership may not have been interested in the Middle East at the beginning of the 1990s, but its importance in the world and its conflict-prone potential pushed Russia first to a limited and then somewhat greater participation in the affairs of the region.

However, the situation inside Russia did not contribute to its prestige in the countries of the region. Moo-

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the Sulman mentality is alien to repentance for past sins. Self-flagellation, denial of the past, denigration of everything that was done by the Soviet Union, was perceived as an ideological striptease. For the region's leftist and anti-Western nationalist forces, this meant the collapse of their own principles and hopes. And for the diverse elites of countries, even those on opposite sides of the Cold War, it meant the bitter need to accept the United States as the undisputed hegemon.

The chaotic nature of the region has opened up opportunities for an increasingly limited Russian presence. But Moscow understood that both in the 90s and in the noughties, the United States remained the hegemon in the Middle East, although there were restrictions on their undivided influence.

"Everything that is happening there (in the Middle East - A.V.) is important for us," said Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Putin. Posuvalyuk to the editor-in-chief of "Monde diplomatique" A. Gresch. - Indeed, we are now weak, and our financial resources are limited. We can no longer give unlimited credits to our allies. We do not have a mandate from the Russian people to supply an infinite amount of weapons. But we have a number of advantages. " 5

One of these advantages was that Russia was no longer bound by the ideological framework of the 1980s.It was also not considered a destabilizing factor, since it did not preach revolution and atheism. Therefore, even on a limited scale, Russia has built a network of cooperation with all countries in the region-from Saudi Arabia to Egypt, including Israel.

Another factor-the Muslim one-has become increasingly important in shaping Russian policy in the region. Events in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf affected Russia itself (especially the North Caucasus - Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan) and the states of Central Asia. As stated by A. Gresh, one of the experts: "We thought that we could leave Central Asia in the name of our interests, but we are forced to return in the name of these same interests, because the conflicts that develop there require our attention."6

The development of political Islamism in the North Caucasus, especially in its extremist forms, was perceived by many in Moscow as a "threat", especially given the incompetence of those who made decisions or acted as political scientists. In any case, even Shiites were sometimes called "Wahhabis", not to mention those Sunnis who rejected the corrupt part of the tariqa (Sufis). The support of separatist funds and weapons by some Saudi and Turkish organizations poisoned the atmosphere of relations between Moscow and Riyadh and Ankara.

But at the same time, relations between Russian Muslims and their religious counterparts in the region were developing "normally".

"How are your muftiate's relations with his partners in Saudi Arabia developing?" - the author asked the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Sheikh R. I. Gainutdin* in his interview with him 7.

R. I. Gainutdin: "As-salamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuhu! (Peace be upon you, the mercy of God and His blessing!) As you know, the religion of Islam was brought to the city of Derbent (Dagestan) by the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). As early as the eighth century, Islam was widespread in the Volga region. For many centuries, the Turkic peoples of the Volga region and the Urals were the northernmost peoples professing Islam, but despite their geographical remoteness, they never lost their spiritual connection with the blessed lands of the Hejaz.

We are proud that in 1926 the Russian Mufti Razaetdin Fakhretdin headed the delegation of Muslim ulemas of the USSR at the World Islamic Congress in Mecca and was elected the first vice-president of the congress headed by the founding father of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Ibn Saud. It was thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy, in the person of the first plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in the Arab countries, Kerim Khakimov, who made a significant contribution to the establishment of good relations between the young Soviet Republic and the Hejaz, that our country was the first in the world to recognize the young state, which today is called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Author: Then there was a multi-year break.

R. Gainutdin: Due to the well-known historical realities, relations between our peoples have been virtually frozen for many decades. But in the early 1990s, religious freedoms were restored to the Russian people. The Council of Muftis of Russia and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European part of Russia are founders of two higher Islamic educational institutions-the Moscow Islamic University and the Russian Islamic University in Kazan.

Author: Tell us about the Hajj of Russian Muslims in a historical perspective, and what is its specifics?

R. I. Gainutdin: From time immemorial, followers of Islam living in Russia, regardless of distances, difficulties and large expenses, were in a hurry to perform the Hajj, to be mentally cleansed and earn

* Ravil Ismagilovich Gainutdinov (Sheikh Gainutdin) (born August 25, 1959) - Chairman of the Presidium of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European part of Russia, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, one of the initiators of the expansion of the historic Moscow Cathedral Mosque. Member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Full member of the World Assembly for the Rapprochement of Islamic Madhhabs. Professor of the Moscow Islamic University, International Slavic Academy, Council for Interaction with Religious Associations under the President of the Russian Federation.

