Ankara in the South Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian War

The South Caucasus graphically illustrates the theory of the cyclic development of history. Once every 100 years, the region becomes a scene of clashes between great powers that seek to change the alignment of forces there. For example, at the beginning of the 19th century, St. Petersburg [Russia's capital at the time -- Ed.] took control of the region and incorporated it in the Russian Empire. At the dawn of the 20th century, Russia neutralized the British Empire's efforts to extend its own influence to the South Caucasus. Finally, in the 2000s, Moscow has been opposing similar attempts of the United States. The active phase of the revision of the boundaries of zones of interest usually lasts 20 to 25 years.

The five-day war in the Caucasus in August 2008 was the culmination of a long period of heightening tensions -- not only between Russia and Georgia but also, as many believe (not without reason), between Moscow and Washington. The war has produced a new situation, which requires a comprehensive analysis of the roles of other regional actors, above all Turkey.

A NEW GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The Georgian-Russian war not only gave rise to open manifestations of the positional struggle between Moscow and Washington for influence in the Caucasus (suffice it to analyze statements of Russian and U.S. high-ranking officials during and immediately after the conflict). Also, the war became a momentous event as it caused other countries to revise

Tigran Torosyan was the Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia in 2006-2008. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science.

Russia's role in world politics, the practice of conflict management, and other factors.

Paradoxically, the outcome of the fighting can be viewed as advantageous to all the participants in the events.

Georgia has "disburdened" itself of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as the unsettlement of the dead-end conflicts with them stood in the way of its NATO membership. In the eyes of many, Tbilisi has become a symbol of self-sacrifice for the interests of the West, and thus it has enlisted international support for itself as a victim of "Russian imperialism." Whatever the attitude of the world's capitals towards Mikheil Saakashvili personally, they cannot now deny Georgia their assistance for either political or moral reasons.

As a result of the armed conflict, Russia has "acquired" Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has laid a claim to a new role in global processes, while the destruction of Georgia's military infrastructure has significantly postponed its admission to the North Atlantic Alliance.

Finally, the United States has "obtained" a Georgia that is no longer overburdened with "frozen conflicts" to establish itself in the South Caucasus.

Of course, formalizing the new geopolitical status quo will require some time and effort. In particular, one will have to find an acceptable compromise between statements about respect for the principle of territorial integrity and the actual application of nations' right to self-determination by the superpowers; but this seems to be feasible.

After the August war, Russia's relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey developed in an interesting way. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave a landmark interview in this respect to Rossiiskaya Gazeta (October 7, 2008). Immediately after Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he hastened to say that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be considered separately, as in case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ethnic cleansing, war crimes and attempted genocide took place.

The minister certainly remembers about the Nagorno-Karabakh war, unleashed by Azerbaijan, and about pogroms and ethnic cleansings. He also knows that, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. But after Russia's

and the United States' attitudes to the practice of proclaiming new states made a U-turn within just a few months between the recognition of the independence of Kosovo and then Abkhazia and South Ossetia, such metamorphoses are not surprising.

After the "loss" of Georgia, Russia's hypersensitivity to Azerbaijan is understandable, because in case of a "loss" of Baku Moscow will lose not only the ability to control the transportation of Azerbaijani energy resources but also the chances to extend its influence south of the Caucasus. A similar situation may also arise if Armenian-Russian relations change, but Lavrov apparently views such a turn of events as incredible, since "Armenia is having big difficulties in communicating with the outside world."

The minister emphasized that there are "few geographic and political options" in the current situation. "As soon as the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia establish normal ties with the outside world," Lavrov said. He pointed out that there remain two or three unresolved issues which need to be agreed to settle the conflict, above all the Lachin corridor issue. The hint, coming from the mouth of the seasoned diplomat, is more than clear: Address these two or three issues in a way acceptable to your neighbors and you will get a lifeline from Turkey.

