The personality of General of Infantry and General of Artillery Alexey Petrovich Ermolov has always aroused special interest. The explanation is simple. Ermolov rightfully occupies a worthy place in the cohort of the most famous military figures of the glorious era of the Patriotic War of 1812, foreign campaigns of 1813-1814, and military operations in the Caucasus from 1816 to 1827. His military biography is a rich material that helps to determine the place and role of this military leader in the history of Russia. No matter how many trials and difficulties fell to his lot, no matter how hard and cruel fate treated him, Ermolov always remained a man of unshakeable loyalty to military duty, a model of courage and perseverance.

One of the most striking pages of Alexey Petrovich's life is his activities in the Caucasus. After many brilliant victories, in June 1816, he was appointed commander of a Separate Georgian (since August 1820, Caucasian) corps and manager of the civilian part in Georgia, Astrakhan and Caucasian provinces. At the same time, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to Persia.

At that time, the Caucasus was considered a semi-savage remote region, and service there was not very attractive to many. But Yermolov accepted the assignment there with pleasure: Alexey Petrovich saw service in this region as more useful for the Fatherland. Here he could put his tireless energy and outstanding organizational skills to use. "I have always been extremely desirous of this appointment," wrote Yermolov, " and even then, as a matter of rank, I could not have had the right to do so." Unlike his predecessors, Alexey Petrovich developed a coherent system of gradual movement into the depths of mountainous regions, slow but reliable development of the Caucasian lands and attracting the peoples inhabiting them to the side of Russia. Instead of persuading and bribing representatives of the local nobility, a significant part of which was hostile to Russia, Ermolov pursued a firm but honest policy towards it.

The main condition for successful implementation of the planned activities

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Ermolov considered the transfer of the existing Russian fortified line, which took place in hot and unhealthy places for the troops, to the very foot of the Caucasus Mountains, where " abundant forests will provide a means to replace the current huts of soldiers with profitable dwellings...". Since the mountaineers carried out their raids from villages inaccessible to Russian troops, Ermolov with the aim of penetrating deep into the mountain regions as well as their dismemberment and blocking, deforestation was used for the first time. Due to the lack of forces and resources, he was not able to conduct operations in several areas at once, so he was forced to limit himself to actions in any one direction, depending on its importance.

Operating with success in the Eastern Caucasus and Kabarda, Yermolov failed to achieve peace in the Western Caucasus: the Circassian peoples living south of the Kuban River were considered, albeit nominally, Turkish subjects. Turkey, having strong fortresses in the Black Sea region of the Caucasus - Anapa and Sunjuk-Kale, pursued a hostile policy towards Russia and secretly encouraged mountain raids into Russian borders. Under these conditions, neither the transfer of the Black Sea Army of up to 40 thousand people under Yermolov's command in December 1819, nor his campaigns in the Trans-Kuban lands, in particular in Abkhazia, led to the establishment of calm in the Kuban.

Summing up the results of Yermolov's military activities in the Caucasus in the period 1816-1827, it should be recognized that, despite the lack of forces and resources, he managed to ensure reliable communication between Russia and its Transcaucasian regions and the security of the lands of the region.

Throughout the entire time of command of the corps, Yermolov preserved in the subordinate troops the traditions of Suvorov and Kutuzov - a kind, fair attitude to the soldier and the rules established during the Patriotic War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns of 1813-1814. In the army corps, among his "comrades in the service", as Ermolov wrote in the orders, he enjoyed a well-deserved love.

Reporting to Tsar Alexander I about his plans for the future, Ermolov wrote:: "I will arrange barracks instead of murderous dugouts, hospitals, infirmaries... I will destroy many of the posts where the appointment of officers and soldiers is a death sentence for them..." Alexey Petrovich forbade exhausting the troops with front-line (from the word "front", meaning "formation") exercises, introduced changes in the form of clothing in relation to the conditions of the Caucasus: he allowed them to wear papakhs and mutton hats instead of uncomfortable and heavy shakos; instead of bulky ones satchels - small canvas bags that served soldiers on the campaign at the same time as pillows; in winter, instead of overcoats - sheepskin coats, etc.

He had every reason to say: "I have a soldier who believes that he is my comrade!" Raised by Yermolov in the spirit of Suvorov traditions, the troops of the Separate Caucasian Corps subsequently showed examples of conducting military operations in difficult mountain conditions and stood out for their combat capability among other troops of the Russian army.