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the special status of a pilgrim is "haji". Willingly or unwittingly, they contributed to the rapprochement of our Fatherland with the peoples and states of the Middle East-the Arab world. By the end of the 19th century. the number of Russian Muslims who performed the Hajj ranged from 2 to more than 5 thousand per year, and by the beginning of the XX century there were already more than 10 thousand of them. Researchers of the hajj theme believe that during the entire existence of the communist system - more than 70 years - only about 900 pilgrims were able to perform the Hajj. The most famous is the Hajj of 1945, which marked the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and the first after the bans since the late 1920s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of hajjis increased many times. So, from the 1990s to the 2000s, their number increased exponentially - from 1,500 to 10,000 per year.

There are thousands of kilometers of distance between the Arab world and Russian Muslims, we live in very different climatic and socio-political conditions, but we are united by our religion and its moral tenets. In religion, Islam is the greatest mercy of God, because it has the potential to unite people, build bridges between countries, continents, and civilizations. In developing our relationship, we must adhere to the Qur'anic message: "Hold on to the line of Allah and do not separate!". This should be especially evident in the approaches to educating the younger generation of Muslims. We must educate Muslim youth in accordance with the principles of piety, humanity, justice and law-abiding. A Muslim of the 21st century should be a man of peace and creativity!"

I will continue the topic raised by R. I. Gainutdin. In 1990, the law on freedom of conscience was adopted, which made it possible to create religious organizations, build mosques and madrasas, and publish religious literature. Religion - both Christian and Muslim - partially filled the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of communist ideology.

The Russian leadership had to take into account the feelings of its Muslim fellow citizens (approximately 17 million). The danger also lay in the fact that anti-Islamic sentiments began to grow stronger in the media. Events in Algeria, Egypt, and Bosnia, reported through the media, and the emergence of" domestic " Islamic extremists fueled anti-Muslim feelings among the Russian population, although they did not become widespread.

After 1991, Washington decided that events in the region should develop in accordance with the American understanding of strategic tasks, which required subordination of the foreign and domestic policies of the countries of the region to it. The euphoria of winning the Cold War, and the willingness of Russian diplomacy to follow Washington's course in conflict situations, seemed to make it possible to simply ignore Russia in Middle Eastern affairs. Russia, unlike the USSR, could not and did not want to take advantage of American mistakes, and the" zero-sum game " was simply not conducted.

The overall situation in the Middle East seemed to be favorable for the United States. A defeated Iraq is almost out of the game, the positions of the Arab oil states and Washington-friendly Egypt have strengthened, internal strife has intensified in the Palestinian resistance movement, and Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait has weakened the PLO's international position. The authority of the United States and NATO has grown with the strengthening of the leading role of the United States in it.

The military power demonstrated by the United States showed that, having overcome the "Vietnam syndrome", they moved to new forms and methods of war, to new weapons and informatization of combat operations. No one seemed to be able to do anything against this force. Military power was combined with "soft" power, namely, informational, economic, educational, and cultural. It seemed that no decision could be made without the consent of Washington or without taking into account its interests.

However, the dynamics of domestic events developed according to their own laws, often contrary to the interests of the United States. New conflicts and centers of power have emerged. In the region, the "Pax Americana"did not develop. Iran has challenged the United States and pitted its own interests - military, economic, technological, and religious-against it. Dictator Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq. Libya and Syria, in Washington's terminology, remained " rogue states." Terrorism has gone from being an ally of the United States in Afghanistan to a global adversary. It was in the 90s that the leadership of Al-Qaeda and its international structures were formed.

The revolutionary changes that took place in the armed forces and in the ways of warfare had their limitations. It turned out that war and the use of force cannot solve regional and global problems and determine the internal structure of states in respect of which the United States acted as the "winner". In the noughties of the twenty-first century, it will become obvious that none of the wars unleashed by the United States has led to stability and the emergence of political systems that would correspond to their messianic ideas.

Russia could not and did not want to take advantage of Washington's numerous mistakes in the region. After several years of "buildup", the emphasis began to be placed on bilateral relations, in which the economic component was the main one. At the same time, Russia was also influenced by the growing anti-Americanism of the masses and the interest of Arab leaders in Russia, at least as a symbolic counterweight to the United States.