But why is the Russian foreign minister pushing Armenia into Turkey's arms? Does he really believe in the Ankara's "traditional policy line towards ensuring the right of countries in the region to an independent search for solutions to problems of the Caucasus and adjacent regions"? Or does he believe in the future of Turkey's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact? Not at all. Moscow certainly knows that this is much the same bluff as the program of proliferating the Communist ideology in the East through Turkey in former times.

The idea of curtsying to Ankara is fairly simple. Turkey has unresolved problems with Armenia which is greatly influenced by Russia. Russia has serious interests in Azerbaijan which is greatly influenced by Turkey. The solution of Turkish problems does not run counter to the interests of Russia, and the solution of Russian problems does not run counter to the interests of Turkey. In other words, Russia and Turkey have a real opportunity to find common ground based on mutual interests.

These frameworks of relations harmoniously combine the July agreement to sell Russia Azerbaijani gas, a simultaneous proposal to Ankara for participating in Russia's South Stream gas project, and the demand of Turkey -- as a transit state -- for a fair share of gas from the Nabucco project (an alternative to South Stream). Although Ankara has finally given up its claim to 15 percent of Nabucco gas (that would have made the project unprofitable and hardly feasible), the gas sharing issue has not been resolved and promises great difficulties in the future.

A disruption of the balance in the region would obviously pose a real threat to the deepening of Russian-Turkish relations. For example, it could hamper the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the near future, as either party (Armenia or Azerbaijan) would remain dissatisfied with any outcome, which would cause it to seek closer relations with the West ("Georgia-2" model). It is not accidental that the U.S. does not conceal its strong interest in settling Armenian-Turkish relations and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The fact of the conflict's settlement or at least a break from the status quo would be much more important for it than the mechanism or outcome of this process.

The continued U.S. presence, an unprecedented activeness of the EU, and another Russian-Turkish rapprochement -- these are the main components of the process of redrawing the strategic landscape of the South Caucasus.

THE PLANS AND ROLE OF TURKEY IN THE REGION

Turkey has never concealed its desire to dominate the South Caucasus. As a columnist of the Turkish newspaper Today's Zaman, MÜmtazer TÜrkÖne, wrote on May 22, 2009, the Turkish Army played a crucial role in shaping the current borders of Azerbaijan. In 1918, when Turkey itself struggled for the preservation of its statehood, it sent an army, led by Nuri Pasha, not only to Baku but also to Nagorno-Karabakh in order to bring it under Azerbaijan's control by force. Turkey also played a decisive role when the future of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh was decided in Moscow in 1921. Turkish politicians understood very well the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh for the distribution of zones of influence in the region.

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first attempt by Ankara to broaden its geopolitical presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus failed. The failure in Central Asia was due to Turkey's limited economic potential, whereas in the South Caucasus it was due to the crude methods used by Turkey. For example, during the Nagorno-Karabakh war (the early 1990s), Turkey tried to exert pressure on Armenia by moving its troops close to the Armenian border several times. The threat did not produce the desired result, and in 1993 Turkey joined the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan, which continues to this day.

Another attempt at an "offensive" was prepared more thoroughly and included actions on several vectors.

The first vector was European integration. Taking avail of the new stage in the EU enlargement, which involved countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey tried to implement its dream of the 1960s and achieve rapprochement with the EU. Although the European institutions have repeatedly emphasized the importance of relations with Ankara, the principled position of some EU members (especially France) has become an insurmountable obstacle, and Turkey remains outside the EU enlargement. In addition to many formal criteria, the EU has announced a set of painful conditions that Turkey must fulfill to join the European Union -- these concern the reunification of Cyprus, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, and the lifting of the Turkish blockade of Armenia.

The second vector was active participation of Turkey in all significant regional economic projects. Turkey has markedly improved its relations with Georgia and has been making great efforts to develop and implement oil and gas projects, specifically the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, and Nabucco. Ankara has also played a major role in attracting funds for the economically unjustified Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railway project.