At the same time, when necessary, Yermolov was a supporter of harsh measures and held the opinion that "one execution could save hundreds of Russians from death and thousands of Muslims from treason." Yermolov applied these harsh measures mainly against traitors who were in contact with the Persians or Turks, and robbers who committed devastating predatory attacks on the villages of Russians and mountaineers who accepted the patronage of Russia. "It is not difficult to punish," he wrote to Zakrevsky, " but according to my rule, it is necessary that the most extreme should compel it."

Alexey Petrovich always strove for justice. He adhered to the same principle with regard to prisoners, demanding "to inspire the troops to spare those who do not defend themselves or even throw down weapons without fail." It is no accident that Yermolov's contemporaries wrote: "It is in vain that they say about Alexey Petrovich that he was cruel, this is not true. But he was reasonably strict."

It was widely practiced by him to train the sons of local residents of the Caucasus in the cadet corps of Russia. Young children of mountaineers were sent for upbringing to military orphanages, from where they entered service in regiments located in the outback of Russia.

This fact is also important. Thanks to Yermolov's efforts, an officer's club with a rich library was opened in Tiflis.

Under Yermolov, significant road construction was carried out, new communication routes were opened, including the Imereti Military Road from Kutaisi to Tiflis and the road between the Transcaucasian Muslim provinces and Dagestan; the road from Georgievsk to Ekaterinodar via Malaya Kabarda was restored. The establishment of a system of military posts along the roads, especially on the Georgian Military Road, has significantly increased the security of communications. There was no need to assign strong convoys to escort transports... The opening of new communication routes required the construction of a significant number of bridges and other road structures.

Yermolov had to perform a large and multifaceted work in the Caucasus in the face of all sorts of obstacles that numerous ill-wishers caused him. Most often, conflicts arose with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the person of K. F. Nesselrode, whom Yermolov called "the minister of non-Russian affairs" for ignoring the state interests of Russia, and with the exarch of Georgia Theophylact - "a snitch, spy and spiritual channel", as Yermolov wrote about him.

Alexey Petrovich's work was also complicated by the fact that in the early 1920s, new people appeared in the state administration of Russia, including in the military department, who were not particularly disposed to him. So, his friend General A. A. Zakrevsky was appointed Governor-General of Finland, and General I. I. Dibich, the future count and field marshal, became the chief of the General staff instead of General P. M. Volkonsky, with whom Yermolov had established good relations since the Patriotic War of 1812. The attitude towards Yermolov changed on the part of Alexander I, whose view of appeasing the highlanders only by humane methods put Yermolov in an extremely difficult position.

Clearly realizing that his activities in the Caucasus were no longer approved in St. Petersburg, Ermolov wrote:: "I'm not joking about waiting for a shift, which, perhaps, is why I need to give a place to one of the clients of powerful people!" Events that took place in Russia in November-December 1825,

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fully confirmed the assumptions of Ermolov. Only the war delayed them somewhat.

Iran began preparing for it in 1821-1823. The Shah's government was only waiting for the right moment for the return of the Azerbaijani khanates. The failure of the previous war forced the Shah to take a number of measures to improve the Iranian army with the help of British officers. Quite modern armed forces were created.

The Iranian government has repeatedly demanded a revision of the borders defined by the Gulistan Treaty. For the first time, claims were made to Transcaucasia in 1815, that is, immediately after the conclusion of the Anglo-Iranian treaty. However, the Russian government strongly rejected these demands.

In addition, Iran evaded border demarcation until the return of Northern Azerbaijan to it. Especially important was the Shuragel Khanate, which was part of it. It was a natural springboard for the offensive of the Iranian troops. The issue of border demarcation was the most important subject of negotiations conducted on behalf of the Russian government by A. P. Ermolov with Abbas Mirza in 1817-1826. During these meetings, the Shah of Iran closely followed the development of Russian-Turkish relations, seeking to take advantage of the contradictions between the two countries.

In 1825, a tense international situation developed and an internal crisis matured in Russia, which ended with the Decembrist uprising. Iran perceived this as the most favorable moment to act against Russia and began to openly prepare for war.