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The "zero-sum game" has really come to an end. Russian diplomats began to talk about a" double win " (win-win), which implied positive results for both the United States and Russia.

But Washington has turned a deaf ear to calls to act together. They didn't need Russia in the Middle East. However, the formal co-sponsorship of the Madrid Conference gave hope for a "double win", i.e. for joint participation in the settlement of the "mother of all conflicts" - the Middle East.

THE MADRID PROCESS AND THE FUTURE OF THE "MOTHER OF ALL CONFLICTS"

The Madrid Conference, more precisely - the " Madrid process "(with formal co-sponsorship of the USA and the USSR/Russia), neither shakily nor valko dragged on for several years. From a technical point of view, the meeting was divided into groups that discussed bilateral issues and others related to "multilaterality". It was unrealistic to expect a breakthrough in the Middle East settlement or even any progress. From the point of view of the Israeli leadership, the only solution would be for the Arab countries to accept their demands, i.e. agree to Israeli conditions. At the opening of the conference, the Israeli government was headed by Ishaq Shamir, a fanatical supporter of the idea of a "Greater Israel".

The change of government in Tel Aviv did not seem to reflect on the main Israeli demands. Didn't Israel have a military power that the Arabs couldn't resist? Didn't he have a patron and strategic partner in the United States, the only superpower? Did not the Arabs who opposed him lose their potential or once-real patron, the Soviet Union, and in its place was left an exhausted Russia, which was actually withdrawing from the Middle East?

The only promising partner for dialogue and negotiations was the Palestinians, represented by the PLO. But the organization was still considered "terrorist" in Israel. And for the PLO, direct negotiations with the Israelis at that time meant an unacceptable concession. Although the Palestinians in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation negotiated their every move with the PLO leadership, they technically represented only themselves and had no authority to sign any agreements.

It was clear that the new Russian leadership was simply not interested in either the Middle East settlement or other matters in the region. Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev publicly rejected all the accumulated Soviet legacy, not only in relation to the Middle East, and suggested that his diplomats simply follow the course of Washington.

This attitude also became counterproductive because the US administration simply did not know what to do next, what the ultimate goal of the Madrid process was. True, for Washington, Israel remained both the main American ally in the region and a significant player in the political struggle within the United States, especially on the eve of the 1992 presidential election. Washington would like to achieve a universal settlement, peaceful solutions in order to maintain its dominance in the region, but the mutual demands of the Arabs and Israel were irreconcilable at that time.

On the one hand, the Middle East conflict in Western political science, and then in Russian, was called "asymmetric": the forces and capabilities of Israel and the PLO, formally recognized by most of the world community as the "legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine", were too unequal. But, on the other hand, it was necessary to somehow determine the fate of several million Palestinians. There was simply no place to deport them and it was physically impossible, both from the point of view of the world community, Arab countries, and the United States itself. The most that the Israeli leadership would have agreed to was the creation of a semi - autonomous Palestinian municipal administration, and the main issues - the fate of Jerusalem, the creation of a Palestinian state, its borders, and the fate of refugees-simply hung up.

But still, the PLO and the Israeli leadership, no matter which parties led it, at least began to see each other as parties to direct negotiations. The Madrid Process helped them to better understand each other's positions and develop the phrase "territories in exchange for peace". In parallel with the Madrid process, since January 1993, they have been secretly organizing meetings in Oslo with the help of Norwegian scientists and diplomats, without any Jupiter flares. In Russia, they were known about them, but they did not participate in any form.

In May 1992, after the Israeli elections, the Labor Party led by Yitzhak Rabin came to power on the basis of a shaky coalition. He needed success, even if it was purely symbolic. The Oslo talks lasted from January to August 1993.

In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn in Washington. Numerous contacts between the two sides, both open and secret, have prepared this symbolic gesture. the USSR/Russia was only involved in creating an appropriate atmosphere, but did not play a role in this meeting.

Signed by the parties-Israeli Foreign Minister Sh. The Declaration of Principles provided for elections in the West Bank and Gaza, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from parts of the occupied territories, the beginning of negotiations on the permanent status of the West Bank, and the establishment of a permanent settlement in the occupied territories.