By the beginning of the August war, Ankara had already prepared solid ground for basically new political initiatives. When the war began, Turkey proposed a Security and Cooperation Platform for the region. Interestingly, Turkey demonstratively held the first discussion of this idea with Russia, without prior consultations with the United States.

Theoretically, the Platform is attractive in terms of regional stability and the security of the transportation of Caspian energy resources to Europe. However, it is unfeasible in practice, as Georgia has refused to participate in the discussion of this idea before its relations with Russia are settled and because of Washington's cold attitude towards the idea that problems of the Caucasus should be addressed by the states of the region, i.e. without U.S. participation.

The idea has no prospects, primarily because it lacks principles and values that would unite the countries of the region. In addition, Turkey's sincerity about the settlement of regional problems raises doubts as it has serious problems in relations with Armenia. On the other hand, Turkey has a gift for implementing unfeasible ideas.

ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS

After Turkey joined the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan in 1993, it set preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening the border with it. To this end, Yerevan needed to do the following:

• give up seeking international recognition of the genocide;

• recognize the borders of Turkey;

• withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and return to Azerbaijan territories adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

For 15 years, Armenia's position was steadfast: diplomatic relations must be established and the border must be opened without any preconditions, after which the parties could discuss any issues. Several attempts to bring the parties' positions closer at confidential meetings failed. In summer 2008, the newly elected president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, made an unusual move -- he invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to visit Armenia to watch a qualifying football match between the two countries for the 2010 World Cup finals. The invitation was accepted a few days before the match, in late August.

Many analysts pointed out, not without reason, that the Turkish president accepted the invitation due to the aggravation of the situation in the Caucasus following the Georgian-Russian war, and to Ankara's desire to promote the above-mentioned Security and Cooperation Pact for the region.

The visit won international attention and approval, despite its modest results -- the two presidents only made a statement on the need to normalize bilateral relations. However, Ankara immediately began to use Gul's visit to Yerevan, which lasted only a few hours, as the main argument in its proactive foreign policy in all major areas. It used the situation to enhance its role in the region, to consolidate its positions on the world stage (in particular with regard to elections of non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, the EU enlargement, etc.), to improve its relations with Russia and the United States, and to prevent new cases of recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

It was certainly clear that real success in settling the Armenian-Turkish relations could be achieved only by overcoming obvious differences in the parties' positions. There followed meetings of the countries' foreign ministers and confidential discussions of outstanding issues at the level of working groups. Simultaneously, Yerevan repeatedly declared that the negotiations were conducted without preconditions, whereas Ankara used flexible role-distribution tactics.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan made optimistic statements; President Gul spoke about Ankara's determination to overcome regional differences, including those in Turkish-Armenian relations; while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly said that the differences would be settled after the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A skilful combination of these tactics with information leaks and the organization of public unrest in Turkey and Azerbaijan over the settlement process let Ankara show both signs of progress at the negotiations and its determination to preserve the "pre-football match" positions. Another factor that played into Turkey's hands was that Armenia actually froze its efforts to seek international recognition of the genocide.

This process lasted seven months until the morning of April 23, 2009, when the foreign ministries of Armenia and Turkey and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland made a joint statement in Geneva.

ROAD MAP - THE END OF THE FIRST STAGE

Every year, on April 24, Armenia and many other countries honor the memory of the victims of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire

(1894-1923). It has long been a tradition for U.S. presidents to address Armenian-Americans with a statement condemning those events.

When a senator, Barack Obama repeatedly used the word "genocide" when speaking about those events. During his presidential campaign, he promised to Armenian-American voters that he would not change his assessment after his election as president; so his 2009 statement was expected with a special interest. During Obama's visit to Turkey in early April, one of the American journalists who accompanied the president asked him a question about Armenian-Turkish relations, using the word "genocide." The U.S. president said that he had not changed his point of view on those events and that he hoped for a settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations.