Alexey Petrovich warned the tsar that war was inevitable, and demanded that additional troops be sent to the Caucasus. However, Nicholas I, who suspected Yermolov of involvement in the Decembrist movement, did not dare to increase the armed forces under the command of the governor in the Caucasus. The tsar directed him to settle relations with Iran.

Considering Yermolov incapable of maintaining peaceful relations with Iran, the tsar sent Prince A. S. Menshikov to Tehran, instructing him to ensure peace at any cost, even through some territorial concessions. Following this, General Paskevich arrived in the Caucasus as Yermolov's assistant. He was preparing to remove the latter from the Caucasus.

With the arrival of Paskevich, who was invested with very broad powers, disagreements arose between the two generals on the plan of conducting the war, which led to an aggravation of their relations.

Nicholas I sent his confidant, General I. I. Dibich, Chief of the General Staff, to the Caucasus, authorizing him in advance, if he saw fit, to remove Yermolov. According to Dibich, neither Yermolov nor Paskevich could remain in the Caucasus, but knowing the emperor's dislike for Yermolov, Dibich tried to persuade the latter to voluntarily submit a request for dismissal.

Yermolov wrote a letter to Nicholas I asking for his dismissal "from the command of the Caucasian Corps." However, even before receiving this letter, Nikolai 1 ordered Dibich to immediately announce Yermolov's dismissal.

Yermolov's closest collaborators in the Caucasus - the chiefs of staff of the Caucasian Corps A. A. Velyaminov, V. G. Madatov, V. O. Bebutov, A. G. Chavchavadze and others were not only his friends, but also like-minded people. After the resignation of their boss, they shared his fate. "I authorize you," Nicholas I wrote to I. I. Dibich, " to remove Madatov, Velyaminov, in a word, all persons whom you consider harmful."

The removal of Yermolov from the Caucasus and his dismissal in the full prime of life from the service caused strong discontent in society. Nicholas 1 was, of course, well aware of the public reaction to Yermolov's resignation, and the government's condemnation for its unwillingness to return such a prominent military commander and statesman to service.

The emperor himself, through his trusted representatives, made an attempt to attract Yermolov to the service, and at the same time was very merciful to him. On November 13, 1831, Alexey Petrovich was appointed a member of the State Council.

The beginning of the Crimean War did not come as a surprise to him. Knowing the weaknesses of the Nikolaev monarchy, Yermolov predicted the possibility of its unsuccessful outcome long before the war. "It is fortunate that there is no European war," he wrote, well aware of the country's insufficient preparation for a clash with a strong enemy.

In connection with the difficult situation in the Crimea, on January 29, 1855, Nicholas I issued a manifesto on the general state militia. Despite the fact that Ermolov is in this

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Vremya was already 78 years old, and he was almost unanimously elected head of the militia in seven provinces: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Smolensk, Kaluga, Pskov, Novgorod and Ryazan. Yermolov was only four months in the post of head of the militia, but even in this short time he managed to do a lot of work.

Yermolov enjoyed a well-deserved respect and love in various strata of Russian society. The rich literature about him also serves as proof of the wide interest in his personality. In addition to works specifically devoted to Yermolov, mention of him and his multifaceted activities is found in many scientific works, literary works, collections of documents, almost all works related to the Patriotic War of 1812 and foreign campaigns of 1813-1814, as well as the history of the Caucasus in the first third of the XIX century.

Yermolov himself did a great job as a memoirist. Already during his stay in the theater of military operations in the Maritime Alps in 1795, during the war between the Austrians and the French, Alexey Petrovich kept a journal of military operations, in which he subtly noticed the positive and negative aspects of the troops, and made very instructive conclusions. Yermolov collected extensive material about the Patriotic War of 1812, about the period of foreign campaigns in 1813-1814, about his diplomatic activities in Persia in 1817 and his stay in the Caucasus from 1816 to 1827.

Unfortunately, there are still no sufficiently complete and thorough scientific works on Yermolov's military and state activities, written not from the positions rooted in Soviet times, but from the positions of truth and objectivity.

The memory of the outstanding Russian general of infantry and general of artillery, a military leader who glorified the Motherland with his military exploits, will always live among the people. Yermolov's name once again finds a halo of glory, because it is inseparable from the history of Russia, from its heroic achievements.

Oleg SARIN, Candidate of Historical Sciences

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