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the Gaza Strip. These negotiations were to last two years. Permanent status-Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, borders, security measures-was supposed to be determined after another three years.

Before signing the Declaration, no symmetrical concessions were made: I. Rabin in his message to Ya. Arafat simply recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and Ya. Arafat in his message recognized Israel's right to exist, UN Security Council resolutions N 242 and 348, gave obligations to cancel the relevant articles of the National Charter, which rejected the very right of Israel to exist. existence.

The opportunity to return to the Palestinian territories was too tempting for the PLO. The Palestinians themselves, as the author was able to see, as an observer at the 1996 elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council, had bright hopes for this. But the main final status issues were postponed for more than two decades and were not resolved in 2015, i.e. after more than 20 years.

Relations between Israel and Jordan were settled with the participation of the Americans. King Hussein, as a strategically minded leader of a small state, realized that the West Bank and East Jerusalem needed to say goodbye. In July 1994, in Washington, in the presence of US President Clinton, he signed a peace agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, ending the state of war between the two countries. The peace treaty was officially signed on October 26 of the same year.

After the assassination of Rabin by an Israeli right-wing extremist, and then the rise to power of right-wing leader Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, the negotiation process was frozen. The "development" of the occupied territories and the construction of new settlements continued. Combined with the Israeli crackdown, all of this has led to the strengthening of the Islamist organization Hamas and the extreme wing of Fatah.

Russia's role in this process remained marginal, if at all. Some involvement of our country in the Middle East settlement is connected with the name of Ye. Primakov Gallery. I am convinced that this was largely his personal initiative. But when such a person found himself at the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry (in January 1996), it became Russian policy. In March 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin even participated in an international meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, and suggested reviving the Madrid process.

Primakov's new role did not arouse, to put it mildly, enthusiasm in Washington. Richard Pearl, one of the ideologues of neoconservatism, a supporter of the invasion of Iraq and, according to many in Moscow, a staunch Russophobe, wrote: "Primakov brought us back to the days of the former Gromyko. He is a man who still rejects the fact that the Soviet Union lost the Cold War. We must make it clear to the Kremlin that his appointment as foreign minister is a step backwards."8. As soon as Russia showed a little independence, American commentators began to talk about a return to the Cold War.

Too fresh, from the point of view of the American administration, were the memories of Ye's activity. Primakov during the Kuwait crisis. At that time, he spared no effort to achieve the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait by political means - this hindered the implementation of Washington's tasks aimed at a victorious war against Iraq, which the United States achieved.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ye. Primakov visited the Middle East three times in 1996 - 1997. He met not only with Arab leaders, but also with Israeli leaders. Then the head of the Party of Labor Sh. Peres spoke directly to a senior Russian official: "We only need one intermediary. It is the United States." The position voiced by Primakov-following the formula of the Madrid conference "territories for peace" and creating a Palestinian state - did not arouse any enthusiasm among the Israeli leadership.

However, Primakov's ideas about activating the Syrian track at the talks were unexpected in both Washington and Tel Aviv and aroused interest. After all, if the Syrian regime could not achieve even a bilateral settlement on its own, then it could undoubtedly prevent Israel's success in negotiations with the Palestinians. At the suggestion of Primakov, it was possible to gradually resolve the demands of Syria to return the occupied Golan Heights. His ideas were broader and covered the creation of a security system in the region in cooperation with the United States. They were not implemented 9.

Netanyahu, who won the 1996 elections and opposed the agreements reached in the Oslo process, nevertheless showed more flexibility in words and agreed with Russia's possible participation in the Middle East settlement. He paid a visit to Moscow. This allowed Russian diplomacy to define its role in the region. But its real focus at that time was far from the Middle East, particularly in the Balkans.

Arafat visited Moscow in 1997, 1998, and 2000, and several Israeli high-ranking officials also visited the Russian capital. Russian-Israeli and Russian-Palestinian committees were established at the level of deputy foreign ministers. 5 meetings were held in 1996-1999. These meetings clarified positions, but did not indicate progress.

Meanwhile, American diplomacy was active both on stage and behind the scenes. On December 14, 1998, in the presence of US President Clinton in Gaza, the Palestinian National Council voted in favor of

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Repeal of the relevant articles of the National Charter on non-recognition of Israel's right to exist, non-recognition of UN General Assembly Resolution No. 181 on the division of Palestine into two states, on Zionism as an instrument of imperialism, etc.