A day before the Remembrance Day, on the eve of Obama's statement, the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers made the aforementioned statement, which says that Armenia and Turkey "have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road map has been identified." The statement and the two countries' decision not to publish the road map caused mistrust for this process in the two countries and heightened tensions in Armenia's relations with the Armenian diaspora. While the holding of secret discussions and negotiations is understandable and acceptable, a decision not to publish the agreed documents is contrary to the protocol and tradition. Contrary to the expectations, President Obama did not mention the word "genocide" in his Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day statement.

The April 23 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers marked the end of the first stage in the regional redistribution of roles. During that period, Yerevan performed the function of an indispensable partner playing up to Turkey (the initiation of the "football diplomacy," agreement to participation in the discussion of Turkey's Security and Cooperation Platform which has no prospects, the ignoring of Prime Minister Erdogan's statements that clearly ran counter to the purpose of settlement, etc.). But Armenia has received nothing for that.

In contrast, for Turkey, which has extensive experience in using simulation processes, this stage ended with significant achievements:

• the process of recognition of the Armenian Genocide was frozen;

• the newly elected U.S. president did not use the word "genocide" in his April 24 statement;

• relations between the Armenian authorities and the Armenian diaspora are marked by unprecedented tensions;

• Turkey has been elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council;

• Turkish influence on regional processes has markedly increased;

• Turkey's relations with Russia, the United States and the European Union have improved dramatically.

The appointments of Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister on foreign policy Ahmet Davutoglu to the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, respectively, were a symbolic ending to the first stage in the redistribution of roles in the region. It immediately became clear that the differences in public statements of the prime minister, the president and the foreign minister were used to simulate the role of the creator of a regional security and cooperation system.

PROSPECTS

Now, from these new positions, Turkey is entering the second stage in the strategic redrawing of the South Caucasian political landscape. Ankara understands that the region is of strategic importance for the Turkish statehood, and that its absence in it, as was the case in the times of the Soviet Union, would be a serious challenge in the future. Therefore, Turkey is now seeking to diversify and upgrade its instruments of influence on processes under way in the South Caucasus and other regions, where Russia and the United States have dominant interests.

There are now good prerequisites for achieving this goal. Turkey has been elected to the UN Security Council, which has added political weight to it. Also, it can use differences among the EU member states over its EU membership prospects to receive huge "compensatory" benefits. Turkey's participation in competing energy transportation projects (Nabucco and South Stream) gives it room for maneuver. Finally, its attempts to mediate in the Middle East settlement are very noticeable, considering the impact this conflict has on global politics.

However, Turkey will have to accomplish difficult tasks in order to effectively use its achievements.

First, an excessive rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Russia is not in Ankara's interests, because it may reduce its role in the two countries' relations.

Second, Turkey will tacitly support efforts to prevent an early settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict according to the U.S. scenario, because its settlement would narrow Ankara's range of influence.

Third, Turkey is interested in maintaining the stagnant state of the process of "settling" relations with Armenia for as long as possible in order to neutralize negative components of its own foreign-policy image.

The Erdogan government is faced with difficult problems beyond the South Caucasus region. There is a growing discontent among Turkey's top military brass about the domestic policy of the pro-Islamic government. Ankara has not yet resolved the Kurdish issue, exacerbated by the existence and development of a prototype of Kurdish statehood in Iraq. This means that prospects for the extension of Turkish influence to the South Caucasus are unclear.

Much will depend on the positions of the two superpowers which have strategic interests in the region -- Russia and the United States. So far, Moscow and Washington have been encouraging Ankara. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in early July after a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu: "Turkey and Russia are playing the most active roles in the South Caucasus." At about the same time, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza, responding to a request by Greek Cypriot officials to put pressure on Ankara, said: "We can't do that, they are super power in the region. We could do that in the 70s, 80s, and the beginning of the 90s, but now we can't."

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