After receiving this decision, Netanyahu immediately put forward new demands and suspended the implementation of previous obligations. Early elections held in May 1999 brought to power the leader of the Labor Party, Ehud Barak, who tried to revive negotiations with the Palestinians through American mediation. The meetings at Camp David in July 2000, with Clinton's participation, were inconclusive, even though the Israelis believed they had made concessions.

On September 26, 2000, a new intifada began, provoked by the visit of A. Sharon to the Temple Mount - attempts by Palestinians to resort to armed actions and other violent methods against Israel based on individual terror and non-cooperation. A. Sharon won new elections in February 2001.

In December 2000, President Clinton proposed a settlement plan that gave the Palestinians many rights over the territorial issue, the status of Jerusalem,and the refugee problem. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak said on December 25 that he would accept the plan if the Palestinians did the same. But Ya. Arafat rejected it under pressure from both his own extremists and a number of Arab states. No more lucrative proposals were ever made to the Palestinians, although if they agreed to the Clinton Plan, there were too many pitfalls in its implementation to be considered realistic.10

THERE WERE WORDS. THERE WAS A "RED LINE"

The author does not see a significant role of Russia in the Middle East settlement process. But some of our diplomats - P. V. Stegny among them-strongly disagree with him11 .

Pavel Stegny: "We ended the Soviet period with the Madrid formula 'peace in exchange for land'. At the same time, Israeli-Palestinian meetings began in Oslo a short time later. Non-working structures were not destroyed, but next to them there were already working ones based on other realities. The most obvious example is the appearance of the "Seven", then for a while the "Eight", then the "Twenty" along with the current United Nations.

Much the same thing happened in the Middle East. The mechanism of the Madrid Conference continued to operate, but these channels appeared on the side, in Norway - they were associated, I think, not in vain with the left, that is, with the marginal part of Israeli society, but then they came to very serious agreements. They brought the Israeli and Palestinian positions much closer together, and all this culminated in a very creative work by Clinton at the turn of the century. During this period and up to the beginning of the Netanyahu era, the second coming of Netanyahu, Israel associated our role in the Middle East settlement with "multilateralism", with the fact that we would play a crucial role in launching the process of normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world. And I have heard this repeatedly from very serious people.

Author: That was good to hear. But they were words...

P. V. Stegny: They weren't just words. We considered serious schemes, held meetings in Moscow to prepare the "multilateral framework". It was an understanding that didn't always make it to the newspaper pages, but was present in professional work quite seriously.

But subsequent failures are difficult to explain. The memoirs published later did not explain them either. I really hope that Ehud Barak will write something after leaving politics.

Israel could have secured internationally recognized borders, agreed to create a de facto demilitarized Palestinian State, maintained its presence on the border with Jordan, and symbolically solved the problem of refugee returns. Back then, the Israeli elite had a certain concept. East Jerusalem will have to be given to the Palestinians.

Author: Eastern or some other districts?

Pavel Stegny: Several districts, of course. But starting from the Old Town. The problem of the Old City and the Temple Mount, of course, was unsolvable. It derailed all attempts to negotiate. This was an absolutely pivotal issue, no matter what anyone said about it. Because for Israelis, how they differ from everyone else, nation and religion are one and the same, they are two elements that are inextricably linked.

Author: American Jews don't have that. There are both of them.

P. V. Stegny: There are complex processes there."

Taking into account that the Middle East settlement (STB) remained frozen in the zero and tenth years of the XXI century, let's look ahead a bit when assessing Israeli-Palestinian relations. In February 2001, Sharon became Prime Minister and launched a crackdown on the Palestinian uprising. They led to some Israeli successes, but pushed a significant part of the Palestinians towards extremism, personal terrorism. The hatred on both sides was mutual and overwhelming.

The Oslo Process ended in bloodshed, and new methods of communication were needed. In May-June 2002, the United States, together with Russia, the United Nations and the European Union, created the so - called "quartet" - a quartet of mediators in the Middle East settlement process and adopted a "Road Map" developed mainly by the Americans. The final destination of the movement was

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it indicates the creation of a Palestinian State without defining its framework, borders and powers.

The author clarified Russia's position on STDs at that time personally with E. M. Primakov 12:

"Of course, you know the STB issues better than anyone else. Is it possible to say that we actually could not influence the process, we no longer had any leverage?

Yevgeny Primakov: What period do you mean?

Author: Yes, anyone. And the 90s, and the first decade of this century, and even the last years. Well, there is a Road Map. Well, there is this "four". But we were cut off from influencing the process by both the Israelis and the Americans.

Yevgeny Primakov: Of course, the real levers were in the hands of the Americans. If they had forced Israel to compromise, because the Arabs made a serious compromise, there would have been a result. But the Americans did not cross a certain "red line".

..Meanwhile, the Israeli leadership followed its own logic. It decided to separate itself from the Palestinians by withdrawing from the Gaza enclave and several settlements in the West Bank and building a separation wall between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank.

In June 2004, the Israeli Cabinet approved Prime Minister Sharon's plan to withdraw from Gaza, evacuate 8,000 settlers, and evacuate four settlements in the northern West Bank. This was done despite the resistance of even Sharon's supporters in the right-wing political sector.

The policy of" unilateral secession " was continued by Prime Minister Olmert. This policy showed that the Israeli leadership was abandoning the task of" digesting " all the territories occupied in 1967, along with their Arab population. But the construction of Israeli settlements in areas that the Israelis did not intend to give up continued, making it impossible for the Palestinians to participate in the farcical negotiations.

P. V. Stegny13: "There was a chance for some kind of harmonization of all approaches to the problems of the Middle East. It was not implemented solely through the fault of Israel and the powerful global structures that patronize it. A huge number of mistakes were also made by the Palestinians - not signing the documents proposed by Clinton in 2000 and further in 2001. But Olmert, as Prime Minister, proposed, according to current concepts, an ideal solution to all four basic problems of the Middle East settlement. Negotiations in Oslo have already ended. This was already Olmert's talks with Mahmoud Abbas in 2009. But the Oslo process gave some impetus. This included both Sharon's "disengagement" in the West Bank and withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. This gave us chances. And they were not used again.

I have asked both Mahmoud Abbas and many other Palestinian figures: why did you do this? Every time you didn't sign what the Americans offered you, and with them the international community, each subsequent option was worse. And it was clear that there would be a worse option after that. You've stumbled over this several times. Under Olmert, it was only about 5-6% of the territories that you gave away without adequate compensation. I saw the map with my own eyes."

Looking ahead in our narrative, we note that the United States, passionate about the task of "spreading democracy", which supposedly should solve all the problems of the region, put forward a plan for its implementation in the Arab countries of the "Greater Middle East" and later - the "New Middle East". What this could lead to was shown by the victory of the radical Hamas movement in democratic elections in the Palestinian territories, including the Gaza Strip, in 2006. This promised an even more serious defeat of "democratization" in the years of "Arab Fitna "(another name for the"Arab Spring").

More on this later. Note only that the Hamas organization itself was created in 1987, not without the encouragement of the Israeli special services, who set out to undermine the dominant role of Fatah and the PLO.

Corruption in the PLO's traditional leadership, lack of progress in negotiations, and the bloodshed of the intifada all contributed to Hamas ' success. But after gaining control of Gaza, Hamas members repeatedly fired mines and rockets into Israel, prompting a disproportionately harsh response from the Israeli army.

(The ending follows)

1 Interview with E. M. Primakov, January 2014

2 Cit. by: Ivanov I. New Russian diplomacy. Ten years of the country's foreign policy. Moscow, OLMA-PRESS, 2001, p. 4. (Ivanov I. 2001. Novaya rossiyskaya diplomatiya ... M.) (in Russian)

3 Interview with I. S. Ivanov, September 2014

4 Interview with P. V. Stegnii, September 2014

Alain Gresh. 5 Russia's Return to the Middle East. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 28, No. 1 (Autumn, 1998), p. 70.

6 Ibid., p. 76.

7 Interview with Ravil Gainutdin, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, June 2013

Alain Gresh. 8 Op. cit., p. 68.

9 See for more details: Zvyagelskaya I. The Middle Eastern clinch. Conflicts in the Middle East and Russian Politics, Moscow, Aspect Press, 2014, pp. 176-177. (Zvyagelskaya I. 2014. Blizhnevostochnyi klinch... М.) (in Russian)

10 Ibid., p. 177.

11 Interview with P. V. Stegnii...

12 Interview with E. M. Primakov...

13 Interview with P. V. Stegnii...

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